Law School

A constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed by a court to benefit a party that has been wrongfully deprived of its rights due to either a person obtaining or holding a legal property right which they should not possess due to unjust enrichment or interference, or due to a breach of fiduciary duty, which is intercausative with unjust enrichment and or property interference. It is a type of implied trust (for example, it is created by conduct, not explicitly by a settler). In the United States (in contrast to England), a constructive trust remedy generally does not recognize or create any continuing fiduciary relationship — that is, a constructive trust is not actually a trust except in name. Rather, it is a fiction declaring that the plaintiff has equitable title to the property at issue, and ordering the defendant to transfer legal ownership and possession to the plaintiff. For instance, in some states the slayer rule is implemented in the form of a constructive trust. Definition. Constructive trusts are imposed by operation of law. They are also referred to as implied trusts. They are not subject to formality requirements. Unlike a resulting trust, which also arises by operation of law, a constructive trust does not give effect to the imputed or presumed intention of the parties. Instead, constructive trusts are largely said to be triggered by unconscionability. This is the idea that a defendant would be unjustly enriched if they were allowed to keep property for themselves. The main issue with this argument is that we would have to have a really broad approach to unjust enrichment in order for a constructive trust to come under that underpinning concept in order for us to understand constructive trust. This statement is incoherent and without any basis in law or fact. Events generating constructive trusts. Breach of fiduciary duty. In a constructive trust the defendant breaches a duty owed to the plaintiff. The most common such breach is a breach of fiduciary duty, such as when an agent wrongfully obtains or holds property owned by a principal. A controversial example is the case of Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid, in which a senior prosecutor took bribes not to prosecute certain offenders. With the bribe money, he purchased property in New Zealand. His employer, the Attorney-General, sought a declaration that the property was held on constructive trust for it, on the basis of breach of fiduciary duty. The Privy Council awarded a constructive trust. The case is different from Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver, because there was no interference with a profit-making opportunity that properly belonged to the prosecutor. Being a Privy Council decision, Reid did not overrule the previous decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Lister v Stubbs which held the opposite, partially because a trust is a very strong remedy that gives proprietary rights to the claimant not enjoyed by the defendant's other creditors. In the event of the defendant's insolvency, the trust assets are untouchable by the general creditors. Supporters of Lister suggested that there was no good reason to put the victim of wrongdoing ahead of other creditors of the estate. There was a tension in English law between Lister and Reid which was highlighted in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd. The United Kingdom Supreme Court subsequently overruled Sinclair in FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC, holding that Lister was no longer a good law.

Sleep. The Australian Model Criminal Code Committee states the law as follows: At the minimum there needs to be some operation of the will before a physical movement is described as an act. The physical movements of a person who is asleep, for example, probably should not be regarded as acts at all, and certainly should not be regarded as acts for the purposes of criminal responsibility. These propositions are embodied in the rule that people are not held responsible for involuntary 'acts', that is, physical movements which occur without there being any will to perform that act. This situation is usually referred to as automatism. In the U.S., People v Huey Newton (1970) holds that unconsciousness, when not self-induced (say, as by voluntary intoxication), is a complete defense to a criminal act even though the defendant's acts seem very goal-oriented. The medical evidence was that " gunshot wound which penetrates in a body cavity, the abdominal cavity or the thoracic cavity is very likely to produce a profound reflex shock reaction, that is quite different from a gunshot wound which penetrates only skin and muscle and it is not at all uncommon for a person shot in the abdomen to lose consciousness and go into this reflex shock condition for short periods of time up to half an hour or so." But the reflexive activity or unconsciousness need not cause physical collapse: it can exist where the subject physically acts in fact, but is not at the time conscious of acting (cf some European continental jurisdictions classify conduct resulting from automatism under the rubric of unconsciousness). In R v Cogdon (1950), unreported but noted in Morris, Somnambulistic Homicide: Ghosts, Spiders and North Koreans (1951), the defendant struck her daughter on the head with an ax while sleepwalking and dreaming about North Koreans. Her movements were not voluntary, so she was acquitted. This interpretation of automatism is consistent with Lord Denning's dicta in Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland (1963): No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context – some people nowadays prefer to speak of it as 'automatism' – means an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind, such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing, such as an act done whilst suffering from a concussion or whilst sleepwalking. Situations involving hypnotism, concussion, and sleepwalking may involve apparently deliberate and purposeful conduct. In fact this is the case for many situations where the defense of automatism is presented – spasms or reflex actions are rarely likely to be perceived as criminally liable acts. As for sleepwalking itself, the Canadian case of R v Parks exemplifies a certain judicial willingness to regard a sleepwalker as behaving as an automaton even though he had performed apparently goal-directed acts. The accused fell asleep in his living room. A few hours later he got up and drove 23 kilometers to his in-laws' home. Still asleep, he entered the house, found a knife in the kitchen and went to the bedroom where his in-laws were sleeping. He strangled and cut his father in-law, who survived the attack. The mother in-law died from the repeated stab wounds and the brutal beating. The medical experts at trial unanimously agreed that the accused was sleepwalking and that sleepwalking was not a "disease of mind". The Supreme Court agreed and held that sleepwalking can negate the voluntary ingredient of the actus reus. There is widespread disagreement among forensic sleep experts that Kenneth Parks was in fact sleepwalking – it is not entirely clear the reason why the prosecution did not call its own experts on sleepwalking, one explanation being frank disbelief that the defense could succeed.

