Law School

Complicity is the participation in a completed criminal act of an accomplice, a partner in the crime who aids or encourages (abets) other perpetrators of that crime, and who shares with them an intent to act to complete the crime. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if they purpose the completion of a crime, and toward that end, if that person solicits or encourages the other person, or aids or attempts to aid in planning or committing the crime, or has legal duty to prevent that crime but fails to make an effort to prevent it properly. Unlike attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy, which are crimes in and of themselves, complicity is not itself a crime but is a way of committing a crime. It also differs from an attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy in that it always depends on that crime having been completed (for example, it is never inchoate). Complicity does not require causation of the crime, merely participating in the commission of the crime. In cases where one is complicit because of a failure to act when one has a duty to act to prevent a crime, complicity differs from omission in that liability for complicity arises from the related to other perpetrators, whereas liability for omission arises from a duty relationship to the victim.  Common law traditionally distinguished between a "principal" perpetrator who is primarily responsible for a crime and an "accessory" perpetrator who is less responsible. However, modern approaches abandon this distinction, and "a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when he is an accomplice of the other person in the commission of the crime". For two persons to be complicit in a crime that does not involve negligence, they must share the same criminal intent; "there must be a community of purpose, partnership in the unlawful undertaking". An accomplice "is a partner in the crime, the chief ingredient of which is always intent". In crimes not involving negligence, there should be evidence that an accomplice had knowledge of the intention of their partner.

Non est factum (Latin for "it is not  deed") is a defense in contract law that allows a signing party to escape performance of an agreement "which is fundamentally different from what he or she intended to execute or sign." A claim of non est factum means that the signature on the contract was signed by mistake, without knowledge of its meaning. A successful plea would make the contract void ab initio. The parol evidence rule is a rule in the Anglo-American common law that governs what kinds of evidence parties to a contract dispute can introduce when trying to determine the specific terms of a contract. The rule also prevents parties who have reduced their agreement to a final written document from later introducing other evidence, such as the content of oral discussions from earlier in the negotiation process, as evidence of a different intent as to the terms of the contract. The rule provides that "extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to vary a written contract". The term "parol" derives from the Anglo-Norman French parol or parole, meaning "word of mouth" or "verbal", and in medieval times referred to oral pleadings in a court case. The rule's origins lie in English contract law, but has been adopted in other common law jurisdictions; however there are now some differences between application of the rule in different jurisdictions. For instance, in the US, a common misconception is that it is a rule of evidence (like the Federal Rules of Evidence), but that is not the case; whereas in England it is indeed a rule of evidence. The supporting rationale for this is that since the contracting parties have reduced their agreement to a single and final writing, extrinsic evidence of past agreements or terms should not be considered when interpreting that writing, as the parties had decided to ultimately leave them out of the contract. In other words, one may not use evidence made prior to the written contract to contradict the writing. Overview. The rule applies to parol evidence, as well as other extrinsic evidence (such as written correspondence that does not form a separate contract) regarding a contract. If a contract is in writing and final to at least one term (integrated), parol or extrinsic evidence will generally be excluded.  However, there are a number of exceptions to this general rule, including for partially integrated contracts, agreements with separate consideration, to resolve ambiguities, or to establish contract defenses. To take an example, Carl agrees in writing to sell Betty a car for $1,000, but later, Betty argues that Carl earlier told her that she would only need to pay Carl $800. The parol evidence rule would generally prevent Betty from testifying to this alleged conversation because the testimony ($800) would directly contradict the written contract's terms ($1,000). The precise extent of the rule varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. As a preliminary or threshold issue, the court may first determine if the agreement was in fact totally reduced to a written document or (in US terminology) fully "integrated". In the case of State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd McHugh J held the parol evidence rule has 'no operation until it is first determined' that all the terms of the contract are in writing. This threshold question applies even in those jurisdictions that apply a very strong form of the parol evidence rule, called the "Four Corners Rule".

