Law School

United States nationality law details the conditions in which a person holds United States nationality. In the United States, nationality is typically obtained through provisions in the U.S. Constitution, various laws, and international agreements. While the domestic documents often use citizenship and nationality interchangeably, nationality refers to the legal means in which a person obtains a national identity and formal membership in a nation and citizenship refers to the relationship a national has with the nation after becoming a member of it. Individuals born in any of the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia or almost any inhabited territory are natural-born United States citizens. The sole exception is American Samoa, where individuals are typically non-citizen U.S. nationals at birth. Foreign nationals living in any state or qualified territory may naturalize after becoming permanent residents and meeting a residence requirement (normally five years). History. Constitutional foundation. Nationality defines the legal relationship between a person and a state or nation, specifying who is a member or subject of a particular nation. The rights and obligations of citizenship are defined by this relationship, as well as the protections to which nationals are entitled. Though nationality and citizenship are distinct and the United States recognizes the distinction between those who are entitled or not entitled to rights, its statutes typically use the words "citizen" and "citizenship" instead of "national" and "nationality". The Constitution of the United States did not define either nationality or citizenship, but in Article 1, section 8, clause 4 gave Congress the authority to establish a naturalization law. Before the American Civil War and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, there was no other language in the Constitution dealing with nationality.

Cohabitation is an arrangement where two people are not married but live together. They are often involved in a romantic or sexually intimate relationship on a long-term or permanent basis. Such arrangements have become increasingly common in Western countries since the late 20th century, being led by changing social views, especially regarding marriage, gender roles and religion. More broadly, the term cohabitation can mean any number of people living together. To "cohabit", in a broad sense, means to "coexist". The origin of the term comes from the mid-16th century, from the Latin cohabitare, from co- 'together' + habitare 'dwell'. Reasons for cohabitation in the United States. Today, cohabitation in the United States is often a part of the dating process. In fact, "cohabitation is increasingly becoming the first coresidential union formed among young adults." In 1996, more than two-thirds of married couples in the US said that they lived together before getting married. "In 1994, there were 3.7 million cohabiting couples in the United States." This is a major increase from a few decades ago. According to Dr. Galena Rhoades, "Before 1970, living together outside marriage was uncommon, but by the late 1990s at least 50% to 60% of couples lived together premaritally. People may live together for a number of reasons. Cohabitants could live together in order to save money, because of the convenience of living with another, or a need to find housing. Lower income individuals facing financial uncertainty may delay or avoid marriage, not only because of the difficulty of paying for a wedding but also because of fear of financial hardship if a marriage were to end in divorce. When given a survey of the reasons why they cohabit, most couples listed reasons such as spending more time together, convenience based reasons, and testing their relationships, while few gave the reason that they do not believe in marriage. The extremely high costs of housing and tight budgets of today's economy are also factors that can lead a couple to cohabitation. Today sixty percent of all marriages are preceded by a period of cohabitation. Researchers suggest that couples live together as a way of trying out marriage to test compatibility with their partners, while still having the option of ending the relationship without legal implications. In 1996, "More than three-quarters of all cohabitors report plans to marry their partners, which implies that most of them viewed cohabitation as a prelude to marriage. Cohabitation shares many qualities with marriage, often couples who are cohabiting share a residence, personal resources, exclude intimate relations with others and, in more than 10% of cohabiting couples, have children. "Many young adults believe cohabitation is a good way to test their relationships prior to marriage. Couples who have plans to marry before moving in together or who are engaged before cohabiting typically marry within two years of living together. The state of cohabitation of a couple often ends either in marriage or in break-up; according to a 1996 study about 10% of cohabiting unions remained in this state for more than five years. According to a survey done by The National Center for Health Statistics, "over half of marriages from 1990-1994 among women began as cohabitation. Cohabitation can be an alternative to marriage in situations where marriage is not possible for financial or family reasons (such as same-sex, interracial or interreligious marriages).

