New Books in Diplomatic History

How should we look back at President Bill Clinton’s foreign policy legacy? As muddled? Visionary? Or simply uninspired? To answer these questions, James D. Boys has just written Clinton’s Grand Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Cold War World (Bloomsbury Academic, 2015). Boys is associate professor of International Political Studies at Richmond University, UK, and visiting senior research fellow at King’s College London, UK.Wedged between two Bushes, Bill Clinton bursts onto the national stage with a reputation as a domestic policy wonk, but thin on foreign policy credentials. Boys examines the development of Clinton’s foreign policy beliefs, the people he surrounded himself with on the campaign trail, and how that team formulated his grand strategy. He explores the major crises that defined Clinton’s White House and how Clinton’s foreign policy shaped the George W. Bush presidency in often underappreciated ways. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 1967, French President Charles de Gaulle cried out “Vive le Quebec libre!” from the balcony of Montreal’s City Hall. The controversial moment became a myth almost instantly. The four words De Gaulle uttered remain emblematic of an extremely important moment in the histories of Quebec and Canada. Illustrative of the General’s penchant for political provocation and spectacle, they also hold a special place in his dramatic biography.David Meren‘s With Friends Like These: Entangled Nationalisms in the Canada-Quebec-France Triangle, 1944-1970(University of British Columbia Press, 2012), is anchored by President de Gaulle’s famous cri du balcon. Situating the incident within the broader context of a complex “triangle” of relations between Canada, Quebec, and France, the book deepens our understanding of what De Gaulle said and the meanings his exclamation have carried since. At the same time, the book develops a much broader and richer historical picture of the relationship between these three societies, and their nationalisms, from the end of the Second World War to the end of the 1960s.With Friends Like These is an exciting example of an international history that interweaves the analysis of diplomacy, economic interests, and societal and cultural change over two and half decades. In our conversation, David and I discussed his methodology and the challenges of thinking together these three national communities within a rapidly shifting global context during the period. We also had a chance to talk about some of the legacies of the history of the Canada-Quebec-France triangle for contemporary political and cultural identities and exchanges. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Aristotle Tziampiris is The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation (Springer, 2015). Tziampiris is Associate Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for International and European Affairs at the Department of International and European Studies at the University of Piraeus.The recent fiscal debt crisis in Greece has drawn world attention to the country’s position in global affairs. Rather than pursue the financial situation, Tziampiris investigates the foreign policy making of Greece, particularly its changing relationship with Israel and Turkey. Greece and Israel have had a distant relationship for much of the last 50 years, but recent politics for both countries have moved the two toward a budding friendship. Tziampiris bases his argument and key findings on high-level original interviews which lend the book a degree of legitimacy and significance. Based on these conversations with Greek and Israeli diplomats, he points to the Gaza Freeodm Flotilla as the point where leaders from the two countries began to rebuild their bi-lateral relationship. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

You’d be hard pressed to find anyone who knows anything about European history–and European diplomatic history in particular–who doesn’tknow a little something about the Congress of Vienna. That “little something” is probably that the Congress fostered a post-war (Napoleonic War, that is) settlement called the “Concert of Europe” that lasted, roughly, until the outbreak of World War I in 1914.That’s a good sound bite. But, as Brian Vick shows in his lively, fascinating bookThe Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon (Harvard University Press, 2014), a lot more than diplomatic toing-and-froing went on in Vienna. The diplomats and their huge entourages, well, partied a lot. The ate (generally well), drank (often too much) and “consorted” (to put it diplomatically). As Vick demonstrates, this setting has a distinct impact on the negotiations and their eventual outcome. In vino veritas? Listen in. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In the annals of cold war history Italy is rarely seen as a crucial locale. In his stimulating new book, The United States, Italy, and the Origins of Cold War: Waging Political Warfare (Cambridge University Press, 2014), Kaeten Mistry reveals how events in Italy proved surprisingly crucial in defining a conflict that dominated much of the twentieth century. For the United States, it marked the first intervention in the postwar era to influence events abroad through political warfare, the use of all measures ‘short of war’ in foreign affairs. Drawing particular attention to the Italian election of 18 April 1948, he explains how the campaign for the first national election of the newfound Italian republic marked a critical defeat for communism in the early cold war. The United States utilized a range of overt and covert methods against Marxist political and social power. Political warfare seemingly outlined a way to tackle communist strength more widely.Analyzing American political warfare efforts against the Italian left allows Mistry to advance a number of important arguments. He shows how U.S. efforts were largely improvised and many key decisions ad hoc. While officials in Washington like George F. Kennan worked to institutionalize political warfare, Italian actors and a host of non-governmental organizations played a crucial role in the defeat of the Italian left, even if they did not always share the same agenda as American officials. Mistry emphasizes Italian agency, explaining how Christian Democrat Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi pursued his own agenda to protect national sovereignty. The Vatican had its own objectives, as did trade unions, citizen groups, and multinational corporations. Other actors held a less rigid view of the Cold War than their American counterparts. In short, political warfare was more than an American story yet U.S. officials and commentators lined up to praise the election campaign as a distinctly American success. Mistry argues that this ‘perception of success’ contributed to an expanded use of political warfare, as U.S efforts turned to subverting communist power in Eastern Europe and, later, the Global South.The work is a refreshing reminder of how foreign policy is rarely under the control of elite figures in Washington. Rather, it is subject to negotiation with various foreign and non-governmental actors. When viewed in this light, Mistry’s work is a useful reminder that governments will almost always invite trouble when they assume the ‘success’ of their efforts to shape events abroad, overlooking the role and motives of other peoples and groups, to make the case for intervention elsewhere. Enjoy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Thomas Weiss and Dan Plesch are the co-editors of We Are Strong: Wartime Origins and the Future United Nations (Routledge, 2015). Weiss is Presidential Professor of Political Science and Director Emeritus of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies at The City University of New York's Graduate Center; Plesch is Director of the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at SOAS, University of London.They write in the introduction "Today a key question that ought to be in bold-faced type on the agenda of global governance is: 'Do we need another cataclysm to re-kindle the imagination and energy and cooperation that was in the air in the 1940s, or are we smart enough to adapt in anticipation?'" Much of the book is built on a hope that the answer to this question is the later, and that world leaders look to the historical lessons delivered in each chapter. Weiss and Plesch break the book into sections: Planning and Propaganda, Human Security, and Economic Development. One is left believing that the original design of the various appendages of the United Nations was the work of truly forward-looking planners, and that while the current institution may not resemble the original vision, much could be gained by looking back to what they designed. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Many Americans know about the military side of the Civil War, and the private, official diplomacy of the Civil War is also well documented. The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War (Basic Books, 2015), though, focuses on public diplomacy — on the battle for public opinion in Europe (primarily) waged by Union and Confederate officials, private citizens, and their European supporters. White northerners were slower to realize what American blacks and European republicans recognized instinctively — that what was at stake in the American Civil War was not the political and territorial integrity of the United States, but the causes of progress and self-government. In The Cause of All Nations, Don H. Doyle has done the impossible — found a hitherto unappreciated feature of the American Civil War that forces us to reevaluate how we understand it. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The current conflict in Ukraine has reopened old wounds and brought the complexity of Russia’s relationship with the United States and Europe to the forefront. One of the most important factors in relations between the Kremlin and the West has been the issue of Ballistic Missile Defense, particularly as a... Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have raised important questions about the future direction of U.S. foreign policy and how Americans can best exercise power abroad in the coming years. Commentators have not shied away from offering advice. Some defend the record of the George W. Bush administration and blame Barrack Obama’s “weakness” for the current disorder that wracks large sections of the Middle East. In their view, the United States must continue to carry out “unilateral” military campaigns when necessary to preempt “terrorist” threats and work to spread democratic government all over the world. It also needs to maintain unquestioned military superiority to deter the aggressive plans of countries like China, Russia, and Iran.Many authors reject the general thrust of these arguments. For some, Americans need to focus more attention on implementing “a realistic” foreign policy that avoids “crusades for democracy” and protects genuine U.S. interests as the world becomes multipolar. No doubt influenced by authors who have either predicted or announced the arrival of a “post-American world,” others have implored U.S. policymakers to address important domestic problems like income inequality and strengthen international institutions designed to promote “global governance.” In a similar vein, a number of commentators have rejected any suggestion that George W. Bush’s policies represent a legitimate form of “Wilsonianism.” If Americans policymakers want to become the “true heirs” of Wilson, they need to strengthen “global governance” and work through the United Nations to gain the “legitimacy” needed when the exercise of military power abroad becomes unavoidable.The political scientist Henry R. Nau (George Washington University) enters debates about the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in his new book Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Reagan, Truman, and Polk (Princeton University Press, 2013). Not one to shy away from controversy, Nau argues that authors have made a fundamental mistake when they offer advice to U.S. policymakers without reference to an important American foreign policy tradition that he defined as “conservative internationalism.” To help readers gain a better grasp of this approach, he includes detailed case studies that highlight the foreign policy successes of Thomas Jefferson, James Polk, Harry Truman, and Ronald Reagan. More than most realize, Nau contends, these Presidents combined the use of force and effective diplomacy in ways that expanded the boundaries of freedom and handled threats in ways that did not allow them to become more costly problems for their successors.Although many critics will question the lessons that Nau draws from his Presidential case studies and analysis of events from 1991 to the present, they will be hard pressed to deny the relevance of his new book. He reminds readers that this “imperfect” world will not necessarily become a better place if the United States chooses to turn inward and fails to deal with the wide array of threats that could potentially undermine the contemporary global order. Nau also offers thought provoking insights on how the disciplined use of military power and “realistic” promotion of democratic government can serve U.S. interests quite well in the years ahead. Enjoy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Any person who turns on CNN or Fox News today will see that the United States faces a number of critical problems in the Middle East. This reality should surprise few. Stunned by the Al-Qaeda attacks on the Twin Towers in 2001, the George W. Bush administration sent U.S. troops to Afghanistan as part of a larger “war on terror” and invaded Iraq in 2003 to “disarm” Saddam Hussein. At this very moment, the United States still has troops in Afghanistan and continues to employ drones to kill “terrorists” in places like Yemen. It has put together a coalition of states, including some Arab governments, to begin the process of taking back the huge swaths of territory that the extremist jihadi group ISIS has taken in Iraq and Syria. The Middle East has also not just “stood still” for U.S. policymakers to find their bearings. The “Arab Spring” and “Green movement” in Iran have raised profound questions about the future of government and authority in the region.In his work Shifting Sands: The United States and the Middle East (Columbia University Press, 2014), Joel Migdal addresses the question of why U.S. policymakers have had so many problems accomplishing their goals in the region since the end of World War II. Employing clear prose without the polemics and scholarly jargon that so many books on this subject contain, he explains how the U.S. government has far too often ignored the complexities and history of the Middle East when acting in the region. While Migdal’s periodization of events in the Middle East and the place of Israel in U.S. foreign policy may strike some as too revisionist, he offers a number of valuable suggestions about how U.S. policymakers can best navigate the shoals of the region in the coming years Even if readers do not find all of these arguments persuasive, they will benefit from grappling with his critiques and insights. Shifting Sands stands out a useful reminder of what can go wrong when policymakers ignore historical trends and assume the universal applicability of the American experience. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices