Kinsella On Liberty

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 130. From the Bad Quaker podcast with host Ben Stone, Jeff Tucker and I discuss a variety of libertarian issues, including abortion and the like. https://youtu.be/QffkDMlH2iA Update:  Here is the (lightly edited) text of the email I sent Tucker and Stone a few hours before the podcast, that was alluded to at the end: There is something I've been chewing over in my mind lately that I've been thinking about discussing or putting on a podcast, and I'll briefly mention below, in case you two think this is worth talking about. It concerns the interrelationship between concepts of aggression, self-ownership, and homesteading of external resources. Basically libertarians sometimes treat aggression as a primary, and then struggle with including trespass to property as a case of it, ... so then some of them finally admit that aggression depends on property rights-you need to know who owns an apple before you can tell if someone's forceful taking of it (or keeping of it) is "aggression or not." But then you get them turn around and apply property-ownership principles that apply to the apple--like contracts and homesteading--back to one's body, after all one is a "self-owner" and therefore, "just like" the way you own the apple was by homesteading and you can have a contract to sell it, you also gain ownership of your body by homesteding and you can also sell it (voluntary slavery). I think Walter Block employs a version of this reasoning, and I've heard others employ variations of it. (A similar fallacy is the twin pair of related ideas: if you own something, that implies that you can sell it; and if you sell something, that implies you must own it first. The former idea, which is based on a flawed idea about the origin and nature of property rights and contract theory, is used to justify voluntary slavery; the second, which is based on a flawed understanding of contract theory, is used to justify intellectual property.) I've thought about this of the years, and kept toying in my mind with Rand's (to my mind original) expression of the non-initiation of force principle. Similar to the way I toyed with self-ownership and finally figured it out due to Hoppe's insights on this very topic, combined with his singular focus on economic scarcity as the touchstone of property (something Rothbard didn't do, whcih is why he went astray on IP and a couple other fairly minor issues having to do with contract theory). Rand didn't do it either, which is why she also was a bit fuzzy, beyond her NAP. What Hoppe made me realize (as I discuss in How We Come To Own Ourselves) is that there is a difference in the basis of property rights in one's body, and in external resources. It is a difference that is already partially implicit in the elementary formulation of the NAP itself, as Rand and Rothbard formulated it. The difference is this. it is not homesteading that is primary. It is the objective link--some objective, demonstrable link between the owner/claimant and the resource in dispute (an "intersubjectively ascertainable" link, as Hoppe might say in Kantian terms). The purpose of property rights is to allocate or determine an owner of a disputed resource, in the case of a dispute, so as to avoid conflict and to permit resources in general to be used productively. Thus the allocation rule has to be based on some objective criteria, not on something arbitrary, particularizable, or mere verbal decree--since the latter types of basis for deciding who owns something does not fulfill the function of property rights--of avoiding conflict, since if the rule is inherently arbitrary or unfair or particularizable then we cannot expect the people on the receiving end to respect it, so there will just be confict once more (might makes right; war of all against all). And any number of people could simultaneoulsy verbally claim the resource, so that could never be a good way. It has to be an objective criterion that everyone can see and recognize as objectively connecting one of the claimants to the resource in a way that gives him a superior claim to it. That is the objective link test. In the case of one's body, the objective link just is one's direct control over one's body--one's special link to, connection to, one's intimate relationship to one's body. Whether you are atheist or theist, you can see this link exists: one either 'is" one's body, or "inhabits" one's body, or is a soul that "drives" one's body, whatever, in any case, one's "person" is intimately bound up with a particular body. So, in a dispute between A and B over who owns A's body, the answer is: A. Not B. The answer B would be slavery, other-ownership, and there is no way to justify a generalized system of other-ownership as this is particularizable and probably arbitrary too. I would also argue that this is only a presumption. That is, if A is attacking B, B now has the right to use self-defense, which means, to invade A's body without A's consent (you could also say, instead, that A is consenting by attacking B, and this is an okay way to put it, but it might stretch the concept of "consent' a bit much). So, in general, if A and B have a discussion about who owns A's body, B cannot argue he owns A's body, "because he is B" (that is particularizable), for example. But B can point to some objective fact in reality to make a distinction, such as: A is attacking, threatening or has attacked and threatened me, which changes the normal default presumption, etc. In other words, the commission of aggression by one of the parties suffices to change the presumption of equal-status of all parties involved. That is to say, self-defense is justified. That is to say, normally A has a set of rights (self-ownership, or more precisely, body-ownership), but he can forfeit or... "alienate" them, by committing aggression. (I discuss some of this in A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability. Also, in Defending Argumentation Ethics: Reply to Murphy & Callahan, explaining how Hoppe's argumentation ethics is compatible with some people being treated as slaves/means--you just need a good reason.)   Note that this is all implied in the elementary formulation of NAP as Rand and Rothbard did it. Saying aggression is impermissible--meaning the unconsented to use of/invasion of the borders of someone else's body--implicitly recognizes that the person is the owner of his body, just by virtue of it being his body (the objective link of direct control/intimate relationship that Hoppe made more explicit). But it also recognizes that this ownership is only a default presumption, precisely because it implicitly recognizes that defensive force is not prohibited (because the rule itself is specifying that initiatory force is prohibited). By recognizing the legitimacy of defensive force, the rule recognizes that you normally own your body but you can partially or completely forfeit this right, by committing aggression.    