The age of criminal responsibility is the age below which a child is deemed incapable of having committed a criminal offence. In legal terms, it is referred to as a defense of infancy, which is a form of defense known as an excuse so that defendants falling within the definition of an "infant" are excluded from criminal liability for their actions, if at the relevant time, they had not reached an age of criminal responsibility. After reaching the initial age, there may be levels of responsibility dictated by age and the type of offense committed. Under the English common law, the defense of infancy was expressed as a set of presumptions in a doctrine known as doli incapax. A child under the age of seven was presumed incapable of committing a crime. The presumption was conclusive, prohibiting the prosecution from offering evidence that the child had the capacity to appreciate the nature and wrongfulness of what they had done. Children aged 7–13 were presumed incapable of committing a crime but the presumption was rebuttable. The prosecution could overcome the presumption by proving that the child understood what they were doing, and it was wrong. In fact, capacity was a necessary element of the state's case. If the state failed to offer sufficient evidence of capacity, the infant was entitled to have the charges dismissed at the close of the state's evidence. Doli incapax was abolished in England and Wales in 1998, but persists in other common law jurisdictions. In criminal law, the intoxication defense is a defense by which a defendant may claim diminished responsibility on the basis of substance intoxication. Where a crime requires a certain mental state (mens rea) to break the law, those under the influence of an intoxicating substance may be considered to have reduced liability for their actions. With regard to punishment, intoxication may be a mitigating factor that decreases a prison or jail sentence. Numerous factors affect the applicability of the defense.

An interest in possession trust is a trust in which at least one beneficiary has the right to receive the income generated by the trust (if trust funds are invested) or the right to enjoy the trust assets for the present time in another way. The beneficiary with the right to enjoy the trust property for the time being is said to have an interest in possession and is colloquially described as an income beneficiary, or the life tenant. Beneficiaries of a trust have an interest in possession if they have the immediate and automatic right to receive the income arising from the trust property as it arises, or have the use and enjoyment of it, such as by living in a property owned by the trustees. Such a beneficiary is also known as an income beneficiary or life tenant. There may be more than one income beneficiary, who may have either a joint tenancy or as tenants in common. The trustee must pass all of the income received, less any trustees' expenses, to the beneficiaries. For income tax purposes, the income so accruing to the income beneficiary is taxable income of the beneficiary, and taxed accordingly, unless otherwise exempted. A beneficiary who is entitled to the income of the trust for life is known as a ‘life tenant’ or as ‘having a life interest’. A beneficiary who is entitled to the trust capital is known as the ‘remainderman’ or the ‘capital beneficiary’. An express trust is a trust created "in express terms, and usually in writing, as distinguished from one inferred by the law from the conduct or dealings of the parties." Property is transferred by a person (called a trustor, settlor, or grantor) to a transferee (called the trustee), who holds the property for the benefit of one or more persons, called beneficiaries. The trustee may distribute the property, or the income from that property, to the beneficiaries. Express trusts are frequently used in common law jurisdictions as methods of wealth preservation or enhancement. A charitable trust is an irrevocable trust established for charitable purposes and, in some jurisdictions, a more specific term than "charitable organization". A charitable trust enjoys a varying degree of tax benefits in most countries. It also generates goodwill. Some important terminology in charitable trusts is the term "corpus" (Latin for "body"), which refers to the assets with which the trust is funded, and the term "donor", which is the person donating assets to a charity.

The Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The assistance of counsel clause includes five distinct rights: the right to counsel of choice, the right to appointed counsel, the right to conflict-free counsel, the effective assistance of counsel, and the right to represent oneself pro se. Attachment at critical stages. As stated in Brewer v Williams, (1977), the right to counsel “means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him, 'whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.'” Brewer goes on to conclude that once adversarial proceedings have begun against a defendant, he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him and that when a defendant is arrested, “arraigned on  warrant before a judge,” and “committed by the court to confinement,” “here can be no doubt that judicial proceedings ha been initiated.” Individuals subject to grand jury proceedings do not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel because grand juries are not considered by the U.S. Supreme Court to be criminal proceedings which trigger the protections of that constitutional protection. Choice of counsel. Subject to considerations such as conflicts of interest, scheduling, counsel's authorization to practice law in the jurisdiction, and counsel's willingness to represent the defendant (whether pro bono or for a fee), criminal defendants have a right to be represented by counsel of their choice. The remedy for erroneous deprivation of first choice counsel is automatic reversal.

In 1954 the contextualization of the equal protection clause would change forever. The Supreme Court itself recognized the gravity of the Brown v Board decision acknowledging that a split decision would be a threat to the role of the Supreme Court and even to the country. When Earl Warren became Chief Justice in 1953, Brown had already come before the Court. While Vinson was still Chief Justice, there had been a preliminary vote on the case at a conference of all nine justices. At that time, the Court had split, with a majority of the justices voting that school segregation did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Warren, however, through persuasion and good-natured cajoling—he had been an extremely successful Republican politician before joining the Court—was able to convince all eight associate justices to join his opinion declaring school segregation unconstitutional. In that opinion, Warren wrote: To separate from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone ... We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Warren discouraged other justices, such as Robert H Jackson, from publishing any concurring opinion; Jackson's draft, which emerged much later (in 1988), included this statement: "Constitutions are easier amended than social customs, and even the North never fully conformed its racial practices to its professions". The Court set the case for re-argument on the question of how to implement the decision. In Brown II, decided in 1954, it was concluded that since the problems identified in the previous opinion were local, the solutions needed to be so as well. Thus the court devolved authority to local school boards and to the trial courts that had originally heard the cases. (Brown was actually a consolidation of four different cases from four different states.) The trial courts and localities were told to desegregate with "all deliberate speed". partly because of that enigmatic phrase, but mostly because of self-declared "massive resistance" in the South to the desegregation decision, integration did not begin in any significant way until the mid-1960s and then only to a small degree. In fact, much of the integration in the 1960s happened in response not to Brown but to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court intervened a handful of times in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but its next major desegregation decision was not until Green v School Board of New Kent County (1968), in which Justice William J Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected a "freedom-of-choice" school plan as inadequate. This was a significant decision; freedom-of-choice plans had been a quite common response to Brown. Under these plans, parents could choose to send their children to either a formerly white or a formerly black school. Whites almost never opted to attend black-identified schools, however, and blacks rarely attended white-identified schools. In response to Green, many Southern districts replaced freedom-of-choice with geographically based schooling plans; because residential segregation was widespread, little integration was accomplished. In 1971, the Court in Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education approved busing as a remedy to segregation; three years later, though, in the case of Milliken v Bradley (1974), it set aside a lower court order that had required the busing of students between districts, instead of merely within a district. Milliken basically ended the Supreme Court's major involvement in school desegregation; however, up through the 1990s many federal trial courts remained involved in school desegregation cases, many of which had begun in the 1950s and 1960s.

The type, functions, and characteristics of marriage vary from culture to culture, and can change over time. In general there are two types: civil marriage and religious marriage, and typically marriages employ a combination of both (religious marriages must often be licensed and recognized by the state, and conversely civil marriages, while not sanctioned under religious law, are nevertheless respected). Marriages between people of differing religions are called interfaith marriages, while marital conversion, a more controversial concept than interfaith marriage, refers to the religious conversion of one partner to the other's religion for sake of satisfying a religious requirement.

The insanity defense, also known as the mental disorder defense, is an affirmative defense by excuse in a criminal case, arguing that the defendant is not responsible for their actions due to an episodic or persistent psychiatric disease at the time of the criminal act. This is contrasted with an excuse of provocation, in which the defendant is responsible, but the responsibility is lessened due to a temporary mental state. It is also contrasted with a finding that a defendant cannot stand trial in a criminal case because a mental disease prevents them from effectively assisting counsel, from a civil finding in trusts and estates where a will is nullified because it was made when a mental disorder prevented a testator from recognizing the natural objects of their bounty, and from involuntary civil commitment to a mental institution, when anyone is found to be gravely disabled or to be a danger to themselves or to others. Exemption from full criminal punishment on such grounds dates back to at least the Code of Hammurabi. Legal definitions of insanity or mental disorder are varied, and include the M'Naghten Rule, the Durham rule, the 1953 British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment report, the ALI rule (American Legal Institute Model Penal Code rule), and other provisions, often relating to a lack of mens rea ("guilty mind"). In the criminal laws of Australia and Canada, statutory legislation enshrines the M'Naghten Rules, with the terms defense of mental disorder, defense of mental illness or not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder employed. Being incapable of distinguishing right from wrong is one basis for being found to be legally insane as a criminal defense. It originated in the M'Naghten Rule, and has been reinterpreted and modernized through more recent cases, such as People v Serravo. In the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the United States, use of the defense is rare; however, since the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, insanity pleas have steadily increased in the UK. Mitigating factors, including things not eligible for the insanity defense such as intoxication (or, more frequently, diminished capacity), may lead to reduced charges or reduced sentences. The defense is based on evaluations by forensic mental health professionals with the appropriate test according to the jurisdiction. Their testimony guides the jury, but they are not allowed to testify to the accused's criminal responsibility, as this is a matter for the jury to decide. Similarly, mental health practitioners are restrained from making a judgment on the "ultimate issue"—whether the defendant is insane. Some jurisdictions require the evaluation to address the defendant's ability to control their behavior at the time of the offense (the volitional limb). A defendant claiming the defense is pleading "not guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI) or "guilty but insane or mentally ill" in some jurisdictions which, if successful, may result in the defendant being committed to a psychiatric facility for an indeterminate period.

A constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed by a court to benefit a party that has been wrongfully deprived of its rights due to either a person obtaining or holding a legal property right which they should not possess due to unjust enrichment or interference, or due to a breach of fiduciary duty, which is intercausative with unjust enrichment and/or property interference. It is a type of implied trust (for example, it is created by conduct, not explicitly by a settlor).  Events generating constructive trusts.  Breach of fiduciary duty.  In a constructive trust the defendant breaches a duty owed to the plaintiff. The most common such breach is a breach of fiduciary duty, such as when an agent wrongfully obtains or holds property owned by a principal. A controversial example is the case of Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid, in which a senior prosecutor took bribes not to prosecute certain offenders. With the bribe money, he purchased property in New Zealand. His employer, the Attorney-General, sought a declaration that the property was held on constructive trust for it, on the basis of breach of fiduciary duty. The Privy Council awarded a constructive trust. The case is different from Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver, because there was no interference with a profit-making opportunity that properly belonged to the prosecutor.  Being a Privy Council decision, Reid did not overrule the previous decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Lister v Stubbs which held the opposite, partially because a trust is a very strong remedy that gives proprietary rights to the claimant not enjoyed by the defendant's other creditors. In the event of the defendant's insolvency, the trust assets are untouchable by the general creditors. Supporters of Lister suggested that there was no good reason to put the victim of wrongdoing ahead of other creditors of the estate. There was a tension in English law between Lister and Reid which was highlighted in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd. The United Kingdom Supreme Court subsequently overruled Sinclair in FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC, holding that Lister was no longer good law.  A resulting trust is an implied trust that comes into existence by operation of law, where property is transferred to someone who pays nothing for it; and then is implied to have held the property for benefit of another person. The trust property is said to "result" or jump back to the transferor (implied settlor). In this instance, the word 'result' means "in the result, remains with", or something similar to "revert" except that in the result the beneficial interest is held on trust for the settlor. Not all trusts whose beneficiary is also the settlor can be called resulting trusts. In common law systems, the resulting trust refers to a subset of trusts which have such outcome; express trusts which stipulate that the settlor is to be the beneficiary are not normally considered resulting trusts.  The beneficial interest results in the settlor, or if the settlor has died the property forms part of the settlor's estate (intestacy). It remains with the person and Re Vandervell case shows that only the beneficial interest disappears but not the beneficiary interest. 

Right to counsel means a defendant has a right to have the assistance of counsel (for example, lawyers) and, if the defendant cannot afford a lawyer, requires that the government appoint one or pay the defendant's legal expenses. The right to counsel is generally regarded as a constituent of the right to a fair trial. Historically, however, not all countries have always recognized the right to counsel. The right is often included in national constitutions. 153 of the 194 constitutions currently in force have language to this effect. Around the world. United States. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. The assistance of counsel clause includes, as relevant here, five distinct rights: the right to counsel of choice, the right to appointed counsel, the right to conflict-free counsel, the effective assistance of counsel, and the right to represent oneself pro se. A defendant does not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in any civil proceeding, including a deportation hearing (even though deportability is often a collateral consequence of criminal conviction). However, as described below, there are certain civil proceedings where parties have a right to appointed counsel; such a right is pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's due process or equal protection clause, a state constitution's due process or equal protection clause, or a federal/state statute. Subject to considerations such as conflicts of interest, scheduling, counsel's authorization to practice law in the jurisdiction, and counsel's willingness to represent the defendant (whether pro bono or for a fee), criminal defendants have a right to be represented by counsel of their choice. The remedy for erroneous deprivation of first choice counsel is automatic reversal.