An elective share is a term used in American law relating to inheritance, which describes a proportion of an estate which the surviving spouse of the deceased may claim in place of what they were left in the decedent's will. It may also be called a widow's share, statutory share, election against the will, or forced share. Function and operation. The elective share is the modern version of the English common law concepts of dower and curtesy, both of which reserved certain portions of a decedent's estate which were reserved for the surviving spouse to prevent them from falling into poverty and becoming a burden on the community. Currently, the amount to be reserved for a spouse is determined by the law of the state where the estate is located. In most states, the elective share is between one-third and one-half of all the property in the estate, although many states require the marriage to have lasted a certain number of years for the elective share to be claimed, or adjust the share based on the length of the marriage, and the presence of minor children. Some states also reduce the elective share if the surviving spouse is independently wealthy. In some jurisdictions, if the spouse claims the elective share, they get that amount, but nothing else from the estate. In other states, claiming an elective share has no effect on gifts under a will or through a trust (though things given by will or trust may fulfill in part the elective share portion). Obviously, there would be no point in seeking an elective share if the surviving spouse has already been willed more than they would receive under the statute. Furthermore, some assets held by the estate may be exempt from becoming part of the elective share, so their value is subtracted from the total value of the estate before the elective share is calculated. Some states also permit children of the deceased to claim an elective share. Pretermitted heir. In the law of property, a pretermitted heir is a person who would likely stand to inherit under a will, except that the testator (the person who wrote the will) did not include the person in the testator's will. Omission may occur because the testator did not know of the omitted person at the time the will was written. A will may contain a clause that explicitly disinherits any heirs unknown at the time that the will is executed, or any heirs not named in the will. While such a clause will not necessarily prevent a claim against an estate by a pretermitted heir, it may make it more difficult to succeed in such an action. Forced heirship is a form of testate partible inheritance which mandates how the deceased's estate is to be disposed of and which tends to guarantee an inheritance for the family of the deceased. In forced heirship, the estate of a deceased (de cujus) is separated into two portions. (1) An indefeasible portion, the forced estate (passing to the deceased's next-of-ki. (2) A discretionary portion, or free estate, to be freely disposed of by will. Forced heirship is generally a feature of civil-law legal systems which do not recognize total freedom of testation, in contrast with common law jurisdictions. Normally in forced heirship, the deceased's estate is in-gathered and wound up without discharging liabilities, which means accepting inheritance includes accepting the liabilities attached to inherited property. The forced estate is divided into shares which include the share of issue (legitime or child's share) and the spousal share. This provides a minimum protection that cannot be defeated by will. The free estate, on the other hand, is at the discretion of a testator to be distributed by will on death to whomever he or she chooses. Takers in the forced estate are known as forced heirs. The expression comes from Louisianan legal language and is ultimately a calque of Spanish sucesión forzosa.