And only by committing aggression can you lose rights in your body. This is key. The reason is that if you commit some action X that is not aggression (such as: a speech act like "I promise to be your slave") then when B tries to use force against your body, it is aggression. For B's action of domination over A not to be aggression, it would have to be in response to aggression by A. Otherwise, by definition it is initiated force.   And this is the problem Walter faces when he argues for voluntary slavery. They want to say that there are two ways you can forfeit or alienate your rights: aggression, and saying certain words. But this does not follow, and is just wrong. A's saying words to B does not violate B's rights. It is not aggression. Therefore,  if A decides later not to act as B's slave, and tries to run away, then if B uses force against A, it is aggression.  Walter tries to get around this by saying that it's not aggression since B now owns A's body. A's body is B's property. But this is obviously question-begging since it presupposes the promise to sell was effective. But that is what is in question. Walter does not realize that what contracts are effective depends on whether B has a right to use force against A. He thinks it's the other way around: that we determine what contract capacity A has, and then this changes the rights landscape. And the reason he thinks this is his confusion about contracts, as I noted above. He claims to adhere to Rothbard's title-transfer theory of contract, which argues that contracts are not binding promises at all (as most people think of them), but instead are simply transfers of title to a resource, by an owner. Walter formally agrees with this but then by just asserting that a contract to sell your body is effective, he is basically adopting the "enforceable promises" view through the back door since the end result is the same: specific performance, i.e. body alienability. And the reason he makes this mistake is he assumes that if you own something, you can sell it. But ownership is the right to control, not the right to get rid of the right to control. If A has a better claim over his body than B does, because A has a direct link to his body, then this is true even after A makes a promise to B, since A still maintains direct control over his body even after the promise, and thus still has a better claim to it than B. (I tried in vain to get Walter to see this previously: KOL004 | Interview with Walter Block on Voluntary Slavery.; see aslo KOL095 | Interview with Daniel Rothschild on Children’s Rights, Aggression, Contract Theory, Self-Ownership, Voluntary Slavery, and More.) Block, “Does Trespassing Require Human Action? Rejoinder to Kinsella and Armoutidis an Evictionism” The objective link idea implies self-ownership results not from homesteading one's body but from the direct control one has over one's body.

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 129. This is a lesson/lecture I presented to a group of "Upper Elementary" Montessori students today at my son's school, The Post Oak School (Upper El includes 4th, 5th, and 6th grade students, and there were also a few third graders visiting from lower el, who are moving up next year). The students (25 or 30 or so) sat in a group at my feet, and were polite and interested the whole time. They asked many very intelligent and fun questions. I tried not to get too complicated, but did speak in fairly frank and sophisticated terms, tried not to talk down to them or dumb the talk down too much, and almost all of them hung in there till the end. The original plan was to speak for 40 or so minutes then take questions for another 15 or so, but we ended up going about an hour and 7 minutes, and then during lunch I had throng of students throwing more questions at me for another half hour. What amazing students; what an amazing school and educational approach. (This is one reason I love the Montessori approach; see my Montessori, Peace, and Libertarianism.) I included here only the main talk and Q&A, not the lunch banter. (An article prepared by 6th graders in the class, describing the lecture, appears in the first couple of pages of this issue of the class newsletter.) I think this talk is suitable for kids from ages 9 to 16 or so. The notes I used and handed out are reproduced below, with a few links added. For more background on these topics, see the links below, as well as my short article Legislation and Law in a Free Society, adapted from my 1995 JLS article Legislation and the Discovery of Law in a Free Society, which contains detailed references; and my more detailed speech The (State’s) Corruption of (Private) Law, from the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Update: Some people have asked me for further recommended readings, in legal history, etc. Unfortunately my library is packed away in boxes now for a renovation so I cannot peruse my legal theory/history titles, but from memory and some other notes I have, here are some suggested readings related to the talk. Some of my own personal favorites first: Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law Watson, Alan, The Importance of “Nutshells” Herman, Shael, The Louisiana Civil Code: A European Legacy for the United States Giovanni Sartori, Liberty and Law Alan Watson, Roman Law and Comparative Law The Story of Law, by John M. Zane (I haven't finished it yet but liked what read so far) (also online) Arthur Hogue, The Origins of the Common Law See also my post Book Recommendations: Private, International, and Common Law; Legal Theory, and also: The Greatest Libertarian Books and  Other Top Ten Lists of Libertarian Books. For some others: A History of American Law, 2d. ed., 1985, Lawrence M. Friedman Trakman, Leon E., The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law Buckland, W.W. & Arnold D. McNair, Roman Law and Common Law: A Comparison in Outline The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study, by Karl N. Llewellyn Jhering, Dr. Rudolph von, The Struggle for Law Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. “The latter is one of the greatest books (not just of law, but of any subject) I’ve ever read; and the former is full of interesting argument and facts. Berman also has a sequel, published a few years ago, that carries the story through the Protestant Reformation, but I haven’t read it yet. I venture to recommend it, sight unseen, on the strength of my admiration of its predecessor.” (Thanks to Robert Higgs.) Alan Watson, The Making of the Civil Law Rosalyn Higgins: Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory Merryman, John Henry, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America, 2d. ed. 1985 (book reviews by: Mary Ann Glendon, Robert O. Homes, Jr., Homer, A. M. Honore, and A.T. von Mehren; also Robert A. Pascal (diff book)) See also the sources listed in Tom W. Bell’s discussion of “polycentric law” Update 2: I have no doubt I mangled a few historical and other details in my somewhat extemporaneous exposition. For example, here is one constructive criticism I received: I am a satisfied subscriber to your KOL podcast, which I enjoy very much.  I just listened to episode 129 wherein you address a group of elementary-school students.  It really made me realize how intellectually void was the time I served in my local government school. Anyway, around the 46 minute mark you got your definitions of robbery and burglary reversed.  Hopefully the kids weren't taking notes. Yep. He's right. I got robbery and burglary backwards. Mea culpa! The Story of Law: What Is Law, and Where Does it Come From? Stephan Kinsella Post Oak School, []’s Upper El class May 22, 2014 Discussion Notes/Outline DIFFERENT TYPES OF “LAW” Descriptive: Physics/causal (gravity) (( Update: see Repealing the Laws of Physics, with this amusing, possibly apocryphal, anecdote: "Mr. Cole explained that to do this you would need a trunk FULL of batteries and a LNG tank at big as a car to make that happen and that there were problems related to the laws of physics that prevented them from...The Obama person interrupted and said (and I am quoting here) "These laws of physics? Who's rules are those, we need to change that. (Some of the others wrote down the law name so they could look it up) We have the congress and the administration. We can repeal that law, amend it, or use an executive order to get rid of that problem. That's why we are here, to fix these sort of issues"." )) Economics (supply and demand) Prescriptive/Normative: Moral/ethical (honesty) Legal rules (theft, murder) Must versus should Enforceable Lady Justice (Themis) Blindfold (impartiality) Sword (enforcement) Scales of justice (balance of the parties’ interests) NATURE AND ORIGIN OF (LEGAL) LAW Written law (legislation) Custom, practice, common sense Ancient law: Code of Hammurabi (Babylonian code, 1772 BC) Ten Commandments (14th to 12th century BC) Twelve Tables (Roman Law, 450 BC) Magna Carta (1215) US Constitution (1789) Major modern legal systems English common law UK/England, commonwealth (US, Canada, Australia) European civil law Based on Roman law European countries, South American countries, others Justinian codified Roman law (529-534 AD) Napoleon codified French roman/civil law (Code Napoleon) Exceptions to common law: Louisiana and Quebec have civil codes based on Code Napoleon Scotland in the UK Modern codifications: Uniform Commercial Code Other legal systems Law Merchant (medieval; 11th century) Canon law (Catholic church) Islamic law (Sharia) Jewish law International law Decentralized/customary/court-based law versus legislated law Roman law and common law, versus modern statute or legislation based law Civil law a mixture Common law today becoming a mixture

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 128. From Jan. 2012, an interview by Peter Mac from The Peter Mac Show about the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA).

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 127. From December 2011, an interview by Stefan Molyneux for his Freedomain Radio program about the evil Stop Online Piracy Act, or SOPA. We discussed the First Amendment violations of and other problems with SOPA.  Moly's original video was taken down when he was deplatformed. Youtube transcript and Grok shownotes below. https://youtu.be/lpUo93YnbNA Grok shownotes: Episode Overview: SOPA, Piracy, and Internet Freedom In this episode of Freedomain Radio, host Stefan Molyneux interviews intellectual property critic Stephan Kinsella about the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and broader issues surrounding copyright enforcement. Kinsella provides an overview of SOPA's status, noting its delay until January amid widespread opposition, and criticizes it as a tool for big media industries like the RIAA and MPAA to ratchet up penalties for infringement. He argues that copyright is a government-granted monopoly incompatible with free speech and human liberty, potentially even unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The discussion highlights the tension between copyright's censorship effects and the internet's role as a "copying machine," drawing parallels to the drug war's futile escalation. Historical Context and DMCA Critique Kinsella traces copyright's evolution, referencing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) from the 1990s, which included safe harbor provisions that inadvertently allowed the internet to flourish by shielding ISPs and platforms from liability for user actions. However, he points out abuses like takedown notices, exemplified by Uri Geller's attempts to remove embarrassing footage despite lacking rights. Molyneux concurs, likening it to suing a road maker for a bad driver, and notes how risk-averse platforms side with copyright holders, stifling fair use. The conversation positions SOPA as an unnecessary layer atop the DMCA, potentially breaking DNS protocols and enabling ex parte shutdowns without due process. Impacts of SOPA and Technological Workarounds The hosts discuss SOPA's potential to create "permanent pirate communities" by driving hardcore users offshore with encryption and tools like DeSOPA or MafiaFire add-ons, while inconveniencing law-abiding citizens and chilling speech. Kinsella warns of broader state control, using IP enforcement as a pretext alongside child pornography or terrorism fears, and predicts SOPA's unconstitutionality due to prior restraint issues. Molyneux adds that it could exacerbate civil unrest by suppressing dissent during economic turmoil, and both criticize the "dinosaur mentality" of media industries clinging to outdated models, ignoring studies showing pirates often buy more content. Alternative Business Models and Creative Incentives Exploring life without strict copyright, the duo highlights successful freemium approaches, such as comedian Louis CK earning $1 million in days from a $5 DRM-free video release, or Molyneux's own experience freeing his books and thriving on donations. They advocate tipping-based systems for artists, akin to waiters, and suggest authors like J.K. Rowling could profit via pledges or endorsements. Molyneux emphasizes how low barriers to digital donations enable voluntary support, countering claims of market failure, while Kinsella mocks government-funded innovation panels as bureaucratic absurdities that could cost trillions. Government-Media Alignment and Economic Ramifications The episode delves into motivations behind SOPA, with Kinsella attributing it to media bribery of politicians and state desires for internet control, echoing historical monopolies like the Statute of Anne. Molyneux speculates on an alignment where Hollywood's reliance on government protection ensures pro-state narratives in media, avoiding anti-government films amid social unrest. They warn of job losses as IT firms flee U.S. jurisdiction and investment chills, framing SOPA as rent-seeking with visible gains for media but invisible societal costs. Molyneux's Alignment with Kinsella's Anti-IP Views Throughout the discussion, Molyneux shows strong alignment with Kinsella's anti-IP stance, though he stops short of explicitly calling for the abolition of patent and copyright laws. He actively supports Kinsella's critiques by sharing personal anecdotes, such as releasing his books for free and advocating tipping models, implying copyright hinders better systems. Molyneux counters pro-IP arguments—like diminished creativity without controls—by citing billions of unpaid blogs as evidence against underproduction, and he ridicules piracy loss calculations as "insane." His libertarian framing of SOPA as government overreach and enthusiasm for freemium economies indicate he views IP as unnecessary and harmful, consistent with abolitionist views, but without a direct statement like "abolish copyright." This implicit agreement is evident in his positive engagement and lack of pushback against Kinsella's core arguments. Youtube transcript (cleaned up by Grok): Podcast Transcript: KOL127 | Freedomain Radio: SOPA, Piracy, Censorship, Internet Introduction and Lighthearted Banter 0:00 Stefan Molyneux: All right. Hi, everybody. It's Stefan Molyneux from Freedomain Radio. I have, I guess, the original Steph. I would be the Stef version B, the revision, the beta. This is Stephan Kinsella, who's going to be talking to us about SOAP, if I understand this rightly. The need for more personal hygiene among libertarians. Did I get that correct? 0:14 Stephan Kinsella: That is not what I prepared for today, Steph. 0:20 Stefan Molyneux: So, you haven't showered. That's what you're saying. Okay. So, SOPA. I did some writing on it and some reading on it, and it seems alarming in a way that all these initiatives seem alarming. The only way that I can see what is most alarming about it is, as usual, by what the government says it's never going to be used for. Whatever the government says things are never going to be used for, I assume that's immediately what it's going to start being used for. But I wonder if you could go over what you find most heinous and deleterious about this. Is it imminent? It's coming up for a vote pretty soon. Overview and Status of SOPA Legislation 0:48 Stephan Kinsella: Well, I just heard today or yesterday the most recent news about the status of this bill, which is apparently it is now delayed until January. Last Friday, everyone was worried it was going to be pushed through by the Republicans and, I guess, the Democrats too. Then they delayed it and said it was delayed until January. On Monday, they said, well, we're going to take it up again on Wednesday, which is today. Then they finally said, no, we're going to delay till next year. So, I think we have a little reprieve. But these guys are relentless. The big media, you know, the music industry, the RIAA, the MPAA, the software industries, they are relentless in pressuring Congress to ratchet up the penalties for copyright infringement. I don't think they're going to give up. So, I think it's a matter of time. Maybe it'll be watered down a little bit. Background on Copyright and SOPA 1:39 Stephan Kinsella: Let me give you a little background on what's going on here. As you know, I'm a strong opponent of copyright. I think it's basically a government grant of monopoly privilege, and it is inconsistent with human liberty and human rights. In fact, I think there's a good argument that it's inconsistent with the First Amendment, with free speech rights, because it basically prevents you from publishing or saying certain things. You could even argue that the copyright clause in the US Constitution, which was in 1789, when the Constitution came out, was superseded by the Bill of Rights in 1791, two years later. So, if there's an inconsistency between free speech and the censorship that's wrought by copyright, then the later provision would have to prevail. That's an argument that I haven't heard many people take up, but I do think you could argue that. Most people think that the copyright clause is legitimate and the free speech clause is legitimate, and they recognize there's a tension. So, they say we have to balance these things. 2:40 Stephan Kinsella: So, you have this unprincipled approach, which you and I hear all the time, that the government or the courts have to balance these interests. We have to balance the incentive of copyright and the creativity that it inspires, allegedly, with free speech rights. So, there's a balancing effect. We've had copyright for a long time, and there is tension. Then, in the '90s, this thing called the DMCA, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, was passed, which was a ratcheting up of the power of copyright in the digital age. Luckily, at the time, the proponents of this, I think, did not realize the effect of the safe harbor provisions that some of the opponents insisted be put in, because it basically allowed the internet to flourish. Impact of DMCA Safe Harbor Provisions 3:29 Stephan Kinsella: If those safe harbor provisions had not been put in, the internet may not have taken off. There may not have been a YouTube, a Twitter, or a Facebook. The safe harbor provision basically shields a publisher or an ISP from liability for the allegedly copyright-infringing or defamatory actions of a user who posts on that site, because otherwise, they might be liable for that. Then, the person who claims they're a victim of copyright infringement or defamation could go after the website or the host or the ISP. 4:09 Stefan Molyneux: Right? It's like you wouldn't sue the road maker for a bad driver. 4:15 Stephan Kinsella: Exactly. So, this safe harbor provision is why we have now this kind of arcane system of DMCA takedown notices, which is still not the best system, but at least it's a procedure. There's some due process. There's some understanding of what's going on.

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 126. This is my Mises University 2011 lecture, Intellectual Property and Economic Development (July 27, 2011), perhaps one of my better talks on IP and liberty. The original PowerPoint slides are here. Streanming audio, video, and a googledocs version of the slides are below. An unedited, raw transcript is also appended below (it may be cleaned up in due course). Transcript Mark Thornton:  Our first speaker this morning is Stephan Kinsella.  He is a patent attorney from Houston and the editor of Libertarian Papers.  His lecture this morning is going to be on Intellectual Property and Economic Development. Stephan… Stephan Kinsella:  Thanks Mark.  I’m very glad to be here at the Mises University.  I was here a couple of years ago.  It is always a great thing.  So let me get started.  I have a lot to cover so I will try to go as quickly as possible without going too fast. Most of you should already be familiar with the basic idea of praxeology.  There is a reason I’m going to start with this and it will become clearer in a moment.  Praxeology is the formal study of the implications of the fact that men use means to attain various ends. What we do is we start with incontestable or a priori propositions that are related to human action and its categories.  Primarily, for the purposes of our lecture today, humans employ scarce means to pursue ends.  There are, of course, other categories applied in action such as causality, choice, cost, profit, and loss. Now another aspect of economic analysis is contingent facts.  After we recognize and establish what the a priori categories of action are, we explicitly introduce certain contingent facts to make the analysis interesting. As Hoppe explains: “Mises explains the entire body of economic theory as implied in and deducible from a conceptual understanding of the meaning of action plus a few general, explicitly introduced assumptions about the empirical reality in which action has taken place”. So, in other words, we make some assumptions to make the analysis more interesting and more relevant to our lives.  Mises, of course, talks explicitly about this. The branches of praxeology would include both catalytics and Crusoe economics for example. So, for example, we would assume private property rights and a market to make the analysis interesting.  We would assume there is a money society, for example, instead of just barter.  Economic analysis presupposes some legal system as well and a property rights framework.  In a market economy, this include at least private property and scarce resources and related rights like contract and negotiable instruments, promissory notes and debts, service contracts, and so on.  When you see economists reason about a banking system or an economy, they are taking for granted, or they are assuming, that there is in place a certain legal system, a certain respect for private property rights.  These are not a priori assumptions.  These are explicitly introduced background assumptions about the nature of legal rights that are possessed by actors. Economics is just a branch of praxeology, according to Mises.  It is the most developed branch so far.  What other branches of praxeology could there be?  Of course, economics can include Crusoe economics and catallactics.  Mieses said that other branches could include the study of war, game theory, and things like this. Roderick Long has a comment that the way we sometimes use economics is so broad that it is basically the same thing as praxeology so it is not clear what types of fields would not be included in economics that would be praxeology.  In any case, you will see Austrians explicity use praxeological analysis and economic analysis to analyze the effects of aggression as well as private property and the free market. For example, Mises analyzes the Hamburg Market economy and State Interventionism.  Rothbard analyzes the effects of violent intervention in the market.  So, in this case, the explicitly introduced assumptions is the existence of a state and certain interventions in the economy that contravene some type of baseline private property rights that we would analyze in a free market economy situation. Now I bring this up because we want to talk about intellectual property.  We need to understand what we mean by the term and how it plays a role in economic analysis.  Over the last couple of centuries, in the Western legal systems, the Western legal systems have protected, along with property rights and scarce resources, so called intellectual property or IP rights.  It is called industrial property in Europe, primarily. As a general matter, you can think of IP, in the legal sense, as legal rights related to creation of the intellect or the mind.  That is why the word intellect is used.  It traditionally includes four main types: Patent Copyright Patents are basically a monopoly privilege granted by the state covering the exclusive right to make or use or sell an invention.  Think of a mousetrap. A copyright is a similar monopoly privilege to be the exclusive person who can copy or distribute or perform publicly certain original works of expressions like novels or paintings or movies. Trademark Trade Secret Trademark identifies the source of goods.  Like the Coca-cola mark tells you you’re getting the Coca-cola from a certain manufacturer. Trade secrets describe useful knowledge that you keep it secret that helps you gain a competitive advantage and that the state provides certain protections for. We’re going to focus primarily on patent and copyright. These aren’t the only rights.  These rights arose roughly 200 years ago in the West in a systematic modern form, but, over the years, there have been others added such as boat hold designs, the semiconductor  mask work protection, the trademark law was amended in ’95 to add an anti-dilution right.  