Helm Talks - energy climate infrastructure & more

As the Chancellor gears up to deliver the Autumn Budget next week, let’s look behind the headlines at the reality of what is going on with the UK’s economy and lack of growth. Despite what the current government argues (not very different from the previous incumbents), the UK’s economic stagnation is not so much due to a lack of new infrastructure projects or excessive regulation, but rather the chronic failure to maintain existing assets. Essential networks—such as railways, roads, water systems, and mobile connectivity—are in poor condition, creating inefficiencies and costs that ripple through the economy. Instead of prioritising glamorous projects like HS2, the focus should be on ensuring that current systems actually work. Well-maintained infrastructure provides resilience and reduces the disproportionate costs of failures, making it a cornerstone for productivity and growth. This is not a technical challenge but a matter of political priorities and regulatory focus. Current fiscal rules and political incentives distort spending decisions. The government re-labels maintenance as “investment” to justify borrowing, shifting costs to future generations and encouraging flashy enhancements over essential upkeep. True maintenance should be funded on a pay-as-you-go basis through current bills, ensuring intergenerational fairness and system reliability. Capital maintenance comes first, second, and third, with new projects only after existing infrastructure is robust.

British energy policy, once heralded as a pathway to cheap, secure and decarbonised power, has instead resulted in some of the highest energy costs globally. Despite the optimism of Ed Miliband and before him, Boris Johnson, Britain’s energy system is heavily dependent on foreign supply chains, finance and ownership. The shift to intermittent renewables like wind and solar has doubled infrastructure needs, while long-term contracts lock in elevated prices until at least 2045. Offshore wind, particularly in Scotland, suffers from grid constraints, leading to payments for unused generation. The government’s approach to nuclear, with its “let’s try one and see if it works” perspective, rather than a fully fledged nuclear programme, has followed an inefficient and costly path, further entrenching high costs. This trajectory poses serious risks to the UK economy. Energy-intensive industries are closing, and few new ones are emerging, as high energy prices deter investment. Britain’s apparent success in reducing carbon emissions masks a growing reliance on imported carbon-intensive goods. Without radical policy reform – renegotiating contracts, restructuring pricing, and rethinking energy strategy – Britain faces a future of permanently high energy costs and diminished industrial competitiveness. What is needed now is not our politicians flying off to yet another COP, this time in Brazil (with access by a new road cut through the Amazon rainforest), but honesty and humility in global climate discussions, urging leaders to learn from Britain’s missteps rather than emulate them.

The UK’s infrastructure costs are amongst the highest globally, making ambitious projects—like new nuclear plants, HS2, and airport expansions—extremely expensive. Hinkley and Sizewell nuclear stations together may end up costing more than the original full costs of HS2, and a new Heathrow runway could reach £40 billion. Even basic upgrades, like sewage tanks and reservoirs, are far pricier than elsewhere. While some projects, such as the Elizabeth Line and Thames Tideway, have been delivered efficiently, these are rare exceptions. The main drivers of high costs are higher costs of capital (due to high interest rates and inflation), low labour productivity, and fragmented project delivery. The UK often builds infrastructure as isolated projects rather than as part of coordinated programmes, which prevents investment in supply chains and skills. France’s programme of nuclear power stations building in the 1980s is an example of how things could be done. Unlike countries that use the state’s balance sheet or commit to long-term programmes, the UK’s piecemeal approach keeps costs high, discourages investors, and limits what can actually be delivered. Without smarter regulation and better planning, these high costs will continue to hold back progress.

Few people have much good to say about the water industry, and the blame game is fully engaged. But what to do? There are four possible options: continue with minimal reform; implement the recommendations of the recent Independent Commission on Water, led by Sir Jon Cunliffe; nationalise the industry; or adopt a catchment-based regulatory model. The Cunliffe Commission advocates: abolishing Ofwat, merging its functions with the Environment Agency, and introducing a supervision model akin to banking regulation. The former is not thought through, not least its neglect of the EA. The latter adds even more layers of regulation. It will be costly and there is a serious risk of regulatory capture, all the while not addressing the core issues of public distrust and investor reluctance. The right approach is Catchment Regulation Model, using digital mapping and AI-enhanced data to guide environmental interventions. It encourages participation by all the parties, including through competitive bidding for projects (as opposed to financial engineering). It is the one route that can create a sustainable, transparent, and inclusive framework for the next 35 years. However, as the government reflects on the recommendations in the final Cunliffe Commission report, continued superficial reforms, particularly in the case of Thames Water, sadly look more likely, kicking the problems down the road.

Why when solar and wind are supposed to be nine times cheaper than gas are electricity prices in the UK amongst the highest in the world? Why when the UK is supposed to be a fast track to this promised cheap net zero electricity by 2030 are large industrial users struggling? Why is Grangemouth in trouble? Why is the steel industry in such bad shape that it has be bailed out and nationalised? Why have fertiliser and petrochemical companies and now biofuels all reached for the exit? The UK’s dash for renewables is supposed to be creating a clean-energy superpower, based upon “home-grown” energy, whereas in fact almost all of the supply chain is imported. Renewables are not cheap when their system costs are properly measured. Marginal costs might be near zero, but a renewables-based system already needs almost twice the capacity as the old coal plus gas plus nuclear system, even though demand has fallen. To produce roughly the same amount of firm power, a renewables-based system already requires lots of new transmission lines, which were not needed in the past for the same demand, as well as a host of upgrades. It requires batteries and storage and lots of back-up gas standing mostly idle, as well relying heavily on imported electricity via the interconnectors to keep the lights on. Renewables are not like-for-like and the wholesale price for firm power should not be compared with the contract for differences (CfD) price for intermittent generation. The nine times cheaper claim relies on leaving almost all the relevant costs out of the comparison. It's time for some energy and climate realism and some honesty about the costs and consequences of the net zero 2030 target.