Common-law marriage, also known as non-ceremonial marriage, sui iuris marriage, informal marriage, de facto marriage, or marriage by habit and repute, is a legal framework where a couple may be considered married without having formally registered their relation as a civil or religious marriage. The original concept of a "common-law marriage" is one considered valid by both partners, but not formally recorded with a state or religious registry, nor celebrated in a formal civil or religious service. In effect, the act of the couple representing themselves to others as being married and organizing their relationship as if they were married, means they are married. The term common-law marriage (or similar) has wider informal use, often to denote relations that are not legally recognized as marriages. It is often used colloquially or by the media to refer to cohabiting couples, regardless of any legal rights or religious implications involved. This can create confusion in regard to the term and to the legal rights of unmarried partners (in addition to the actual status of the couple referred to). Terminology. Common-law marriage is a marriage that takes legal effect without the prerequisites of a marriage license or participation in a marriage ceremony. The marriage occurs when two people who are legally capable of being married, and who intend to be married, live together as a married couple and hold themselves out to the world as a married couple. Common-law marriage vs. cohabitation. The term "common-law marriage" is often used incorrectly to describe various types of couple relationships, such as cohabitation (whether or not registered) or other legally formalized relations. Although these interpersonal relationships are often called "common-law marriage", they differ from its original meaning in that they are not legally recognized as "marriages" but are a parallel interpersonal status such as a "domestic partnership", "registered partnership", "conjugal union" or "civil union". Non-marital relationship contracts are not necessarily recognized from one jurisdiction to another. In Canada, while some provinces may extend to couples in marriage-like relationships many of the rights and responsibilities of a marriage, they are not legally considered married. They may be legally defined as "unmarried spouses" and for many purposes such as taxes and financial claims, and within those contexts treated the same as married spouses. A 2008 poll in the UK showed that 51% of respondents incorrectly believed that cohabitants had the same rights as married couples. In Scotland, common-law marriage does not exist, although there was a type of irregular marriage called 'marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute' which could apply to couples in special circumstances until 2006, and was abolished by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 (irregular marriages established before 4 May 2006 are recognised).

Those who oppose these practices argue that distribution denies the copyright holder potential sales, in the form of re-released titles, official emulation, and so on. Likewise, they argue that if people can acquire an old version of a program for free, they may be less likely to purchase a newer version if the old version meets their needs. From game developers with sympathy with abandonware. Some game developers showed sympathy for abandonware websites as they preserve their classical game titles. In this quote Richard Garriott states, “Personally, I think that sites that support these old games are a good thing for both consumers and copyright owners. If the options are (a) having a game be lost forever and (b) having it available on one of these sites, I'd want it to be available. That being said, I believe a game is 'abandoned' only long after it is out of print. And just because a book is out of print does not give me rights to print some for my friends.” In this quote Tim Schafer states, “Is it piracy? Yeah, sure. But so what? Most of the game makers aren't living off the revenue from those old games anymore. Most of the creative teams behind all those games have long since left the companies that published them, so there's no way the people who deserve to are still making royalties off them. So go ahead—steal this game! Spread the love!” In this quote Chris Taylor states, “If I owned the copyright on Total Annihilation, I would probably allow it to be shared for free by now (four years after it was originally released)” Law. In most cases, software classed as abandonware is not in the public domain, as it has never had its original copyright officially revoked and some company or individual may still own rights. While sharing of such software is usually considered copyright infringement, in practice copyright holders rarely enforce their abandonware copyrights for a number of reasons – chiefly among which the software is technologically obsolete and therefore has no commercial value, therefore rendering copyright enforcement a pointless enterprise. By default, this may allow the product to de facto lapse into the public domain to such an extent that enforcement becomes impractical. Rarely has any abandonware case gone to court, but it is still unlawful to distribute copies of old copyrighted software and games, with or without compensation, in any Berne Convention signatory country. Enforcement of copyright. Old copyrights are usually left undefended. This can be due to intentional non-enforcement by owners due to software age or obsolescence, but sometimes results from a corporate copyright holder going out of business without explicitly transferring ownership, leaving no one aware of the right to defend the copyright. Even if the copyright is not defended, copying of such software is still unlawful in most jurisdictions when a copyright is still in effect. Abandonware changes hands on the assumption that the resources required to enforce copyrights outweigh benefits a copyright holder might realize from selling software licenses. Additionally, abandonware proponents argue that distributing software for which there is no one to defend the copyright is morally acceptable, even where unsupported by current law. Companies that have gone out of business without transferring their copyrights are an example of this; many hardware and software companies that developed older systems are long since out of business and precise documentation of the copyrights may not be readily available. Often the availability of abandonware on the Internet is related to the willingness of copyright holders to defend their copyrights. For example, unencumbered games for Colecovision are markedly easier to find on the Internet than unencumbered games for Mattel Intellivision in large part because there is still a company that sells Intellivision games while no such company exists for the Colecovision.

Equitable remedies are judicial remedies developed by courts of equity from about the time of Henry the 8th to provide more flexible responses to changing social conditions than was possible in precedent-based common law. Equitable remedies were granted by the Court of Chancery in England, and remain available today in most common law jurisdictions. In many jurisdictions, legal and equitable remedies have been merged and a single court can issue either, or both, remedies. Despite widespread judicial merger, the distinction between equitable and legal remedies remains relevant in a number of significant instances. Notably, the United States Constitution's Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in civil cases over $20 to cases "at common law". Equity is said to operate on the conscience of the defendant, so an equitable remedy is always directed at a particular person, and that person's knowledge, state of mind and motives may be relevant to whether a remedy should be granted or not. Equitable remedies are distinguished from "legal" remedies (which are available to a successful claimant as of right) by the discretion of the court to grant them. In common law jurisdictions, there are a variety of equitable remedies, but the principal remedies are: injunction, specific performance, account of profits, rescission, rectification, equitable estoppel, certain proprietary remedies, such as constructive trusts, subrogation, in very specific circumstances, an equitable lien, equitable compensation, appointment or removal of fiduciary, Interpleader and equitable tracing as a remedy for unjust enrichment. Specific performance is an equitable remedy in the law of contract, whereby a court issues an order requiring a party to perform a specific act, such as to complete performance of the contract. It is typically available in the sale of land law, but otherwise is not generally available if damages are an appropriate alternative. Specific performance is almost never available for contracts of personal service, although performance may also be ensured through the threat of proceedings for contempt of court. An injunction, often concerning confidential information or real property, is a type or subset of specific performance and is one of the more commonly-used forms of specific performance. While specific performance can be in the form of any type of forced action, it is usually to complete a previously established transaction, thus being the most effective remedy in protecting the expectation interest of the innocent party to a contract. It is usually the opposite of a prohibitory injunction, but there are mandatory injunctions that have a similar effect to specific performance and these kinds of distinctions are often difficult to apply in practice or even illusory. At common law, a claimant's rights were limited to an award of damages. Later, the court of equity developed the remedy of specific performance instead, should damages prove inadequate. Specific performance is often guaranteed through the remedy of a right of possession, giving the plaintiff the right to take possession of the property in dispute. As with all equitable remedies, orders of specific performance are discretionary, so their availability depends on its appropriateness in the circumstances. Such orders are granted when damages are not an adequate remedy and in some specific cases such as land (which is regarded as unique).

In criminal law, automatism is a rarely used criminal defense. It is one of the mental condition defenses that relate to the mental state of the defendant. Automatism can be seen variously as lack of voluntariness, lack of culpability (unconsciousness) or excuse. Automatism means that the defendant was not aware of his or her actions when making the particular movements that constituted the illegal act. For example, Esther Griggs in 1858 threw her child out of a first floor window believing that the house was on fire, while having a sleep terror. In 2002, Peter Buck, lead guitarist of the band R E M, was cleared of several charges, including assault, which resulted from automatism brought on by a bad interaction between alcohol and sleeping pills. In a 2009 case in Aberporth in west Wales, Brian Thomas strangled his wife in their camper van, also during a sleep terror, when he mistook his wife for an intruder. The defense of automatism is denying that the person was acting in the sense that the criminal law demands. As such it is really a denial-of-proof – the defendant is asserting that the offense is not made out. The prosecution does not have to disprove the defense as is sometimes erroneously reported; the prosecution has to prove all the elements of the offense including the voluntary act requirement. Automatism is a defense even against strict liability crimes like dangerous driving, where no intent is necessary. There are several limitations to the defense of automatism in English law. Prior fault generally excludes automatism. Intoxication generally excludes automatism, even when involuntary. Any defense that rests on insanity comes under the M'Naghten rules. Under English law internal causes of automatism are generally judged to be insane automatism and so result in the special verdict (not guilty by reason of insanity) rather than simple acquittal. Scope. Automatism is arguably the only defense that excludes responsibility by negating the existence of the actus reus which uniquely allows it to be a defense to both conventional and strict liability offenses (although this argument could be extended to the status defense of insanity, too). Strict automatism is a denial of actus reus and therefore most commonly used as a defense against strict liability offenses. There are a number of reasons why a person may go into a state of automatism, including dissociation or hypo or hyperglycemia. Unconsciousness is the defense of denial of mens rea, which is easier to prove and hence more commonly used for non-strict liability crimes. For example, in cases of homicidal sleepwalking the illegal act is typically not denied but the intent to kill is. The defendant will typically be perplexed and confused and will not cover up the episode. Kenneth Parks, after killing his mother-in-law and severely injuring his father-in-law, drove to the police station stating that he thought he had killed some people. The person's movements seem purposeful - the sleepwalker interacts with their environment in a limited way. Nonetheless the sleepwalker is not conscious of their actions. The use of the term "automatism" for these situations causes some confusion, as in these cases it is really the lack of intent on the part of the defendant which denies the mens rea of the offense rather than the actus reus (although this distinction is problematic in many instances), better called "unconsciousness". Intention is a problem in crimes of strict liability. Very few people intend to crash their vehicles, so clearly something better than intent is required to define automatism.

