Decisive Point Podcast

New strategic art is required to maneuver political economies to meet the demands of future engagements and campaigns. Current discussions of the projection of political-economic power are typically abstract, high-level, and policy-focused or present singular tactical actions as strategic actions, creating a gap for campaign practitioners. This article addresses the gap by drawing on Joint Planning, Joint Publication 5-0, and Joint Campaigns and Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, to further develop the concept and methodologies first introduced in the author’s earlier article “Multidimensionality: Rethinking Power Projection for the 21st Century.” Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss1/4/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: sanctions, political-economic power, Russia, Ukraine, China

If the United States and its allies seek to deny Vladimir Putin an objective victory in the Russia-Ukraine War, they must commit to providing sufficient aid to the Ukrainian army soon because the window of opportunity to provide sufficient resources is narrow—and closing. This article argues that the West must articulate a reasonable strategy for Ukrainian victory now, as a failure in Ukraine will weaken relationships between the United States and Western European states and their global partners while emboldening state and non-state actors to threaten the rules-based international order. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss1/3/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, NATO, Europe, security force assistance

Retired United States general and flag officers participate politically as individuals and in groups. Purportedly, participation damages civil-military relations. This article argues these activities, including but not limited to endorsements of candidates, do little harm to US democratic institutions and to the nonpartisan reputation of the military institution.Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/15/Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.Keywords: civil-military relations, general officers, promotions, flag officers, political participationDownload the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/12/2003411848/-1/-1/0/DP-PODCAST-TRANSCRIPT-GRIFFITHS.PDF

To compete effectively for global influence, US Army and defense planners should focus on economic globalization in addition to security interests when assessing potential foreign military partners. The results of a quantitative analysis of US-led exercise participants between 1990 and 2016 demonstrate the variety of interests, including economic, that underly a partner’s decision to train or not with US forces. Since the US Army bills itself as the “partner of choice,” this piece will interest military and policy practitioners involved in strategically assessing potential international military partners. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/13/Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: economic interests, globalization, strategic competition, multinational exercises, bilateral exercisesDownload the full transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Feb/28/2003401481/-1/-1/0/DP-4-31-FORESTER-TRANSCRIPT.PDF

The China Landpower Studies Center will open in 2024. It is intended to be an approachable organization. It will tackle the complex and pressing questions about China’s emergence as a global power and its implications for the US military and provide senior leaders and practitioners with a better understanding of the strategies, capabilities, and the integration of the PLA into the CCP’s campaign to turn the rules-based international order to its advantage. Further, the Center will share insights and recommendations for developing better deterrence strategies and campaigns for the United States and our alliesRead the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/16/Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.Keywords: China, Taiwan, Philippines, South China Sea, China Landpower Studies CenterDownload the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Feb/15/2003395258/-1/-1/0/DP-4-30-Butler-transcript.PDF

Reflexive control aims to change the other’s perceptions about their utility sets. It contains underlying elements that could help give structure to analyses of strategic behavior by using a nonlinear approach that aims to improve the quality of assessments. This podcast explores the interpretations of the concept of reflexive control, how elements of reflexive control link to the more widely accepted body of knowledge, and how these elements could be valuable additions to the current work on the analysis of strategic behavior.E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.Keywords: reflexive control, strategic behavior, strategic analysis, nonlinearity, complex adaptive systemDownload the full transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Feb/06/2003389155/-1/-1/0/DP-TRANSCRIPT-4-29-DEGOEIJ.PDF

This podcast enters the debate on American grand strategy by questioning the logic underpinning offshore balancing. It concludes that the United States is an ambivalent balancer due to the stopping power of water. It builds on the relevant literature in international relations, producing a novel set of theoretical propositions that are applied to the contemporary Middle East. There and elsewhere, the United States could fail to maintain the balance of power when it is most threatened.Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/11/Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.Keywords: freedom to roam, grand strategy, offshore balancing, offensive realism, regional hegemony, stopping power of water, Middle EastRead the transcript here: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Dec/15/2003360996/-1/-1/0/DP-PODCAST-TRANSCRIPT-SCHUESSLER.PDF

A change in deterrence thought and strategy is necessary to avoid nuclear escalation in armed conflict with Russia. Traditional threat-based deterrence strategies will not be successful, and a new strategy must address the conditions that might cause Russian leadership to employ nuclear weapons. An examination of the Able Archer 83 exercise using an original framework highlights the ways Russian interests and US actions interact to generate misperception and inhibited deterrence. The US military must execute extremely restrained, deliberate, and empathetic operations that pursue minimalist military objectives to achieve the political goal. Read the article here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/10/ Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: deterrence, nuclear, misperception, Russia, multidomain operationsDownload the full transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Dec/07/2003353220/-1/-1/0/DP-TRANSCRIPT-PARSONS.PDF

The Russia-Ukraine War holds many lessons for the US Army and American policymakers and leaders on the nature and role of reconnaissance-strike complexes in modern combat, especially Ukraine’s development of a battle-management system that uses unmanned aerial systems and satellite reconnaissance to enable the fire coordination for deep strikes into the enemy rear. In the research presented here, open-source analysis and interviews in Ukraine focus on the development and employment of reconnaissance-strike complexes with respect to deep strike and the likelihood of mutual territorial attack.Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/9/Keywords: unmanned aerial systems, deep strike, reconnaissance-strike complex, electronic warfare, Russia-Ukraine WarEmail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on the genesis article or the podcast.Download the full transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/30/2003349193/-1/-1/0/DP-TRANSCRIPT-4-26-HALEM%201.PDF

In February 2022, many observers initially evaluated the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a failure of Western deterrence.That assessment was and is f lawed inasmuch as the West never articulated a clear strategy to deter such an invasion. Engaging with relevant conceptual debates about how deterrence works and relating this information to what the West did and did not do in the run-up to the invasion, this article shows that deterrence efforts were based on problematic assumptions about the Kremlin’s motivations. The study concludes with lessons for Western military and policy practitioners with the intention to enable better future thinking about how to deter Russia.Keywords: deterrence, Ukraine, Russia, Putin, NATORead the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/8Full transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/22/2003346392/-1/-1/0/DP-4-25-TRANSCRIPT-RENZ.PDF