The Naked Pravda

Russian opposition politician Alexey Navalny famously returned to Moscow in January 2021, where he was promptly arrested at the airport for supposed parole violations. A month later, his suspended sentence was replaced with a 2.5-year prison sentence. Roughly a year later, in March 2022, a judge added another nine years to his prison term, convicting him in a kangaroo court of embezzlement and contempt of court. So, Navalny has at least another decade of imprisonment ahead of him, but it will likely be far more. In a new trial with a verdict expected on Friday, August 4, public prosecutors have asked a judge to sentence Navalny to an additional 20 years in prison on charges of “creating an extremist organization,” “inciting extremism,” and creating a nonprofit organization that infringed on Russian citizens’ rights, financed extremism, and involved minors in dangerous activities. Oh, and they say he “rehabilitated Nazism.” In late April, the prosecution dumped a 196-volume case file on Navalny, and the court gave him a week to review the materials. Before this, Navalny had said he expects to be charged in a separate case, in a military court actually, for crimes related to “terrorism,” probably facing life imprisonment.  Ahead of the verdict in this latest case against Russia’s best-known anti-Kremlin opposition leader, The Naked Pravda spoke to political scientist Mikhail Turchenko and Wilson Center senior adviser and Meduza Ideas editor Maxim Trudolyubov about Alexey Navalny, his movement, and about how he’s changed Russian politics even as he languishes behind bars.Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

In the final week before the State Duma’s summer recess, Russian lawmakers have been ramming through some curious legislation, including several initiatives the authorities would apparently like to roll out now before Putin’s re-election campaign presumably kicks off in the fall. Notably, one last-minute amendment empowers the president to charge governors with the creation of “special militarized formations” during periods of mobilization, wartime, and martial law. These new armed groups, controlled by the state but separate from the military, will be yet another factor in Russia’s complicated civil-military relations — a subject that’s gained even more global attention in the aftermath of last month’s mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner Group mercenaries. To learn more about the “specialized enterprises” forged in this new legislation and to explore what such a project says about the relationship between the military and everything else in Russia, Meduza welcomes back Kirill Shamiev, a Russian political scientist and a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, who recently wrote an essay on this subject for Carnegie Politika, titled “Suspensions, Detentions, and Mutinies: The Growing Gulf in Russia’s Civil-Military Relations.” Timestamps for this episode: (3:27) Is the Russian military’s chief struggle that Putin values loyalty over competence?(7:56) Former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov’s reforms and civilian innovations(10:51) Putin’s reluctance to spend political capital(15:23) Russia’s forthcoming “specialized militarized formations”Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Since the early aftermath of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many major Western companies have been in various stages of divesting from Russia. Nearly a year and a half into the war, we’ve entered a new phase of business relations, as the Kremlin has started nationalizing foreign companies’ Russian assets. The latest watershed moment occurred on April 25, when Putin issued an executive order allowing the Russian authorities to place the Russian assets of companies from “unfriendly nations” under the state’s “temporary administration.” As a result, Russia seized the assets of Uniper Russia, including Uniper’s 84% stake in the power generation company Unipro, which was valued at $5.5 billion before the invasion. More recently, earlier this week, President Putin placed the Russian subsidiaries of French yogurt maker Danone and Danish brewer Carlsberg under the Russian state’s “temporary management,” effectively seizing these businesses. The Federal Property Management Agency has already entrusted Danone Russia’s CEO position to Ramzan Kadyrov’s nephew. For some guidance through this tumultuous period of international sanctions and elite business politics in Russia, Meduza spoke to Alexandra Prokopenko, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, who worked at Russia’s Central Bank and at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow from 2017 until early 2022. Timestamps for this episode: (2:15) Putin seizes Unipro(4:23) Putin seizes Danone Russia and Baltika(8:55) Has the war been good for business?(12:59) Where’s the business community stand on the invasion?(15:26) The fight over Western assets(17:23) Chinese business interests (and unease) in all these confiscations and fire salesКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

The podcast discusses a joint investigation that estimates the number of Russian combatants killed in the invasion of Ukraine to be 47,000. They explore the reactions to the investigation, discuss rates of inheritance claims for different types of combatants, explain confidence levels and calculation methodology, and analyze geographic trends in inheritance cases in Russia.