In the mid-2030s, historians may look back and note that, despite numerous COP meetings and agreements like the Paris Agreement, global carbon emissions continued to rise, with significant contributions from countries like India, China, and Indonesia. The world failed to meet the 1.5°C target, making 2°C and even 3°C more likely. In this podcast, Dieter Helm looks at why the COP process has not delivered the desired outcomes, and the immediate imperative to shift strategies to tackle climate change from territorial net zero targets in the UK to more realistic approaches to reducing global emissions. Renewable energy sources like wind and solar, despite their growth, still contribute a small fraction to global energy supplies compared to fossil fuels. The increasing demand for electricity – in particular, from new technologies and data centres – and the intermittent nature of renewables have led to higher system costs, with nuclear power emerging (once again), but this time as a more viable option for stable and continuous energy supply. Looking ahead, more radical measures, including geoengineering, might be necessary to address climate change effectively. Whatever strategy is adopted, the net zero path being pursued in the UK is unlikely to be successful, as our historians in 2035 will no doubt have discovered.

The UK’s national debt now stands at around 100% of GDP, meaning that the country has borrowed the equivalent of an entire year’s economic output. Under current fiscal rules, the government aims to stop borrowing for day-to-day spending by 2030, but borrowing for investment is exempt from these limits. This creates a loophole: by reclassifying current spending as “investment”, the Chancellor can continue borrowing without breaching her fiscal rules. Even routine maintenance of infrastructure – fixing potholes, school buildings or bridges – is being labelled as investment, when in fact it’s simply capital maintenance. This accounting sleight of hand allows for open-ended borrowing while giving the illusion of fiscal discipline. Beyond these reclassifications, a deeper fiscal fiddle is the long-standing trend of moving public spending off the government’s books through privatisation and private finance initiatives (PFIs). Infrastructure once funded and owned by the state—like power stations, water systems, and telecoms—has been shifted to private hands, masking the true scale of national indebtedness. While this may reduce the official debt-to-GDP ratio, the financial burden still falls on the public, now as utility customers rather than taxpayers. With rising interest rates and growing infrastructure needs, the cost of this hidden debt is mounting. What is needed now is honesty, through greater transparency of public finances. Without it, future generations will bear the brunt of the current delusion, and the fact that we are living beyond our means.

The economic outlook for the UK is bleaker than the government would have us believe. The government's ambition to be the fastest-growing economy in the G7 by 2030 faces significant challenges. Starmer and Reeves blame the Conservatives for the current economic mess, citing a £20–£22 billion gap. They argue that, once constraints are addressed, the government will push towards net zero and build 1.5 million new homes, with growth solving public expenditure problems through increased tax revenue. If only… The IMF predicts 1.1% GDP growth, but even this meagre number overstates the prospects, for three reasons. First, it is flattered by increasing population, with GDP per head lower. Second, borrowing is larger than expected, with a debt-to-GDP ratio already at around 100%, making the cost of debt a significant constraint. Third, the Autumn Budget increased the cost of labour and capital, and savings taxes were increased. More fundamentally, the government's balance sheet is damaged by consuming capital rather than investing in infrastructure. Core infrastructure is not fit for purpose, and building houses and achieving net zero are not the panaceas they are claimed to be. Accounting ruses such as more PFI-type schemes and treating capital maintenance as if it is investment to push stuff off the government’s books do not make the problems go away. True national debt should add all this back, painting a very different and even more unsustainable picture. A fundamental rethink is needed to put the economy on a sustainable consumption and sustainable economic growth path, and thereby reduce the burden on future generations.

How have investors managed to turn Thames Water, despite its extraordinary debt, inefficiency and poor performance, into a company that offers rich financial rewards, at least for some? The roots of this began with the privatisation of water in England and Wales in 1989. At the time, the sector was in need of significant repairs to its infrastructure, and privatisation promised renewed assets and improved efficiency. Since then, with weak regulation, practices like gearing up balance sheets and extracting dividends have led some (not all) water companies to undertake financial engineering, without proper regulatory checks on balance sheets and corporate plans. To some, Thames Water appears to have prioritised financial gains, possibly to the expense of capital maintenance and the interests of customers and the environment. It has become the unacceptable face of water privatisation. Regulatory neglect is linked to broader public dissatisfaction and the erosion of the social licence to operate. Distressed debt players have taken control, with a £3billion loan to keep Thames Water afloat and at very high interest and associated “costs”. They are planning to sell out the equity to a sole preferred bidder, KKR, for around £4 billion. This move raises serious questions about the terms and the interests of the A-class bondholders versus the public interest, about transparency and public accountability. It is likely to be profitable all round, given the value of the Thames Water regulatory asset base is around £20 billion. The irony is that it probably will not save Thames Water, and there is the possibility that it could lead eventually to the nationalisation the government has been so determined to try to head off.

The recent fire at an electricity substation shut Heathrow Airport for 24 hours, causing chaos in the skies and across international airports. In doing so, it highlighted the broader critical condition of the UK’s major infrastructure and its lack of resilience. “Just in time” and “just enough” have replaced secure, ready and prepared. The incident at Heathrow prompted calls for inquiries, in the search to find someone to blame – not the more obvious economic regulator of the airport, the CAA, but instead the National Energy System Operator (NESO). The key lesson to be learned from this is that robust systems are needed to support modern requirements, including from all the new data centres that depend on continuous electricity supply, before such failures become normalised. To ensure the future stability of the economy, proactive measures need to be taken to reinforce these essential systems, prioritising investment and innovation that can cope with the evolving demands of our modern society.