Acts constituting conversion. An action for conversion does not rest on knowledge or intent of the defendant. The act constituting "conversion" must be an intentional act, but does not require wrongful intent, and is not excused by care, good faith, or lack of knowledge. Fraudulent intent is not an element of conversion. The defendant is answerable for the conversion, no matter how good his intentions were, or how careful he has been, or how apparently well-founded was his belief that his tortious act was right. The existence of probable cause does not preclude liability. A person may be liable for conversion even though he was reasonably mistaken in thinking the facts to be such as would give him a legal right to the goods. There are cases in which the defendant does not clearly appropriate the property to his own use, and in which the question whether there is a conversion therefore depends on the intent of the defendant either express or implied. In general. Conversion, being a wrongful act, cannot spring from the exercise of a legal right. Such acts include the right of execution on a legal judgment or contesting rights under a contract. The general rule is that there is no conversion until some act is done which is a denial or violation of the plaintiff's dominion over or rights in the property. To constitute a conversion of a chattel, there must be an unauthorized assumption of the right to possession or ownership. The act must have the essence of a tort. Depriving owner of possession. The exercise of ownership over property may take a number of forms. All that is required is that the defendant exercise control over the chattel in a manner inconsistent with the plaintiff's right of possession. The gist of a conversion is not the acquisition of the property by the wrongdoer, but the wrongful deprivation of another's property which the owner is entitled to possess. Receipt of property. A person who accepts the possession of personal property from one not authorized to transfer it may be regarded as a converter. The Restatement (Second) of Torts is in accord with this concept, stating that one who receives possession of a chattel from another with the intent to acquire for himself or a third person a proprietary interest in the chattel which the other has not the power to transfer is subject to liability for conversion to a third person then entitled to the immediate possession of the chattel.

United States v Texas was United States Supreme Court case that involved the Texas Heartbeat Act (also known as Senate Bill 8 or SB8), a state law that bans abortion once a fetal heartbeat is detected, typically six weeks into pregnancy. A unique feature of the Act, and challenges to it, is the delegation of enforcement to any and all private individuals who are authorized by the Act to file civil actions against abortion providers who violate it, and aiders and abetters, while state and local officials are prohibited from doing so. The Act is stated by its opponents to go against the landmark 1973 Supreme Court decision Roe v Wade, which bans states from regulating abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy in favor of the woman's right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. As one of several challenges to the law, the Supreme Court within United States v Texas will consider and decide whether the federal government has standing and the right to sue Texas for injunctive and declaratory relief to stop enforcement of the Act through private civil litigation in the Texas judicial system. The case was fast-tracked by the Court and heard on November 1, 2021, alongside Whole Woman's Health v Jackson, which was brought by abortion providers and allies as a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of the Texas Heartbeat Act under the U.S. constitution. The Supreme Court ruled in a per curiam decision in December 2021 that the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted and dismissed the case. Background. Texas passed the Texas Heartbeat Act in May 2021, with the bill to go into effect on September 1, 2021. One of several heartbeat bills in the country, Texas's bill banned abortion once "cardiac activity" in an embryo can be detected, typically after six weeks of pregnancy. Because of the potential conflict with the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v Wade in that states could not regulate abortions during the first trimester (three months) of pregnancy in the interest of the right of privacy for women, the Texas Heartbeat Act does not allow the state to enforce the ban, but instead gives power to any interested party to sue anyone that performs an illegal abortion or supports that, and seek statutory damages of at least $10,000 in courts. District Court. On September 6, 2021, United States Attorney General Merrick Garland announced that the Justice Department (DOJ) will protect abortion seekers under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act. On September 8, 2021, The Wall Street Journal reported that the Biden administration plans to sue Texas on the basis that the Act "illegally interferes with federal interests".

Excise tax in the United States is an indirect tax on listed items. Excise taxes can be and are made by federal, state, and local governments and are not uniform throughout the United States. Some excise taxes are collected from the producer or retailer and not paid directly by the consumer, and as such often remain "hidden" in the price of a product or service, rather than being listed separately. Federal excise taxes and revenues. Federal excise taxes raised $98.3 billion in fiscal year 2015 or 3% of total federal tax revenue. Fuel. Excise taxes on fuel raised $37.4 billion in fiscal year 2015. These fuel taxes raised 90% of the Highway Trust Fund (18.4¢ for gasoline and 24.4¢ for diesel fuel per gallon). Airport & airway trust fund. Excise taxes dedicated to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund raised $14.3 billion in fiscal year 2015. 90% of the excise tax revenue comes from taxing passenger air fares and the remaining 10% comes from air cargo and aviation fuel taxes. Affordable Care Act excise taxes. Excise taxes for the Affordable Care Act raised $16.3 billion in fiscal year 2015. $11.3 billion was an excise tax placed directly on health insurers based on their market share. The ACA was going to impose a 40% "Cadillac tax" on expensive employer sponsored health insurance but that was postponed until 2018, and later further postponed and eventually repealed before its rollout on December 20, 2019. Annual excise taxes totaling $3 billion were levied on importers and manufacturers of prescription drugs. An excise tax of 2.32% on medical devices and a 10% excise tax on indoor tanning services are applied as well. The same budget bill that repealed the Cadillac tax also repealed the medical device tax for all sales occurring after December 31. Tobacco. Excise taxes on tobacco raised $14.5 billion in fiscal year 2015. The tax equals about $1 per 20-pack of cigarettes. Alcohol. Excise taxes on alcoholic beverages raised $9.6 billion in fiscal year 2015. Cannabis. In 2020, state and local governments earned over $3 billion in tax revenue from cannabis taxes.

