Law School

Clause 2: Classification of senators; Vacancies. Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies. After the first group of senators was elected to the First Congress (1789–1791), the senators were divided into three "classes" as nearly equal in size as possible, as required by this section. This was done in May 1789 by lot. It was also decided that each state's senators would be assigned to two different classes. Those senators grouped in the first class had their term expire after only two years; those senators in the second class had their term expire after only four years, instead of six. After this, all senators from those states have been elected to six-year terms, and as new states have joined the Union, their Senate seats have been assigned to two of the three classes, maintaining each grouping as nearly equal in size as possible. In this way, election is staggered; approximately one-third of the Senate is up for reelection every two years, but the entire body is never up for re-election in the same year (as contrasted with the House, where its entire membership is up for reelection every 2 years). As originally established, senators were elected by the Legislature of the State they represented in the Senate. If a senator died, resigned, or was expelled, the legislature of the state would appoint a replacement to serve out the remainder of the senator's term. If the state legislature was not in session, its governor could appoint a temporary replacement to serve until the legislature could elect a permanent replacement. This was superseded by the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for the popular election of senators, instead of their appointment by the state legislature. In a nod to the less populist nature of the Senate, the amendment tracks the vacancy procedures for the House of Representatives in requiring that the governor call a special election to fill the vacancy, but (unlike in the House) it vests in the state legislature the authority to allow the governor to appoint a temporary replacement until the special election is held. Note, however, that under the original Constitution, the governors of the states were expressly allowed by the Constitution to make temporary appointments. The current system, under the Seventeenth Amendment, allows governors to appoint a replacement only if their state legislature has previously decided to allow the governor to do so; otherwise, the seat must remain vacant until the special election is held to fill the seat, as in the case of a vacancy in the House. Clause 3: Qualifications of senators. No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen. A senator must be at least 30 years of age, must have been a citizen of the United States for at least nine years before being elected, and must reside in the State they will represent at the time of the election.

Course Title and Objectives. Let's start by looking at the title of our course: "Constitutional Law: Sources and Principles." As the title suggests, we will delve into the various sources of constitutional law and examine the fundamental principles that underpin it. Importance of the U.S. Constitution. Now, why is it essential to study the U.S. Constitution? The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, serving as the foundation for our legal system and the framework upon which our government operates. It establishes the structure of our government, outlines the powers and limitations of each branch, and safeguards individual rights. Understanding the Constitution is crucial for any lawyer, as it forms the basis of our legal framework. Historical Context and Drafting of the Constitution. Before we delve into the Constitution's content, let's take a step back and examine its historical context. The Constitution was drafted in the late 18th century, following the American Revolutionary War and the failure of the Articles of Confederation. It was a result of the collective efforts and compromises of the Founding Fathers, who sought to create a more effective and unified system of government. Basic Structure of the Constitution. Now, let's explore the basic structure of the Constitution. It is divided into three main parts: the Preamble, the Articles, and the Amendments. The Preamble sets out the broad goals and purposes of the Constitution, while the Articles outline the powers, functions, and limitations of the three branches of government: the Legislative Branch (Article 1), the Executive Branch (Article2), and the Judicial Branch (Article 3). The Amendments, on the other hand, add to and modify the original provisions of the Constitution. Preamble and its Significance. Let's focus on the Preamble for a moment. The Preamble serves as an introductory statement that outlines the goals and objectives of the Constitution. It begins with the famous words, "We the People," which reflect the idea that the power of the government emanates from the citizens. The Preamble sets the stage for the subsequent Articles and Amendments, guiding the interpretation and application of the Constitution

