Decisive Point Podcast

This article explores the current debate about service and Joint operating concepts, starting with the Army’s multi-domain operations concept. It argues for adaptations to an old operational design technique—defeat mechanisms; updates to Joint and service planning doctrine; and discipline regarding emerging concepts. Rather than debate over attrition versus maneuver, combinations of a suite of defeat mechanisms should be applied to gain victory in the future.Keywords: multi-domain operations, operational design technique, Mechanisms in Modern Warfare, vulnerabilities of cyber-enabled systemsRead the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/6/Episode Transcript:Stephanie Crider (Host)Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Frank Hoffman, author of “Defeat Mechanisms in Modern Warfare,” featured in Parameters 2021 – 22 Winter issue. Dr. Hoffman is a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. His latest book, Mars Adapting: Military Change under Fire, was published this year.Frank, I’m glad you’re here. Thank you for joining me. We’re here to talk about your article that was published in Parameters Winter 2021 – 22, “Defeat Mechanisms in Modern Warfare.” Your article assesses several conceptual efforts to better posture US military for success and future wars. Specifically, you explore the debate between service and joint operating concepts and the opportunities and vulnerabilities of cyber-enabled systems to produce decisive effects at the operational level of war. Please set the stage for our listeners and explain the current debate.Dr. Frank HoffmanSure, thank you. Great to be here today.It’s just interesting that, you know, in the literature right now, we’re going back to fundamentals about how we in the military conceive of, plan for, and conceptualize obtaining victory. And there seems to be quite a fervent debate going on both in the military literature and in the academic literature. In the current issue of “Survival,” published by double I double S in London, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Franz-Stefan Gady challenges American concepts and thinking about maneuver versus attrition, which is an age-old debate that goes back in the Army and the Marine Corps back to the 1980s. And Gady suggests that we need to reemphasize attrition, since maneuver, both in the sense of movement and mobility across the battlespace, is going to be much harder because of persistent surveillance, attacks from drones, drones as a source of ISR. His reading of future technology suggests that maneuver is going to be very hard and that we need to focus on buying capabilities to attrit the adversary.And this is also taken up by Michael Kofman from the Center for Naval Analysis, who argues that the Army and the joint world need to let loose their embrace of strategic or operational paralysis, you know, attempting to confuse commanders. And we need to reembrace attrition and firepower to destroy enemy capabilities, not by combinations and not by the way we currently think about it.And this is also then taken up by Dr. Heather Venable, who’s a professor at the Air University. And she also argues that most of our thinking in the Army and the Marine Corps is based upon some rather thin historical cases drawn largely from either 1916’s infiltration tactics or the theories of John Boyd and the OODA loop and this notion of cognitive paralysis and outmaneuvering the enemy in the broader sense through combinations of forces in modern combine arms.Those are the critics. In the service literature, in the joint world, and in the United States, we do seem to have this emphasis now on what in the Army is described as creating multiple dilemmas for the opponent as a theory of victory. I found in the Air Force’s doctrine the same kind of theory of victory. And I’ve also found it in the latest British integrated operating concept that we’re predicating our ability to win and to defeat the adversary by somehow generating multiple dilemmas. And that there’s this perception that if we come from different directions with different cross-domain capabilities, our opponents will be cognitively constipated or somehow operationally paralyzed and unable to defend themselves. Or they’ll just make a lot of mistakes.And I do have some problems with this notion of cognitive paralysis. So I’m glad that the critics have pointed up this particular debate, but I’m not sure that attrition, particularly against peers, is really the way to go about it. So I’ve been exploring some old concepts that I learned from General Wass de Czege in the 1990s, that I think need to be reintroduced. They need to be updated to account for the cyber and information strike capabilities we have now. We just don’t rely upon physical strikes. We have offensive capabilities in cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum capability as well. As do our adversaries. So I think a refreshing look at defeat mechanisms, a terminology that I learned from the Army a long time ago, more than two decades ago, just needs to be refurbished and made more contemporary. And that’s what the essence of the article is about.HostYour article says the real issue is the construction of concepts or operational plans that have a historically demonstrated or testable theory of victory. What are some possible defeat mechanisms that might contribute to a solution?HoffmanWell, I do have to say that the critics are right, that attrition, or the phrase I use that I think is more preferable is destruction–the use of firepower to destroy either capabilities or the capacities of the size of the enemy forces–is a component. But I think in the cyber realm, we also need to think about disorientation or disruption through both deception through information operations and through cyber capabilities. There is certainly this physical and nonphysical means that we have of both destroying and disorienting the adversary to gain an operational advantage. That is where I think the future lies.I do believe that maneuver in its tactical sense, you know, the movement of forces, can create the options of dislocation, and again, this is where seizing a positional advantage or making an opponent’s defense irrelevant by moving around them or over them or coming from a sudden direction, still has some utility–even in a period of massive surveillance capability. We can still blind somebody, disorient them first, and then conduct the maneuver and dislocate them.So disruption disorientation, dislocation, and destruction are the for defeat mechanisms that in different contexts against different adversaries, can be combined and sequenced and orchestrated in time and place to gain an operational advantage and achieve a degree of systems disruption over the adversaries operating system that makes them far less capable relative to us. I think that’s where the future lies in creating overmatch or creating a competitive advantage in the battlespace in the future.I don’t believe that we can paralyze an enemy commander, I don’t believe that we can stupefy them. But I do believe that their system disruption, through the combination of disorientation, dislocation, and disruption, is still feasible in the twenty-first century. And I think our concepts, our military planning, should define some of these terms. And I’m only offering my definitions to begin the debate. Let the joint doctrine world find the best terms.But this isn’t a big lift for us intellectually, but it does put us on, I think, more solid ground both in terms of what has worked in the past, what worked in World War II, what has worked in contemporary conflict, and what will work in the future in a world in which command systems are operating at great ranges–in which everybody has some space parity and some operational aviation capability. We’re dealing with a much more contested space; I think we need to reconceptualize victory and defeat mechanisms to deal with this twenty-first century.HostCan you give us any final thoughts or any concluding thoughts on this topic?HoffmanI think this is very, very critical. It’s particularly critical for our concepts. It’s particularly critical for us to imagine and understand what it is to be in a competitive environment with a peer–someone whose space capabilities and aviation capabilities, and their C-2/AI-enabled capabilities may approach our own in some senses. We’ll have edges and some areas and not. I think it’s very important for us to rethink our operational art and refocus. After 15 or 20 years of focusing on the lower half of the conflict spectrum, the scale, the pace, the role of destruction, also, but the role of deception and disorientation and dislocation is still relevant, I think, in the 21st century. I think we need to rejuvenate our thinking about this.HostThank you for joining me. I had a blast and learned a lot.HoffmanI’m really pleased to work with the Army War College Press.

Deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan without recklessly threatening a great-power war is both possible and necessary through a tailored deterrence package that goes beyond either fighting over Taiwan or abandoning it. This article joins cutting-edge understandings of deterrence with empirical evidence of Chinese strategic thinking and culture to build such a strategy.Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/4/Keywords: People’s Republic of China, INDOPACOM, Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Indo-Pacific AffairsEpisode Transcript:Stephanie Crider (Host)Welcome to Decisive Point, a US Army War College Press production featuring distinguished authors and contributors who get to the heart of the matter in national security affairs.Decisive Point welcomes Dr. Jared M. McKinney, co-author of “Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan,” written with Dr. Peter Harris and featured in Parameters’ 2021 – 22 Winter issue.Dr. McKinney is the chair of the Department of Strategy and Security Studies at the eSchool of Graduate Professional Military Education, Air University, and reviews editor of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.Dr. Peter Harris is associate professor of political science at Colorado State University and Indo-Pacific Perspectives editor of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.Jared, I’m so glad you’re here. Thanks for joining me today. Let’s talk about your article, “The Broken Nest.” Would the People’s Republic of China invade Taiwan even if it meant risking war with the United States and its allies? Your article says there’s no doubt that the United States has a strong interest in deterring a Chinese takeover of Taiwan but relying on the latent threat of a great power war is the wrong approach.Please elaborate on this.Dr. Jared M. McKinneyYeah, it would be my pleasure to walk you through the argument. Just as I get going, I’ll note that my opinions, conclusions, and recommendations are solely my own and that of Peter Harris, my coauthor, and we don’t represent the views of the Air Force or the Department of Defense.The Taiwan issue is really hot right now not just because of provocations or perceived provocation, but also because the strategic environment has changed.The historical position of the United States has been that the Navy could deter a Chinese invasion by denying it the possibility to succeed.This is how the 7th Fleet responded in the 1950s to various Taiwan Straits crises. And as recently as 1996, the US Navy again was deployed to the region around Taiwan in an act of deterrence against perceived Chinese aggression at the time.In 2021, the question really is, is this possible anymore? And pretty much everyone agrees that the status quo is inadequate.One camp says that we need to double down on deterrence by denial, and we need to do more much more quickly.This is in a response to the recognition that China’s capabilities have developed very quickly. The PRC of this decade is radically more powerful than (the) PRC of previous eras.And so, in this environment a posture of deterrence by denial seems much less credible because it’s quite