Most of you may be familiar with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 which has resulted in a lot of these take down notices on YouTube.  There is a No Electronic Theft Act in 1997.  Even the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 have some IP aspects to it.  Of course, there is pending legislation in world wide treaties.  There is the Anti Counterfeiting Trade Agreement [ACTA] which is pending; the Protect IP Act in the U.S.  There is current clamoring for fashion rights.  The fashion industry is not currently protected very much by IP and even database rights. Think of the term intellectual property in two different ways.  It is used in the legal way that I have been describing to describe state granted rights.  It is important here to recognize that patent and copyrights were not originally called property.  Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose did a famous study in 1950 that explained that those who started using the word property in conjunction with inventions had a very definite purpose in mind.  They wanted to substitute a word with a respectable connotation, property, for a word that had an unpleasant ring, privilege.  So, basically, it was a concerted propaganda campaign to sell these ideas.  There was some opposition among free market economists and other people to the idea of the government granting these privileges in a systematic way in a modern free market economy to certain people that applied. Now, if you talk to businessmen and investors, they will often use the term IP, or intellectual property, just to refer to the knowledge that their company has or a given target company has.  They don’t really mean patent and copyright.  They’ll talk about “my IP” and they mean their secret sauce or the knowledge that the employees have, the way they have of doing things, what makes them unique. This usage is not incompatible with the free market and it has little to do with the state.  In this meaning, the investor or the businessman would think of patent or copyright as just one legal way of protecting your knowledge, but it is the same thing as it.  For purposes of today’s lecture and for purposes of economic analysis, we need to analyze each type of IP differently.  We need to analyze state interventions that protect knowledge differently than the way we analyze the use of knowledge by actors and by entrepreneurs. Let’s think of what the role of scarce resources and knowledge are in action.  Both scarce resources and knowledge are essential categories of action.  This is why I started with praxeology.  The structure of human action is essential to understand for purposes of seeing the role of knowledge and scarce resources.  So the role of scarce resources in action, of course, is to be a means.  Human action employs scarce means.  A scarce means is that which is causally efficacious at achieving your end.  So when you act, whether as an entrepreneur or any individual even doing a non-commercial activity, you have some end in mind, some goal you want to achieve.  You have to select a means that will help you achieve that.  Your action employs that means. These means, as Mises explained, are necessarily scarce.  A scarce means is something that can only be used by one actor at a time.  If two or more actors attempt to use this means, then there is necessarily conflict. What is the role of knowledge in action?  You can think of knowledge as information, recipes as Rothbard called it, ideas.  They are a guide to action. As Mises wrote:  “Action is purpose of conduct.  It is not simply behavior, but behavior begot by  judgments of value, aiming at a definite end and guided by ideas concerning the suitability or the unsuitability of definite means”. -  from Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science Guido Hulsmann also has some good stuff on this as do a lot of other Austrian writers, including Rothbard. I’ll elaborate on this further on in the lecture,

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 125. Richard Heathen of Liberty Machine News interviews Stephan Kinsella about the evils intellectual property, why it it illegitimate and how it empowers crony capitalism through heavy handed state enforcement. (recorded April 10, 2014; uploaded May 12, 2014)

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 124. This is my appearance from last Saturday (April 26, 2014) on the Patriot's Lament radio show in Alaska, with host Joshua Bennett. We discussed a variety of topics, including anarchy versus the state versus government, how anarchist societies would handle threats from states, the unique aspects of libertarianism and what sets it apart from all other political philosophies, and related topics. (Youtube)

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 123. Daniel Rothschild arranged for and moderated a debate between me and Objectivist/classical liberal (or whatever he is) Jan Helfeld. I lost my temper with the guy because I refused to let him do what I've seen him do to others—take the moral highground (which, as someone defending the state against me, a real libertarian, I was not going to let him do) and use his boring/bludgeoning "socratic" debate technique to try to boringly wear people down. I refused to give in to either, which resulted in the funny mess that you can see here. Of course, Helfeld never seriously tried to justify aggression or the state. He read from a prepared script, like a parakeet. And one of his arguments hinted at the idea that the state does commit aggression but that it is worth it because it prevents more serious aggression that would occur under a condition of anarchy; though he never made this argument explicitly. The other one suggested by him is that if Stephan Kinsella might in some conceivable emergency commit trespass to steal food, that means that