In common law, a deed is any legal instrument in writing which passes, affirms or confirms an interest, right, or property and that is signed, attested, delivered, and in some jurisdictions, sealed. It is commonly associated with transferring (conveyancing) title to property. The deed has a greater presumption of validity and is less rebuttable than an instrument signed by the party to the deed. A deed can be unilateral or bilateral. Deeds include conveyances, commissions, licenses, patents, diplomas, and conditionally powers of attorney if executed as deeds. The deed is the modern descendant of the medieval charter, and delivery is thought to symbolically replace the ancient ceremony of livery of seisin. The traditional phrase signed, sealed and delivered refers to the practice of seals; however, attesting witnesses have replaced seals to some extent. Agreements under seal are also called contracts by deed or specialty; in the United States, a specialty is enforceable without consideration. In some jurisdictions, specialties have a liability limitation period of double that of a simple contract and allow for a third party beneficiary to enforce an undertaking in the deed, thereby overcoming the doctrine of privity. Specialties, as a form of contract, are bilateral and can therefore be distinguished from covenants, which, being also under seal, are unilateral promises. Requirements. At common law, to be valid and enforceable, a deed must meet several requirements: It must state on its face that it is a deed, using wording like "This Deed..." or "executed as a deed". It must indicate that the instrument itself conveys some privilege or thing to someone. The grantor must have the legal ability to grant the thing or privilege, and the grantee must have the legal capacity to receive it. It must be executed by the grantor in presence of the prescribed number of witnesses, known as instrumentary witnesses (this is known as being in solemn form). In some jurisdictions, a seal must be affixed to it. Originally, affixing seals made persons parties to the deed and signatures optional, but seals are now outdated in most jurisdictions, so the signatures of the grantor and witnesses are primary. It must be delivered to, (delivery), and, in some jurisdictions, accepted by the grantee, (acceptance). Conditions attached to the acceptance of a deed are known as covenants. A deed indented or indenture is one executed in two or more parts according to the number of parties, which were formerly separated by cutting in a curved or indented line known as the chirograph. A deed poll is one executed in one part, by one party, having the edge polled or cut even, and includes simple grants and appointments.

Under the English common law, an accomplice is a person who actively participates in the commission of a crime, even if they take no part in the actual criminal offense. For example, in a bank robbery, the person who points the gun at the teller and demands the money is guilty of armed robbery. Anyone else directly involved in the commission of the crime, such as the lookout or the getaway car driver, is an accomplice, even if in the absence of an underlying offense keeping a lookout or driving a car would not be an offense. An accomplice differs from an accessory in that an accomplice is present at the actual crime, and could be prosecuted even if the main criminal (the principal) is not charged or convicted. An accessory is generally not present at the actual crime, and may be subject to lesser penalties than an accomplice or principal. At law, an accomplice has lesser guilt than the person he or she is assisting, is subject to lesser prosecution for the same crime, and faces the smaller criminal penalties. As such, the three accomplices to the bank robbery above can also to a degree be found guilty of armed robbery even if only one stole money. The fairness of the doctrine that the accomplice is still guilty has been subject to much discussion, particularly in cases of capital crimes. Accomplices have been prosecuted for felony murder even if the actual person who committed the murder died at the crime scene or otherwise did not face capital punishment. In jurisdictions based on the common law, the concept of an accomplice has often been heavily modified by statute, or replaced by new concepts entirely. United States. Aiding and abetting is a provision in United States criminal law, for situations where it cannot be shown the party personally carried out the criminal offense, but where another person may have carried out the illegal act(s) as an agent of the charged, working together with or under the direction of the charged party, who is an accessory to the crime. It is derived from the United States Code (USC), section two of title 18: (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever knowingly and willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed. by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. Where the term "principal" refers to any actor who is primarily responsible for a criminal offense. An accomplice was often referred to as an abettor. This term is not in active use in the United States, having been replaced by accomplice.