Moscow and Kyiv have traded allegations that the other side is planning a disastrous attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant that they warn could cause a major radiological event. Last week, Ukrainian President Zelensky warned that Russian occupation forces have placed “objects resembling explosives” on some rooftops at the power station, “perhaps to simulate an attack on the plant.” Officials in Moscow, on the other hand, have their own allegations, claiming that Ukraine plans to frame Russian troops for an attack on the plant. Meanwhile, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency are on the ground but still aren’t getting unrestricted access. On July 7, the IAEA reported that they visited the isolation gate separating the cooling pond from what remains of the Kakhovka reservoir after the destruction of the downstream dam a month ago. They found no leakage from the pond, and they’ve observed no visible indications of mines or explosives anywhere inside the plant, but they still haven’t been allowed onto the rooftops of reactor units 3 and 4 and parts of the turbine halls. To make sense of these reports and to respond to the panic that this situation provokes, The Naked Pravda welcomes back nuclear arms expert Pavel Podvig, a senior researcher at the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research. Timestamps for this episode: (4:37) Why it’s wrong to fear a repeat of the Chernobyl or Fukushima disasters at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant(9:48) Disagreements among nuclear experts about the dangers now in Ukraine(13:06) Weighing the reports and allegations from Moscow and Kyiv(18:22) Escalating rhetoric about nuclear weapons in Russia’s foreign-policy expert community(23:12) Why there are probably no Russian nukes in Belarus, at least not yetКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Yevgeny Prigozhin is now (in)famous around the world for mounting a failed mutiny against the Russian military in a last-ditch attempt to avoid being absorbed into it, as the Kremlin reclaims its monopoly on violence and ends an experiment with outsourcing bits of the Ukraine invasion to mercenaries. The Naked Pravda has focused numerous times before on Wagner Group, and it’s now time to write the private military company’s obituary. Or is it? How did Prigozhin manage to convince his men to embark on this misadventure? What did we learn about the Russian political elite in this crisis? And what should we expect in Belarus, where at least some remnant of Wagner Group is said to be headed? For insights into the failed insurrection and its aftermath, Meduza turns to three experts. Timestamps for this episode: (3:40) Kirill Shamiev, Russian political scientist and visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations(19:43) Маrgarita Zavadskaya, senior research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs(27:17) Katia Glod, policy fellow at the European Leadership Network and nonresident fellow at CEPA’s Democratic Resilience Program Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

On June 14, the Russian State Duma passed the first reading of a new bill that would essentially ban every aspect of gender transitions, from changing your gender marker in official documents to health care like hormone replacement therapy and gender-affirming surgeries. The only exceptions would be for people with “congenital physiological anomalies,” meaning intersex people, and even then it would only be possible in state hospitals after review by a medical panel. Russia has never been a safe or comfortable place for trans people, but until now, it’s at least been possible for them to legally and medically transition. Since the start of the full-scale war, though, Russia’s leaders have actively begun demonizing LGBTQ+ people, painting them as an existential threat to the country being exported by the West. In October, for example, one lawmaker said Russian troops in Ukraine are fighting for “families to consist of a mom, a dad, and children — not some guy, some other guy, and some other who-knows-what.” To learn about how the new legislation and the rise in official anti-trans rhetoric is likely to affect trans Russians, Meduza spoke to Nef Cellarius, an activist from the LGBTQ+ rights group Coming Out; Anna-Maria Tesfaye, one of the cofounders of the organization Queer Svit; and a trans woman currently living in Russia. Timestamps for this episode: (2:58) The main challenges facing trans Russians in recent years(4:40) The likely effects of the ban on gender transitions(7:20) Why are the Russian authorities doing this now?(8:50) How many trans people have fled Russia(10:50) The difficulties trans Russians encounter abroad(12:26) Why not all trans people in Russia want to leave(13:35) How Russian lawmakers are the real agents of “foreign influence” from the WestКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