Lapse and anti-lapse. Lapse and anti-lapse are complementary concepts under the US law of wills, which address the disposition of property that is willed to someone who dies before the testator (the writer of the will). Lapse. At common law, lapse occurs when the beneficiary or the devisee under the will predeceases the testator, invalidating the gift. The gift would instead revert to the residuary estate or be granted under the law of intestate succession. Anti-lapse statutes. Most common-law jurisdictions have enacted an anti-lapse statute to address this situation. The anti-lapse statute "saves" the bequest if it has been made to parties specified in the statute, usually members of the testator's immediate family, if they had issues that survived the testator. For example, the New York anti-lapse statute specifies brothers, sisters, and issue, specifically. If the anti-lapse statute does indeed apply, then the issue of the deceased beneficiary will inherit whatever was willed to the beneficiary. The testator can prevent the operation of an anti-lapse statute by providing that the gift will only go to the named beneficiary if that beneficiary survives the testator, or by simply stating in the will that the anti-lapse statute does not apply. Ademption, or ademption by extinction. Ademption, or ademption by extinction, is a common law doctrine used in the law of wills to determine what happens when property bequeathed under a will is no longer in the testator's estate at the time of the testator's death. For a devise (bequest) of a specific item of property (a specific gift), such property is considered adeemed, and the gift fails. For example, if a will bequeathed the testator's car to a specific beneficiary, but the testator owned no car at the time of his or her death, the gift would be adeemed and the aforementioned beneficiary would receive no gift at all. Abatement of debts and legacies. Abatement of debts and legacies is a common law doctrine of wills that holds that when the equitable assets of a deceased person are not sufficient to satisfy fully all the creditors, their debts must abate proportionately, and they must accept a dividend. Ademption by satisfaction. Ademption by satisfaction, also known as satisfaction of legacies, is a common law doctrine that determines the disposition of property under a will when the testator has made lifetime gifts to beneficiaries named in the will. Under the doctrine, a gift that the maker of the will (the testator) gives during his lifetime to a named beneficiary of the will is treated as an advance payment of that beneficiary's inheritance. If the probate court determines that the testator intended the lifetime gift to satisfy a bequest under the will, the amount of the lifetime gift is deducted from the amount that the beneficiary would have received under the will. Acts of independent significance. The doctrine of acts of independent significance at common law permits a testator to effectively change the disposition of his property without changing a will, if acts or events changing the disposition have some significance beyond avoiding the requirements of the will.