The statute of frauds is the requirement that certain kinds of contracts be memorialized in writing, signed by the party to be charged, with sufficient content to evidence the contract. The term statute of frauds comes from an Act of the Parliament of England passed in 1677 (authored by Lord Nottingham assisted by Sir Matthew Hale, Sir Francis North and Sir Leoline Jenkins. and passed by the Cavalier Parliament), the title of which is An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries. Many common law jurisdictions have made similar statutory provisions, while a number of civil law jurisdictions have equivalent legislation incorporated into their civil codes. The original English statute itself may still be in effect in a number of Canadian provinces, depending on the constitutional or reception statute of English law, and any subsequent legislative developments. Application. The statute of frauds typically requires a signed writing in the following circumstances: Contracts in consideration of marriage. This provision covers prenuptial agreements. Contracts that cannot be performed within one year. However, contracts of indefinite duration do not fall under the statute of frauds regardless of how long the performance actually takes. Contracts for the transfer of an interest in land. This applies not only to a contract to sell land but also to any other contract in which land or an interest in it is disposed, such as the grant of a mortgage or an easement. Contracts by the executor of a will to pay a debt of the estate with his own money. Contracts for the sale of goods totaling $500.00 or more. Contracts in which one party becomes a surety (acts as guarantor) for another party's debt or other obligation. In an action for specific performance of a contract to convey land, the agreement must be in writing to satisfy the statute of frauds. The statute is satisfied if the contract to convey is evidenced by a writing or writings containing the essential terms of a purchase and sale agreement and signed by the party against whom the contract is to be enforced. If there is no written agreement, a court of equity can specifically enforce an oral agreement to convey only if the part performance doctrine is satisfied. In most jurisdictions, part performance is proven when the purchaser pays the purchase price, has possession of the land, and makes improvements on the land, all with the permission of the seller. No jurisdiction is satisfied by payment of the purchase price alone. Under common law, the statute of frauds also applies to contract modifications. For example, in an oral agreement for the lease of a car for nine months, immediately after taking possession, the lessor then decides that he really likes the car and makes an oral offer to the lessee to extend the term of the lease by an additional six months. Although neither agreement alone comes under the statute of frauds, the oral extension modifies the original contract to make it a fifteen-month lease (nine months plus the additional six), thereby bringing it under the statute as the contract now exceeds twelve months in duration. In theory, the same principle works in reverse as well, such that an agreement to reduce a lease from fifteen months to nine months would not require a writing. However, many jurisdictions have enacted statutes that require a writing for such situations.

Conversion is an intentional tort consisting of "taking with the intent of exercising over the chattel an ownership inconsistent with the real owner's right of possession". In England & Wales, it is a tort of strict liability. Its equivalents in criminal law include larceny or theft and criminal conversion. In those jurisdictions that recognize it, criminal conversion is a lesser crime than theft/larceny. Examples of conversion include: 1) Alpha cuts down and hauls away trees on land s/he knows is owned by Beta, without permission or privilege to do so; and 2) Gamma takes furniture belonging to Delta and puts it into storage, without Delta's consent (and especially if Delta does not know where Gamma put it). A common act of conversion in medieval times involved bolts of cloth that were bailed for safekeeping, which the bailee or a third party took and made clothes for their own use or for sale. Many questions concerning joint ownership in enterprises such as a partnership belong in equity, and do not rise to the level of a conversion. Traditionally, a conversion occurs when some chattel is lost, then found by another who appropriates it to his own use without legal authority to do so. It has also applied in cases where chattels were bailed for safekeeping, then misused or misappropriated by the bailee or a third party. Conversion, as a purely civil wrong, is distinguishable from both theft and unjust enrichment. Theft is obviously an act inconsistent with another's rights, and theft will also be conversion. But not all conversions are thefts because conversion requires no element of dishonesty. Conversion is also different from unjust enrichment. If one claims an unjust enrichment, the person who has another's property may always raise a change of position defense, to say they have unwittingly used up the assets they were transferred. For conversion, there always must be an element of voluntarily dealing with another's property, inconsistently with their rights.

Debate. The estate tax is a recurring source of contentious political debate and political football. Generally the debate breaks down between a side which opposes any tax on inheritance, and another which considers it good policy. Arguments in support. Proponents of the estate tax argue that large inheritances (currently those over $5 million) are a progressive and fair source of government funding. Removing the estate tax, they argue, favors only the very wealthy and leaves a greater share of the total tax burden on working taxpayers. Proponents further argue that campaigns to repeal the tax rely on public confusion about the estate tax and about tax policy more generally. William Gale and Joel Slemrod give three reasons for taxing at the point of inheritance in their book Rethinking Estate and Gift Taxation. "First, the probate process may reveal information about lifetime economic well-being that is difficult to obtain in the course of enforcement of the income tax but is nevertheless relevant to societal notions of who should pay tax. Second, taxes imposed at death may have smaller disincentive effects on lifetime labor supply and saving than taxes that raise the same revenue (in present value terms) but are imposed during life. Third, if society does wish to tax lifetime transfers among adult households, it is difficult to see any time other than death at which to assess the total transfers made." While death may be unpleasant to contemplate, there are good administrative, equity, and efficiency reasons to impose taxes at death, and the asserted costs appear to be overblown. — William Gale and Joel Slemrod