About a month ago, the Russian authorities outlawed Greenpeace, giving it the same treatment as Meduza, slapping the organization with an “undesirability” label that makes its operations illegal. Greenpeace International “poses a danger to the foundations of Russia’s constitutional order and security,” declared the Prosecutor General’s Office. Its work “actively promotes a political agenda and attempts to interfere in the state’s internal affairs, with an aim to undermine its economic foundations.” Greenpeace itself says the crackdown — which forced it to dissolve its Russian branch — was retaliation for its opposition to proposed changes to the Russian environmental law that would lift the ban on logging around Lake Baikal, a protected ecosystem in Siberia and the world’s deepest freshwater lake. A couple of months earlier, Russia’s Justice Ministry designated the World Wildlife Fund as a “foreign agent” for allegedly “trying to influence the decisions of the executive and legislative branches of the Russian Federation, and to hinder the completion of industrial and infrastructural projects” — “under the guise of protecting nature and the environment.” To understand the short-term and long-term consequences of these designations and the fallout of Russia’s wartime environmental policies, Meduza spoke to environmental journalist Angelina Davydova, who recently coauthored an article with Eugene Simonov, titled “Does Russia Have a ‘Green’ Future?” that explores where Russia is headed environmentally in light of the war effort against Ukraine and all the Western sanctions imposed as a result. Timestamps for this episode: (6:56) Russian environmentalism after the crackdown on Greenpeace and the WWF(10:31) Declining professionalism and corruption in environmental science(16:25) Russia’s historical approach to nature reserves(19:18) Opportunities for ‘great green power’(25:36) The chances of environmental cooperation with the Putin regime at warКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Ten years ago this week, a curious thing happened: during the intermission of a ballet performance at the State Kremlin Palace, Vladimir Putin and his wife of thirty years gave an interview to a TV news crew where they revealed that they were no longer married. It was a brief exchange, but it’s also one of the rare moments in his long presidency when Putin spoke openly about his family life. Back in June 2013, there was already wide speculation about Vladimir Putin’s secret love life, which focused largely on his alleged relationship with former Olympic gymnast Alina Kabayeva. Since then, investigative journalists have uncovered a lot more, digging up evidence of other lovers, other children, and the elaborate schemes Putin and his entourage use to conceal their wealth and corruption. On this week’s show, to discuss the latest revelations about Putin’s family, The Naked Pravda spoke to investigative journalists Roman Badanin, the founder and editor-in-chief of Proekt Media, and Andrey Zakharov, a special correspondent who’s reported groundbreaking stories at outlets like Fontanka News, RBC, Proekt, and BBC News Russian. The interviews focus particularly on a June 1, 2023, story about Putin’s ex-son-in-law and a November 2020 article about the president’s apparent third daughter. Timestamps for this episode: (5:55) After all these years, what’s still surprising about Putin’s secret family life?(10:18) Why does Putin’s family like to keep marriages and properties off official records?(13:32) How property ownership works in Putin’s inner circle(15:45) Ukrainian drones(18:51) The biggest blind spots for journalists when it comes to Putin(23:26) Why all the secrecy?(27:34) Finding Putin’s third daughterКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Last week, on May 25, the digital-rights group Access Now broke a story revealing that Pegasus spyware was used to hack civil-society figures in Armenia. Notably, these infiltrations took place against the backdrop of the conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh — making this investigation’s findings the first documented evidence of Pegasus spyware being used in the context of an international war. Never heard of Pegasus? Well, buckle up. Developed by the Israeli firm NSO Group, this frighteningly sophisticated piece of hacking software is capable of infecting both iOS and Android devices through so-called “zero-click” attacks. In other words, it can worm its way into your phone — often by exploiting vulnerabilities that the manufacturer has yet to find and fix — and you’d be none the wiser. Once installed, Pegasus grants total access to your device, allowing the hacker to not only view your messages, emails, and photos, but also track your phone’s location, record calls, and use the camera and microphone to capture what’s going on around you. “Basically, the attacker gets control of the settings and has even more control than you yourself have over your device,” Natalia Krapiva, a tech-legal counsel at Access Now, told Eilish Hart, editor of Meduza’s weekly newsletter The Beet, in an interview for this week’s show. Timestamps for this episode: (3:46) What is Pegasus spyware?(5:31) What is NSO Group, the Israeli firm that developed the tool?(7:25) Access Now’s investigative findings(12:56) Reactions from those targeted in this spying campaign(15:15) Who is behind hacking all these figures in Armenia?(19:28) Using Pegasus in the context of a war(22:50) Reactions to Access Now’s investigation(25:20) International spyware policymaking, going forwardКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно