Continuing on functionalism with David M. Armstrong's "The Causal Theory of the Mind" (1981). Your four hosts start afresh the day after Part One on Putnam to discuss this version of functionalism that is supposed to clear the way for the scientific identification of mental states with brain states. Mental states are defined by their causal relations with other states and with behavior, and the content of a mental state is exhausted by its intentional object, e.g. the content of a perception is the thing you're perceiving which (normally) causes the perception. So what about things like colors and sounds that aren't really out in the world? Can functionalism explain how these seem to us? Listen to part one first or get the full, ad-free Citizen Edition. Please support PEL!
End song: "Pain Makes You Beautiful" by Jeff Heiskell's JudyBats, as featured on Nakedly Examined Music #5.
