The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast Ep. 221: Functionalist Theories of Mind (Putnam, Armstrong) (Part Two)
Jul 22, 2019
A deep dive into Armstrong's causal-functional account of mental states and how they might map onto brain processes. The conversation probes whether dispositions, purposes, and perceptions can be defined by causal roles alone. They wrestle with secondary qualities like color, the limits of functional description for pain and pleasure, and how philosophy can or cannot prepare the ground for science.
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Making Materialism Intelligible
- Armstrong argues a correct analysis of mental concepts makes identifying mental with physical brain states intelligible.
- He treats mental states as forms realized by physical substrates, not mysterious nonphysical substances.
Mental States As Dispositional Roles
- Mental states are dispositional causal roles linking perceptions, beliefs, desires and behaviors within a nexus.
- This view preserves internal mental relations while explaining outward behavior without reducing mind to mere outputs.
Dispositions Link Concepts And Science
- Armstrong's causal account admits both active and passive dispositional properties, enabling empirical discovery of underlying bases.
- This bridges conceptual analysis and scientific investigation of mental phenomena.
