EconTalk Richard Epstein on the Economics of Organ Donation
21 snips
Jun 5, 2006 
Richard Epstein, law professor and law-and-economics scholar, outlines how a market for kidneys might work and argues it could increase supply. He covers current wait times, paired exchanges, screening and safeguards, experiments like state purchases, and how markets interact with charity and technology. Short, provocative takes on policy, incentives, and practical hurdles.
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Price Controls Create Deadly Kidney Shortages
- The U.S. kidney system creates long waits and high mortality because organs are allocated without price signals.
- Richard Epstein cites four-year average waits, ~18 kidney-waitlist deaths per day, and worsening backlogs as the tangible harm.
Simultaneous Swaps Solve The Assurance Problem
- Epstein describes a real double-donor swap where incompatible spouses cross-donate simultaneously to avoid reneging.
- Surgeons operate rooms simultaneously with radio contact so neither pair can pull out, converting two failed solo donations into two successful transplants.
Try Market Experiments To Expand Kidney Supply
- Experiment with markets to increase kidney supply rather than reflexively banning all financial incentives.
- Epstein recommends trials including straight sales or state purchase programs and argues public savings could fund payments via dialysis cost reduction.