Abuse and infidelity. University of Chicago sociologist Linda Waite found that "16 percent of cohabiting women reported that arguments with their partners became physical during the past year, while only 5 percent of married women had similar experiences." Most cohabiting couples have a faithful relationship, but Waite's surveys also demonstrated that 20% of cohabiting women reported having secondary sex partners, compared to only 4% of married women. According to an article by Judith Treas and Deirdre Giesen, cohabiting couples are twice as likely to experience infidelity within the relationship than married couples. Fertility. Regarding cohabitation as a fertility factor, a large survey in the United States came to the result that married women had an average of 1.9 children, compared to 1.3 among those cohabiting. The corresponding numbers for men were 1.7 and 1.1, respectively. The difference of 0.6 children for both sexes was expected to decrease to between 0.2 and 0.3 over the lifetime when correcting for the confounder that married people have their children earlier in life. A study of the United States and multiple countries in Europe came to the result that women who continue to cohabit after birth have significantly lower probability of having a second child than married women in all countries except those in Eastern Europe. Another study, on the contrary, came to the result that cohabiting couples in France have equal fertility as married ones. Also, Russians have a higher fertility within cohabitation, while Romanians rather tend to have childless marriages. Survey data from 2003 in Romania came to the result that marriage equalized the total fertility rate among both highly educated and low educated people to approximately 1.4. Among those cohabiting, on the other hand, a lower level of education increased fertility rate to 1.7, and a higher level of education decreased it to 0.7. On the other hand, another study came to the result that Romanian women with little education have about equal fertility in marital and cohabiting partnerships. Financial effects. In the United States, married couples that submit a combined tax return may face a marriage penalty, where tax credits for low-income single earners are not applied to the combined income. In October 1998, Senate GOP leader Trent Lott decided to pull a bill to abolish "the marriage penalty," "which in the tax code reflects the fact that married couples who both work for wages frequently pay more in taxes than if they earned the same amount of income but weren't married. And the more equal the incomes of the couple, the steeper the marriage tax penalty." The earned income tax credit (EITC) is cash welfare for low-income workers, but the problem is the EITC is not for married couples because they have to combine their wages, which again leads to "the marriage penalty." If couples do not get married then their wages do not have to combine and the EITC in a way is "paying for" low-income couples not to marry. Opponents of cohabitation believe that some cohabiting couples choose not to marry because they would suffer a tax penalty. Despite the perceived disincentive to marry that the EITC provides, cohabiting couples suffer many financial losses as their unions are not recognized with the same legal and financial benefits as those who are legally married. These financial penalties can include the costs of separate insurance policies and the costs of setting up legal protections similar to those that are automatically granted by the state upon marriage.

Abandonware is a product, typically software, ignored by its owner and manufacturer, and for which no official support is available. Within an intellectual rights contextual background, abandonware is a software (or hardware) sub-case of the general concept of orphan works. Museums and various organizations dedicated to preserving this software continue to provide legal access. The term "abandonware" is broad, and encompasses many types of old software. Definitions of "abandoned" vary, but in general it is like any item that is abandoned – it is ignored by the owner, and as such product support and possibly copyright enforcement are also "abandoned". Types. Commercial software unsupported but still owned by a viable company The availability of the software depends on the company's attitude toward the software. In many cases, the company which owns the software rights may not be that which originated it, or may not recognize their ownership. Some companies, such as Borland, make some software available online, in a form of freeware. Others, such as Microsoft, do not make old versions available for free use and do not permit people to copy the software. Commercial software owned by a company no longer in business. When no owning entity of a software exists, all activities (support, distribution, IP activities, etcetera) in relation to this software have ceased. If the rights to a software are non-recoverable in legal limbo ("orphaned work"), the software's rights cannot be bought by another company, and there is no company to enforce the copyright. An example of this is Digital Research's original PLI compiler for DOS: which was considered for many years as without an owner; Micro Focus, which acquired Novell, which had bought Digital Research's assets, owns this old PLI compiler, but has a more up-to-date PLI offering. Shareware whose author still makes it available. Finding historical versions, however, can be difficult since most shareware archives remove past versions with the release of new versions. Authors may or may not make older releases available. Some websites collect and offer for download old versions of shareware, freeware, and (in some cases) commercial applications. In some cases these sites had to remove past versions of software, particularly if the company producing that software still maintains it, or if later software releases introduce digital rights management, whereby old versions could be viewed as DRM circumvention. Unsupported or unmaintained shareware. Open source and freeware programs that have been abandoned. In some cases, source code remains available, which can prove a historical artifact. One such case is PC-LISP, still found online, which implements the Franz Lisp dialect. The DOS-based PC-LISP still runs well within emulators and on Microsoft Windows. Orphaned code. The source code or executable might still be available but the author is unknown or only identified by a dead email or equivalent and there is no realistic prospect of finding the owner of the IP.