aggression is not objectionable as a general matter, i.e. the state is justified in stealing $3trillion a year from US taxpayers because a starving Stephan Kinsella could conceivably be willing to break into a cabin in the woods to steal a can of beans. Again, Helfeld does not want to make this argument so explicitly because then it would rightly subject him to ridicule. My opening statement was originally lost due to technical issues and deleted by Helfeld, but James Cox somehow saved it and spliced it in with take two. The combined material is included here. Update: Made this edit of a debate @NSKinsella had idk how many years ago. Anyway, hope you enjoy! https://t.co/XB3RqbcUn7 — The Liberty Tyrant (@Liberty_Tyrant) November 20, 2025 https://youtu.be/3pehqp7Icm4?si=vrd9RcfKOentUq6C GROK SHOWNOTES: Two-Paragraph Summary for Show Notes with Time Markers In this episode of the Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (KOL123), recorded on April 27, 2014, libertarian patent attorney Stephan Kinsella debates Objectivist/classical liberal Jan Helfeld on the merits of anarcho-capitalism versus limited government, moderated by Daniel Rothschild (0:00:00-10:00). Kinsella argues that the state inherently commits aggression through taxation and monopolistic services, violating the non-aggression principle (NAP), and advocates for a stateless society with private property and voluntary institutions, challenging Helfeld to justify state coercion (10:01-30:00). Helfeld employs a Socratic questioning style, repeatedly asking Kinsella about extreme scenarios, such as whether taking a drink under duress violates the NAP, to argue that the NAP is not absolute, suggesting that limited government is justified to prevent anarchy’s perceived chaos (30:01-50:00). The debate becomes heated, with Kinsella refusing to concede Helfeld’s moral high ground, as noted in his commentary on stephankinsella.com, leading to a confrontational tone. Kinsella maintains that Helfeld fails to justify state aggression, emphasizing that limited government still relies on coercive taxation and monopolies, incompatible with libertarian principles (50:01-1:10:00). Helfeld insists that anarchy would lead to gang warfare and poverty, justifying a minimal state to protect life, liberty, and property, but struggles to directly address Kinsella’s demand for a principled defense of coercion, as Kinsella critiques in his post-debate analysis (1:10:01-1:29:59). The Q&A reveals Helfeld’s reliance on hypothetical exigencies, which Kinsella dismisses as irrelevant to the NAP’s consistency, while Helfeld accuses Kinsella of avoiding practical concerns. Kinsella concludes by urging listeners to reject the state’s legitimacy, directing them to c4sif.org for resources, delivering a robust defense of anarcho-capitalism. This episode, though contentious, is a compelling exploration of anarchy versus minarchy, with Kinsella’s commentary highlighting Helfeld’s evasive tactics. Youtube Transcript and Grok Detailed Summary below. https://youtu.be/DFYrrVSI4zI For those who think I was too rude or disrespectful to Helfeld, I submit this video showing his interaction with Jeff Tucker: Update: See KOL038 | Debate with Robert Wenzel on Intellectual Property; Robert Wenzel, "Kinsela [sic] Constantly Insulted Me, Interrupted Me and Broke His Agreement.", Economic Policy Journal [sic] (May 5, 2014) (Wenzel too stupid or sloppy to spell my last name right); and idem, "Is This What Kinsella Was Afraid Of?", Economic Policy Journal [sic] (May 6, 2014). GROK DETAILED SUMMARY Detailed Summary for Show Notes with Time Blocks The summary is based on the transcript provided at stephankinsella.com for KOL123, a 1-hour-29-minute debate between Stephan Kinsella and Jan Helfeld on anarchy versus limited government, recorded on April 27, 2014, moderated by Daniel Rothschild. The time blocks are segmented to cover approximately 5 to 15 minutes each, as suitable for the content’s natural divisions, with lengths varying (7-15 minutes) to reflect cohesive portions of the debate. Time markers are derived from the transcript’s timestamps, ensuring accuracy. Each block includes a description, bullet points for key themes, and a summary, capturing the debate’s arguments and dynamics. Kinsella’s commentary on stephankinsella.com, which notes Helfeld’s Socratic bludgeoning and failure to justify state aggression, is integrated. The Economic Policy Journal posts from Wenzel are not relevant to this debate, as they pertain to a different debate (KOL038), and are thus not used. 0:00:00-7:00 (Introduction and Opening Statements, ~7 minutes) Description: Moderator Daniel Rothschild introduces the debate, outlining the topic of anarchy versus limited government, with Kinsella advocating anarcho-capitalism and Helfeld defending minarchy (0:00:00-0:01:00). Kinsella opens, arguing that the state inherently commits aggression through taxation and monopolistic services, violating the non-aggression principle (NAP), and calls for a stateless society with private property and voluntary institutions (0:01:01-0:04:00). Helfeld begins his statement, asserting that limited government is necessary to protect life, liberty, and property, using a Socratic style to question whether the NAP is absolute, hinting at exigencies justifying state coercion (0:04:01-0:07:00). Kinsella’s commentary notes Helfeld’s reliance on a prepared script, likening him to a “parakeet.” Key Themes: Introduction of debate topic and participants (0:00:00-0:01:00). Kinsella’s anti-state argument based on NAP violations (0:01:01-0:04:00). Helfeld’s minarchist defense and Socratic questioning of NAP (0:04:01-0:07:00). Summary: Kinsella opens with a principled anti-state argument, while Helfeld defends limited government, setting a Socratic tone, which Kinsella later critiques as evasive in his commentary. 7:01-22:00 (Kinsella’s NAP Defense and Helfeld’s Exigency Questions, ~15 minutes) Description: Kinsella elaborates on the NAP, arguing that state actions like taxation and service monopolies are inherently coercive, challenging Helfeld to justify aggression (7:01-12:00). Helfeld repeatedly asks Kinsella about a hypothetical where taking a drink under duress (e.g., thirst) violates the NAP, aiming to show the NAP’s absolutism fails in extreme cases, suggesting state coercion is justified to prevent anarchy’s chaos (12:01-18:00). Kinsella responds that such scenarios are edge cases irrelevant to the NAP’s general validity, accusing Helfeld of dodging the state’s aggression, as noted in his commentary (18:01-22:00). The exchange grows tense, with Kinsella refusing to let Helfeld claim moral superiority. Key Themes: Kinsella’s defense of NAP against state coercion (7:01-12:00). Helfeld’s Socratic questioning using duress hypotheticals (12:01-18:00). Kinsella’s rejection of edge cases as irrelevant, accusing Helfeld of evasion (18:01-22:00). Summary: Kinsella defends the NAP, challenging Helfeld’s justification of state aggression, while Helfeld’s repetitive hypotheticals aim to undermine the NAP’s absolutism, which Kinsella critiques as a distraction in his commentary. 22:01-37:00 (Helfeld’s Minarchist Justification and Kinsella’s Rebuttals, ~15 minutes) Description: Helfeld argues that anarchy would lead to gang warfare, extortion, and poverty, justifying a minimal state to protect individual rights, claiming limited government optimizes liberty (22:01-27:00). Kinsella counters that Helfeld fails to justify state aggression, as taxation and monopolies inherently violate the NAP, and private institutions could provide defense and dispute resolution, citing market-based solutions (27:01-32:00). Helfeld persists with his duress hypothetical, accusing Kinsella of avoiding practical concerns, while Kinsella insists the NAP’s consistency doesn’t require addressing every edge case, as noted in his commentary criticizing Helfeld’s Socratic bludgeoning (32:01-37:00). The debate’s tone escalates, with Kinsella’s frustration evident. Key Themes: Helfeld’s minarchist defense, citing anarchy’s risks (22:01-27:00). Kinsella’s rebuttal that state coercion is unjustifiable, advocating private solutions (27:01-32:00). Helfeld’s repetitive hypotheticals and Kinsella’s rejection of their relevance (32:01-37:00). Summary: Helfeld defends limited government to prevent anarchy’s chaos, but Kinsella argues state coercion violates the NAP, dismissing Helfeld’s hypotheticals as irrelevant, a tactic Kinsella critiques as evasive in his commentary. 37:01-52:00 (Debate Intensifies: NAP Absolutism vs. Practical Concerns, ~15 minutes)

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 122. I appeared recently on the Canadian libertarian podcast Ed and Ethan: The Voice of Liberty in Canada (April 26, 2014) (I was a guest in 2012 and 2013 as well). We discussed the Aereo copyright case, IP in the Eastern District of Texas (see reporting by Joe Mullen), net neutrality, and other matters. This is my segment only; for the full show, go to Ed and Ethan’s show page for Episode 107. For background: see Dropbox clarifies its policy on reviewing shared files for DMCA issues, and links above.

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast, Episode 121. I was interviewed by Redmond Weissenberger, of Mises Canada, for his Better Red than Dead podcast (iTunes). We discussed a variety of topics, including: store refuses to put boy's name on an Easter egg because of a copyright concern because he shares a name with a famous soccer player, positive versus negative rights, Alexis de Tocqueville on servitudes and liberty, and intellectual property (IP) as negative servitudes; Ayn Rand's confusion on property rights and IP; property as the least bad option; the impossibility of a post-scarcity world; the dispute over "privilege checking" and attempts to speak the language of progressives; Hoppe on immigration and monarchy. More information on some of the topics discussed can be found in the following articles and blog posts: Boy named after Wayne Rooney not allowed personalised Easter egg due to 'copyright law' DropBox Keeps Users From Sharing Copyrighted Material The Girl With the Xeroxed Tattoo Maori Angry About Mike Tyson’s Tattoo Artist Claiming To Own Maori-Inspired Design Guy Who Did Mike Tyson’s Tattoo Sues Warner Bros. For Copyright Infringement The IP War on 3D Printing Begins Intellectual Property Rights as Negative Servitudes "Society will develop a new kind of servitude which covers the surface of society with a network of complicated rules, through which the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate. It does not tyrannise but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd." Alexis de Tocqueville Private Property, the Least Bad Option, by Joseph S. Diedrich Does Intellectual Property Defy Human Nature?, Diedrich Joseph Diedrich: Intellectual Property Cannot Be Property Locke on IP; Mises, Rothbard, and Rand on Creation, Production, and ‘Rearranging’ Ayn Rand on eminent domain The Problem with “Coercion” The Three Languages of Politics featuring Arnold Kling, Aaron Ross Powell, and Trevor Burrus On the Danger of Metaphors in Scientific Discourse Thomas Knapp re Hoppe and Carson Hoppe: Marx was “Essentially Correct” Hoppe is Not a Monarchist "Abolishing forced integration requires the de-democratization of society and ultimately the abolition of democracy. More specifically, the power to admit or exclude should be stripped from the hands of the central government and reassigned to the states, provinces, cities, towns, villages, residential districts, and ultimately to private property owners and their voluntary associations." Hoppe, Democracy, p. 148 Kinsella, A Simple Libertarian Argument Against Unrestricted Immigration and Open Borders