The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics, Doctrine and Leadership.

This podcast explores the leadership dynamics of the 8th Division in World War II, including the controversial commander Black Jack Galleghan and the mutiny that took place. It also delves into the ambush at Gemas, discussing the Japanese's role and the actions taken by Galleghan to minimize its impact. The podcast highlights the importance of leadership, training, and communication in military operations.

Good leadership, thorough training and success on operations will all contribute to high morale. We contrast LT COL Stewart and with other units. The Indian and Australian armies had a lot of new troops, with varying degrees of training. This contrasts with battle hardened IJA troops, some who had many years of experience. Kampar was the high point for the Allied morale. The conduct of the withdrawl is difficult to do and it is difficult to maintain morale during the withdrawl. This continually eroded Allied morale with many of the Brigades. Lack of training in tank fighting was evident in most Brigades. This led to poor performance against the Japanese tanks which eroded morale. Too many senior officers weren't team players. Morale in BDE and DIV HQs was often poor because of the friction generated within the HQs. This impacted decision making and lead to further defeats. The way the Japanese fought neglected many of the principles of war. Trust and co-ordination with units staying in place would have enabled fierce and effective counter attacks. We look at the importance of fighting the battle in the enemy commanders mind and how that impacts the battle. We look at Moral Dislocation, a concept that both Clausewitz and Liddell Hart had discussed. The moral dislocation of the Indian troops. The Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere wanted to deliver Asia for the Asians. The Japanese were coming as liberators of the Indian people. The Indian workers were underpaid. The evacuation of Penang helped dislocate the locals from the British morally. Lastly the operationally tempo increased inversely with morale. The moral dislocation by the Japanese was crowned with the creation of the Indian National Army, consisting of Indian troops wanting to fight the British. The Japanese Army had troops, bought up on a modified Bushido code in school, that were successful, highly motivated and fighting for a cause that they all believed in. What role does / should the education system play in a national defence strategy? Lastly, despite Yamashita's high tempo, he was still able to rotate troops out of the front line for a few days rest. Fresh troops were able to continually harass defeated, depleted and over tired Allied troops with predictable results. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Colourised image courtesy of Colours of Yesterday. It is a great picture showing the moral of the Australian troops.

We look at how the Japanese were able to use operational manoeuvre from the sea as a part of their approach to flexibility. We look at their history of amphib operations and how they developed their capability. We look at the Shanghai Incident and how the IJN demonstrated their already impressive amphib capability. The Japanese are able to launch 3 independent landings to start the offensive in Malaya. We look at the Battle of Kampar and how the Japanese assault bogged down and how they were able to respond to a change in the tactical situation. BRIG Paris wanted a more offensive defence. How did Kampar mask the limitations of the Allied forces? We look at the performance of the British Battalion at Kampar, which differs markedly from that exhibited from a lot of the Allied forces. How was LT COL Stewart was able to train a Battalion that was able to operate effectively in the jungle. How did he do it? Did he use Mission Command to manage for the difficulties created by jungle fighting. What are the requirements for mission command and were they displayed within 8th Division. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.

Sustainment - often the least considered of the principles. How did logistics impact the conduct of the Malaya We look at the interplay of logistics between the forces. There The Japanese were operating from an amphibious operation which severely constrained their operations. The British were fighting a defensive battle, with a lot of trucks on well made roads. What was the relationship between the two? What were the Churchill supplies and why were they so important? How did the conduct of the British withdrawal impact the Japanese supplies? With constrained sea lines, what action did Yamashita take to ensure that he could supply his 4 divisions. What was Yamashita's mobility solution that helped solve his logistics problem and enabled him to outmanoeurve the British by moving a lot quicker than the defenders could. What are the similarities between Sherman's march to the sea with Yamashita's march to Singapore.

Malaya and Economy of Effort We look at the definition and how the Japanese and Allies applied this principle. For the Allies there was too much economy and not enough effort. There wasn't enough resources available to prepare the defences so Allied troops spent a lot of time digging in rather than training. The Royal Navy, Air Force and Army all allocated insufficient resources to be able to achieve the mission. There was a lot of economy of effort in the hope that the US would be able to assist in the defence of Singapore. By the time the perilous situation was realised, it was too late to reinforce before Singapore fell. Synchronisation and Orchestration are implicit in cooperation, so where did the wheels fall off the wagon? It is every commanders job to work towards cooperation, building harmonious relationships between agencies. The base building program for the RAF was kept from the Army. The British provided no strategic guidance provide by higher in London. Brooke Popham was the first Air Force commander of a Joint Command. How did he do? The defence often gives the defender the ability to choice the ground that they will fight on. Percival lost that right because the locations was dictated by the location We look at Brig Ivan Simpson, the CRE for Malaya Command. He was energetic, thoughtful and planned extensive defensive works to slow the Japanese advance. His work was largely ignored for a range of reasons. A lack of training and understanding of the work that engineers do was replicated with other Corps. There was little understanding of the employment of Artillery, Signals was understood poorly. There was very little combined arms training. Artillery was employed by Bn COs, often in the wrong place, meaning that the troops did not receive the support that they needed.

Malaya was a secondary effort of secondary effort for both the British and the Japanese - so how does Concentration of Force work for secondary efforts? Force Z was HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. A force too small to effect the outcome, but too large to lose. 1 Squadron RAAF conduct the first air strike against the Japanese in WW2. How did Admiral Tom Phillips plan to interdict the Japanese landing forces? What is the role of the naval LO? Why did CAPT Tennant disobey orders about radio silence? RAAF support for Force Z was too little, too late. Churchill described this as the most direct shock that he had ever received after Force Z was sunk. Force Z was the first capital ships sunk by air power alone, this is a great example of technological surprise. The Japanese create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation - how did this impact the British decision making. Don't penny packet your Battleships. The IJA stacked the deck in aircraft. More aircraft and aircraft that were better with better pilots - this helps swing the balance for the Japanese. The force ratios for the Japanese were very low. They never achieved overwhelmingly combat power, but they achieved overwhelming success. They had 11 Divisions for their land operations across the Pacific AO. How did Yamashita entirely pay of Concentration of Force and still succeed? Leadership, training, doctrine, planning, morale, combined arms and audacity. Do this and pay of concentration of force at your leisure. "Read this alone and the war can be won" was the book that built the moral case for the offensive and covered the tactics as well that would lead to victory.

How did Security and Surprise impact operations in Malaya and Singapore? There was little security in the Malaya campaign for the Allies. The Japanese had a strong expat community. We look at the work of Patrick Heenan, a Kiwi born British and Indian Army Officer who became a spy for the Japanese, betraying the Air Force base at Alor Star. Not sure why he did, but he took a 6 month secondment to Japan prior to the war. We also look at how the Japanese learnt that the British had no capability to reinforce Singapore and Malaya when a highly sensitive document from the British War Cabinet for Brooke Popham was captured on the SS Automedon. Security for the Allies created a reluctance to use wireless, which inhibited tactical flexibility. Japanese security was tight enough to limit the time available for Brooke Popham to be able to make a decision. Percival conducted an appreciation in 1937 that was very accurate in regards to how the Japanese would attack Singapore and yet there was little work done in the 4 years before the Japanese landing. The Allies are surprised because they fundamentally under rated the technical and operational capabilities of the Japanese. The British were reading Japanese diplomatic messages one month before the invasion, but it still did not start ringing alarm bells. The British did not think that the Japanese would attack during the wet season - why were the Japanese in the wet, with the much more difficult conditions for troops and movement. How about in the Australian Army? Were we surprised? Where do you find the Officers and SNCO's when you raise 3 new divisions? What impact did the death of Australia's ablest soldier on 13 August 1940 have on the Australian Army? Gordon Bennett gets the Div Comd job that he so desperately wanted. Sixth time lucky after being rejected 5 times prior! How did the battalions prepare for the Malaya campaign? We look at a PAR report from 6 months before the Japanese invasion. Surprise sees Australia commit 2 BDEs to Malaya, poorly equipped and poorly trained - we look at the reasons. How can a country improve the Whole of Government approach when moving over onto a war footing? Lastly we look at what happens when the Japanese pay off security entirely and repeatedly.

We look at the dithering that occurred in the British Malaya Command. We look at Operation Matador and how centralised control lead to delays and an inability to execute on an offensive defence that was planned. How do you think a Combat Team assault would go against a prepared Divisional defensive position? We find out as we look at the Battle of Jitra. The application of manouevre requires: Combat Arms Teams Orchestration Focus all actions on the Centre of Gravity. How does all of this relate to the Japanese conduct of their offensive. We look at the Japanese driving charge and how it harnessed offensive action. At the tactical level, this looks like the filleting attack whereby tanks fight through the defensive positions on the road and push through into the rear of the defense. The driving charge along with poor British training and decision making enabled Yamashita to attack with a 1:3 numerical inferiority and win. The strategic and tactical operational tempo created an OODA loop that was much tighter than that of the British. The defence of Jitra was unprepared for the Japanese assault. How long did they have to prepare their defences? We look at the Saeki Detachment, their training, their tactics and their success at Jitra. The Japanese win the Battle of Jitra and win 3 months of ammunition and 300 trucks. 75% of the Indian casualties are taken as prisoners of war. Jitra saw 500 troops against 14,000 troops. The British are able to defend successfully at the Battle of Kampar, only withdrawing after being forced to withdraw when the Japanese are able to threaten their Main Supply Route. We look at Slim River, where the Allies had 500 KIA and 3,200 POW, and Japanese suffered 17 KIA and 60 wounded. It was described as reckless and gallant determiniation. LT COL Stewart admitted the position of BDE HQ was not very good and he should have used the artillery in an anti-tank roll, but he had never taken part in an exercise with an anti tank component. He was surprised at the use of tanks on a road and at night.

We look at how the British and Japanese came about to select their aims and how they got to them. What was the British mission and what did Churchill understand of the mission to be? How did Brooke Popham understand his mission and how did that impact the troops on the ground (and pilots in the air). We have a slight diversion to look at the Whole of Government approach to defence and how the Australian Government undermined the Air Force and it's capabilities. Why would they do that? How effective was the Beaufort Bomber? Was a defence procurement decision influenced by political needs? What role did the 'China incident' play with Japanese decision making processes? How did COL Tsuji influence the decision to go south and east as opposed to north and west. The Imperial Japanese Navy was using 400 tonnes of oil an hour - how would they secure the resources they needed? What were the similarities and differences between the Japanese and British thinking? We look at Unity of Command in both the Japanese and British forces. How did issues with command structure effect each of the forces? What was the relationship between Bennett and Percival? Did Bennett's micromanagement of the Brigades limit their effectiveness. How would command issues effect 22nd and 27th Brigade. What issues did LT GEN Yamashita have? What is Gekokujo and why was Charlie Chaplin nearly assassinated? What was the May 15th incident and why did 350,000 people sign a petition in blood?

Allied Doctrine had seen little development between the war with significant budget cuts. The Army was relegated to an Imperial policing role. It is very Command and Control way of We look at Sir John Dill and his visit to Tannenburg and his interpretation of 'Mission Command'. Malaya was a very laissez-faire, with some units preferring not to train in the jungle. LT COL Ian Stewart from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. He trained one of the best battalions in Malaya. How was his training methodologies viewed at Malaya Command? British Staff College focused on strategy, not on Brigade and Division Command, which meant that British officers struggled when commanding one up. How did the 8th Division transition from the training for desert fighting once they landed in Malaya? What was the thinking about Combined Arms and how was it trained for? How did MAG GEN Gordon Bennett train the Division for the withdrawal and what where his thoughts on digging in? How did the personalities of the individual Battalion Commanders impact each of their battalions. The Japanese developed a Jungle Warfare in Taiwan to develop doctrine. They also conducted 10 major exercises for amphibious operations. The reliance on the bicycle enabled rapid movements of troops with very little logistics impact. The difference between the Japanese and British highlighted the amount of recent modern warfare experience that each Army had been subjected to. How did the road impact the thinking for each of the commanders? How would it shape their actions and dispositions. What is fighting for the road off the road and how did the British and Indian troops respond to this tactic? How did the Japanese task organise for their upcoming offensive? 8th Division started from the ground up to develop their doctrine, which meant that there was still significant work to be done after first contact with the enemy.