An honorary trust, under the law of trusts, is a device by which a person establishes a trust for which there is neither a charitable purpose, nor a private beneficiary to enforce the trust. While such a trust would normally be void for lack of a beneficiary, many jurisdictions have carved out two specific exceptions to this rule: trusts for the care of that person's pets; and trusts to provide for the maintenance of cemetery plots. The name of the device derives from the lack of any beneficiary legally capable of enforcing an honorary trust: the trustee is bound by honor, but not by law, to carry out the wishes of the creator of the trust. Like many states, New York has only recently allowed such trusts by statute. An asset-protection trust is any form of trust which provides for funds to be held on a discretionary basis. Such trusts are set up in an attempt to avoid or mitigate the effects of taxation, divorce and bankruptcy on the beneficiary. Such trusts are therefore frequently proscribed or limited in their effects by governments and the courts. The asset-protection trust is a trust that splits the beneficial enjoyment of trust assets from their legal ownership. The beneficiaries of a trust are the beneficial owners of equitable interests in the trust assets, but they do not hold legal title to the assets. Thus this kind of trust fulfills the goal of asset protection planning, for example to insulate assets from claims of creditors without concealment or tax evasion. A creditor's ability to satisfy a judgment against a beneficiary's interest in a trust is limited to the beneficiary's interest in such trust. Consequently, the common goal of asset protection trusts is to limit the interests of beneficiaries in such a way so as to preclude creditors from collecting against trust assets. Such trusts must be irrevocable (a revocable trust will not provide asset protection because and to the extent of the settlor's power to revoke). Most of them contain a spendthrift clause preventing a trust beneficiary from alienating his or her expected interest in favor of a creditor. The spendthrift clause has three general exceptions to the protection afforded: the self-settled trusts (if the settlor of a trust is also a beneficiary of a trust), the case when a debtor is the sole beneficiary and the sole trustee of a trust, and the support payments (a court may order the trustee to satisfy a beneficiary's support obligation to a former spouse or minor child). The first general exception, which accounts for the majority of asset protection trusts, no longer applies in several jurisdictions. The laws of certain jurisdictions including Alaska, Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands allow self-settled trusts to afford their settlors the protection of the spendthrift clause.

Grounds for divorce are regulations specifying the circumstances under which a person will be granted a divorce. Adultery is the most common grounds for divorce. However, there are countries that view male adultery differently than female adultery as grounds for divorce. Before decisions on divorce are considered, one might check into state laws and country laws for legal divorce or separation as each culture has stipulations for divorce. Grounds for divorce. Cruel and inhuman treatment constitute grounds for divorce. In a proper defense, acceptable differences enable the defendant to have the ability to arrange grounds for divorce. Some examples for grounds for divorce are: Sexual harassment, Attendant circumstance, Adulter, Alcoholism, Disability, Desertion, Imprisonment, and Domestic violence (Including physical, sexual, or mental abuse of the other spouse and or the child or children of the couple.) The spouse that is responsible for committing these allegations is required to confirm the correct date and place that the allegations were committed. The reason for the spouse to confirm the allegations is to show proof that the allegations have taken place in the same state. The state then has to have the authority to administer justice by hearing and determining the controversies. Different states accept different grounds for divorce. For example, some states only accept no-fault divorce where other states accept both fault and no-fault grounds for divorce. No-fault divorce is the dissolution of a marriage that does not require a showing of wrongdoing by either party. Laws providing for no-fault divorce allow a family court to grant a divorce in response to a petition by either party of the marriage without requiring the petitioner to provide evidence that the defendant has committed a breach of the marital contract. History. In early modern Europe, Prussia took a pioneering role with Frederick the Great's 1757 edict allowing marriages to be resolved on the ground of serious and continuous hostility between spouses, without pointing to any one guilty party. This early example of no-fault divorce was expanded on and formalized with the 1794 General State Laws for the Prussian States, which allowed childless couples to file for divorce without giving a ground. The first modern no-fault divorce law was enacted in Russia in December 1917 following the October Revolution of the same year. Regarding marriage as a bourgeois institution, the new government transferred divorce jurisdiction from the Russian Orthodox Church to the state courts, which could grant it on application of either spouse. Alimony guarantees under the new regime were weak until a new family code was passed in 1926. With a law adopted in 1969, California became the first U.S. state to permit no-fault divorce. California's law was framed on a roughly contemporaneous effort of the non-governmental organization National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which began drafting a model of no-fault divorce statute for states to consider in 1967. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) is a model law in the United States and has been used since 1970. Australia established no-fault divorce in 1975, with the only ground for divorce being irretrievable breakdown of marriage, evidenced by a twelve-month separation. Canada effectively permitted no-fault divorce in 1986 by reducing the separation period to one year.

While investment managers tend to exercise most voting rights in corporations, bought with pension, life insurance and mutual fund money, employees also exercise voice through collective bargaining rules in labor law. Increasingly, corporate law has converged with labor law. The United States is in a minority of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries that, as yet, has no law requiring employee voting rights in corporations, either in the general meeting or for representatives on the board of directors. On the other hand, the United States has the oldest voluntary codetermination statute for private corporations, in Massachusetts since 1919 passed under the Republican governor Calvin Coolidge, enabling manufacturing companies to have employee representatives on the board of directors, if corporate stockholders agreed. Also in 1919 both Procter & Gamble and the General Ice Delivery Company of Detroit had employee representation on boards. In the early 20th century, labor law theory split between those who advocated collective bargaining backed by strike action, those who advocated a greater role for binding arbitration, and proponents of codetermination as "industrial democracy". Today, these methods are seen as complements, not alternatives. A majority of countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development have laws requiring direct participation rights. In 1994, the Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations: Final Report examined law reform to improve collective labor relations, and suggested minor amendments to encourage worker involvement. Congressional division prevented federal reform, but labor unions and state legislatures have experimented. Corporations are chartered under state law, the larger mostly in Delaware, but leave investors free to organize voting rights and board representation as they choose. Because of unequal bargaining power, but also historic caution of labor unions, shareholders monopolize voting rights in American corporations. From the 1970s employees and unions sought representation on company boards. This could happen through collective agreements, as it historically occurred in Germany or other countries, or through employees demanding further representation through employee stock ownership plans, but they aimed for a voice independent from capital risks that could not be diversified. Corporations where workers attempted to secure board representation included United Airlines, the General Tire and Rubber Company, and the Providence and Worcester Railroad. However, in 1974 the Securities and Exchange Commission, run by appointees of Richard Nixon, rejected that employees who held shares in AT&T were entitled to make proposals to include employee representatives on the board of directors. This position was eventually reversed expressly by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 §971, which subject to rules by the Securities and Exchange Commission entitles shareholders to put forward nominations for the board. Instead of pursuing board seats through shareholder resolutions, for example, the United Auto Workers successfully sought board representation by collective agreement at Chrysler in 1980, and the United SteelWorkers secured board representation in five corporations in 1993. However, it was clear that employee stock ownership plans were open to abuse, particularly after Enron collapsed in 2003. Workers had been enticed to invest an average of 62.5 percent of their retirement savings from 401(k) plans in Enron stock, against basic principles of prudent, diversified investment, and had no board representation. This meant, employees lost a majority of pension savings. For this reason, employees and unions have sought representation simply for investment of labor, without taking on undiversifiable capital risk.

Clause 2: Qualifications of Members. No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. The Constitution provides three requirements for Representatives: A Representative must be at least 25 years old, must be an inhabitant of the state in which he or she is elected, and must have been a citizen of the United States for the previous seven years. There is no requirement that a Representative reside within the district in which he or she represents; although this is usually the case, there have been occasional exceptions. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Qualifications Clause as an exclusive list of qualifications that cannot be supplemented by a house of Congress exercising its Section 5 authority to "judge...the...qualifications of its own members" or by a state in its exercise of its Section 4 authority to prescribe the "times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives." The Supreme Court, as well as other federal courts, have repeatedly barred states from additional restrictions, such as imposing term limits on members of Congress, allowing members of Congress to be subject to recall elections, or requiring that Representatives live in the congressional district in which they represent. A 2002 Congressional Research Service report also found that no state could implement a qualification that a Representative not be a convicted felon or incarcerated. However, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that certain ballot access requirements, such as filing fees and submitting a certain number of valid petition signatures do not constitute additional qualifications and thus few Constitutional restrictions exist as to how harsh ballot access laws can be. Finally, although the U.S. Constitution places no restrictions on state or local office-holders simultaneously holding federal office, most state constitutions today effectively ban state and local office holders from also holding federal office at the same time by prohibiting federal office holders from also holding state and local office. Unlike other state-mandated restrictions, these sorts of prohibitions are constitutional as long they are enforced purely at the state level (for example against active federal office holders seeking to obtain or hold a state or local office). Clause 3: Apportionment of Representatives and taxes. Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

The right of self-defense (also called, when it applies to the defense of another, alter ego defense, defense of others, defense of a third person) is the right for people to use reasonable or defensive force, for the purpose of defending one's own life (self-defense) or the lives of others, including – in certain circumstances – the use of deadly force. If a defendant uses defensive force because of a threat of deadly or grievous harm by the other person, or a reasonable perception of such harm, the defendant is said to have a "perfect self-defense" justification. If the defendant uses defensive force because of such a perception, and the perception is not reasonable, the defendant may have an "imperfect self-defense" as an excuse. General concepts – legal theory. Justification does not make a criminal use of force lawful; if the use of force is justified, it cannot be criminal at all. The early theories make no distinction between defense of the person and defense of property. Whether consciously or not, this builds on the Roman Law principle of dominium where any attack on the members of the family or the property it owned was a personal attack on the pater familias – the male head of the household, sole owner of all property belonging to the household, and endowed by law with dominion over all his descendants through the male line no matter their age. The right to self-defense is phrased as the principle of vim vi repellere licet ("it is permitted to repel force by force") in the Digest of Justitian (6th century). Another early application of this was Martin Luther's concept of justified resistance against a Beerwolf ruler, which was used in the doctrine of the lesser magistrate propounded in the 1550 Magdeburg Confession. In Leviathan (1651), Hobbes (using the English term self-defense for the first time) proposed the foundation political theory that distinguishes between a state of nature where there is no authority and a modern state. Hobbes argues that although some may be stronger or more intelligent than others in their natural state, none are so strong as to be beyond a fear of violent death, which justifies self-defense as the highest necessity. In the Two Treatises of Government, John Locke asserts the reason why an owner would give up their autonomy: ...the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which many call by the general name, property. In earlier times before the development of national policing, an attack on the family home was effectively either an assault on the people actually inside or an indirect assault on their welfare by depriving them of shelter and or the means of production. This linkage between a personal attack and property weakened as societies developed but the threat of violence remains a key factor. As an aspect of sovereignty, in his 1918 speech Politik als Beruf (Politics as a Vocation), Max Weber defined a state as an authority claiming the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within defined territorial boundaries. Recognizing that the modern framework of nations has emerged from the use of force, Weber asserted that the exercise of power through the institutions of government remained indispensable for effective government at any level which necessarily implies that self-help is limited if not excluded.

In American estate planning parlance, an incentive trust is a trust designed to encourage or discourage certain behaviors by using distributions of trust income or principal as an incentive. A typical incentive trust might encourage a beneficiary to complete a degree, enter a profession, or abstain from harmful conduct such as substance abuse. The beneficiary might be paid a certain amount of money from the trust upon graduating from college, or the trust might pay a dollar of income from the trust for every dollar the beneficiary earns. The Protective Trust is a form of settlement found in England and Wales and several Commonwealth countries. It has marked similarities to asset-protection trusts found in several offshore jurisdictions and US Spendthrift trusts. In such a trust assets are ordinarily held to pay an income to the beneficiary. The beneficiary may also have access to capital of the trust with the trustee's permission. The right to receive income from a trust would ordinarily be an asset in the hands of the beneficiary and could be sold, thwarting the intention of the donor to spread the gift over the recipient's lifetime. Additionally on a bankruptcy the right to the income would be sold by the beneficiary's trustee in bankruptcy. The Protective Trust is a form of settlement found in England and Wales and several Commonwealth countries. It has marked similarities to asset-protection trusts found in several offshore jurisdictions and US Spendthrift trusts. In such a trust assets are ordinarily held to pay an income to the beneficiary. The beneficiary may also have access to capital of the trust with the trustee's permission. The right to receive income from a trust would ordinarily be an asset in the hands of the beneficiary and could be sold, thwarting the intention of the donor to spread the gift over the recipient's lifetime. Additionally on a bankruptcy the right to the income would be sold by the beneficiary's trustee in bankruptcy.

Adultery (from Latin adulterium, “I change or alter one lineage for another”) is extra-marital sex partaken by a spouse, or premarital sex partaken by a betrothed person, that is considered objectionable on social, religious, moral, or legal grounds. Although the sexual activities that constitute adultery vary, as well as the social, religious, and legal consequences, the concept exists in many cultures and shares some similarities in Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Adultery is viewed by many jurisdictions as offensive to public morals, undermining the marriage relationship. Historically, many cultures considered adultery a very serious crime, some subject to severe punishment, usually for the woman and sometimes for the man, with penalties including capital punishment, mutilation, or torture. Such punishments have gradually fallen into disfavor, especially in Western countries from the 19th century. In countries where adultery is still a criminal offense, punishments range from fines to caning and even capital punishment. Since the 20th century, criminal laws against adultery have become controversial, with most Western countries decriminalizing adultery. However, even in jurisdictions that have decriminalized adultery, it may still have legal consequences, particularly in jurisdictions with fault-based divorce laws, where adultery almost always constitutes a ground for divorce and may be a factor in property settlement, the custody of children, the denial of alimony, etc. Adultery is not a ground for divorce in jurisdictions which have adopted a no-fault divorce model. International organizations have called for the decriminalization of adultery, especially in the light of several high-profile stoning cases that have occurred in some countries. The head of the United Nations expert body charged with identifying ways to eliminate laws that discriminate against women or are discriminatory to them in terms of implementation or impact, Kamala Chandrakirana, has stated that: "Adultery must not be classified as a criminal offense at all". A joint statement by the United Nations Working Group on discrimination against women in law and in practice states that: "Adultery as a criminal offense violates women’s human rights". In Muslim countries that follow Sharia law for criminal justice, the punishment for adultery may be stoning. There are fifteen countries in which stoning is authorized as lawful punishment, though in recent times it has been legally carried out only in Iran and Somalia. Most countries that criminalize adultery are those where the dominant religion is Islam, and several Sub-Saharan African Christian-majority countries, but there are some notable exceptions to this rule, namely Philippines, and several U.S. states. In some jurisdictions, having sexual relations with the king's wife or the wife of his eldest son constitutes treason.

While the board of directors is generally conferred the power to manage the day-to-day affairs of a corporation, either by the statute, or by the articles of incorporation, this is always subject to limits, including the rights that shareholders have. For example, the Delaware General Corporation Law §141(a) says the "business and affairs of every corporation ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation." However, directors themselves are ultimately accountable to the general meeting through the vote. Invariably, shareholders hold the voting rights, though the extent to which these are useful can be conditioned by the constitution. The DGCL §141(k) gives an option to corporations to have a unitary board that can be removed by a majority of members "without cause" (for example a reason determined by the general meeting and not by a court), which reflects the old default common law position. However, Delaware corporations may also opt for a classified board of directors (for example where only a third of directors come up for election each year) where directors can only be removed "with cause" scrutinized by the courts. More corporations have classified boards after initial public offerings than a few years after going public, because institutional investors typically seek to change the corporation's rules to make directors more accountable. In principle, shareholders in Delaware corporations can make appointments to the board through a majority vote, and can also act to expand the size of the board and elect new directors with a majority. However, directors themselves will often control which candidates can be nominated to be appointed to the board. Under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, §971 empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission to write a new SEC Rule 14a-11 that would allow shareholders to propose nominations for board candidates. The Act required the SEC to evaluate the economic effects of any rules it wrote, however when it did, the Business Roundtable challenged this in court. In Business Roundtable v SEC, Ginsburg J in the DC Circuit Court of Appeals went as far to say that the SEC had "acted arbitrarily and capriciously" in its rulemaking. After this, the Securities and Exchange Commission failed to challenge the decision, and abandoned drafting new rules. This means that in many corporations, directors continue to have a monopoly on nominating future directors. Apart from elections of directors, shareholders' entitlements to vote have been significantly protected by federal regulation, either through stock exchanges or the Securities and Exchange Commission. Beginning in 1927, the New York Stock Exchange maintained a "one share, one vote" policy, which was backed by the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1940. This was thought to be necessary to halt corporations issuing non-voting shares, except to banks and other influential corporate insiders. However, in 1986, under competitive pressure from NASDAQ and AMEX, the NYSE sought to abandon the rule, and the SEC quickly drafted a new Rule 19c-4, requiring the one share, one vote principle. In Business Roundtable v SEC the DC Circuit Court of Appeals struck the rule down, through the exchanges and the SEC subsequently made an agreement to regulate shareholder voting rights "proportionately". Today, many corporations have unequal shareholder voting rights, up to a limit of ten votes per share. Stronger rights exist regarding shareholders' ability to delegate their votes to nominees, or doing "proxy voting" under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Its provisions were introduced to combat the accumulation of power by directors or management friendly voting trusts after the Wall Street Crash.