possible that the United States would not have the ability to effectively deny a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The question therefore becomes, does this create an opportunity for a Chinese invasion, and what would the United States do?In our article, we argue that simply doubling down on deterrence by denial is foolish and not sufficient in the long run. Because even if deterrence by denial could be reinvigorated for this year or next year, it’s not going to be possible to do so in the long run due to imbalances in valuing Taiwan, and in geography. The United States is located on the other side of the world.In this environment. There is an increase in risk because if the United States policy is to deter such an invasion, but it no longer has the capability to do so, there’s the potential for a real crisis.We develop an argument that deterrence is still possible, but we need to rethink how we go about it. Because deterrence by denial has succeeded for so long. It’s our default approach today.But we need to start thinking of the situation in new terms, and so we suggest a deterrence by denial [should be deterrence by punishment as corrected by author post-taping] approach. The bottom line is that because of shifts in the balance of power, and because of Taiwan’s trajectory further away from China, mainland China is becoming increasingly aggressive in a way to signal its dissatisfaction with the status quo.Deterrence by denial [should be deterrence by punishment as corrected by author post-taping] seeks not to stop an invasion from occurring, but to inflict such costs after an invasion has occurred that the costs of invasion outweigh the benefits.The U.S. has, to some extent, a de facto policy of deterrence by punishment such that automatically US sanctions would probably be inflicted on China in response to an invasion, regardless of any other military decision. However, we can actually think ahead about the economic response, and we can design a strategy that makes the economic costs of an invasion very, very high. And that is what we have called the “Broken Nest” approach.HostIf Taiwan fell to China, a successful democracy would be snuffed out, and Beijing’s geopolitical position in East Asia would be enhanced at the expense of the United States and its allies. What are the costs and the risks attached to abandoning Taipei to China?McKinneyThe most basic cost is that 23.5 million people who live in Taiwan would no longer live under a free and democratic government. And that’s a real and significant cost. To some extent, we need to be aware that U.S. policy has at least partially accepted this cost in the sense that from 1954 to 1979 the United States had a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, including sometimes tens of thousands of soldiers deployed to Taiwan.We severed this mutual defense treaty in 1979, despite knowing the risks that China would successfully invade Taiwan.We have lived with the ambiguity of the “one China” policy and taking no stance on the sovereignty of Taiwan since 1979 and the earlier years when the agreements were negotiated.That being said, there are also geopolitical costs in that China’s position would be marginally improved in terms of power projection.There’s also image costs in that a successful Chinese invasion would send a great victory to China’s communist regime, and it would certainly come at the expense of American credibility.So, the costs are real, and for that reason, just a blanket “abandon Taiwan” position is not prudent, and that’s why it has not been US policy.HostAre there options to the Taiwan-China issue that don’t involve a great power war?McKinneySo this is the problem: deterrence by denial, if it can’t succeed, the tendency would be to escalate it. Because if you can’t succeed in the Taiwan Straits or over Taiwan, then there’s concepts of AirSea battle, which call for strikes on the Chinese mainland and the horizontal escalation of the war.Very quickly a local war could become a global war, and the costs are essentially incalculable.So, that’s actually part of the problem, because incalculable costs indicate that America’s current posture may not be credible.A Chinese proverb asks, “Beneath a broken nest, how can there be any whole eggs?” and we work with this metaphor to suggest that Taiwan, so long as the status quo is maintained, should be an unbroken nest in that it is mutually beneficial in its ties with China and with the United States and the region.However, were China to invade Taiwan, it’s possible that a strategy could be set up beforehand that would inflict very high costs on a Chinese invasion.And these costs would be from the United States economically. But from Taiwan, they would have to be worked domestically. At the center of Taiwan’s economy, and actually the region’s economy and the global economy, is the semiconductor industry.Were Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing to be destroyed as a result of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the costs would be very significant.Beyond that, were this strategy to be joined to a wider economic sanctions and interdiction campaign against advanced semiconductor trade with China and Taiwanese attacks on Chinese manufacturing capability in Shanghai, it’s possible that a Chinese invasion would trigger a semiconductor and economic crisis in China, which would have no resolution for the short term.The costs would be very high. There would also be costs the global economy, but the costs would be distributed principally to China.Now this isn’t in itself likely to deter a Chinese invasion. However, a “broken nest” approach, which could combine serious harm to the semiconductor industry with a well-planned resistance to a Chinese occupation to a significant defensive effort before the invasion succeeded and to a regional coordinated regional response which takes the Taiwan issue as an assessment of China’s relative belligerency could create a package of tailored deterrence by punishment that would make the invasion of Taiwan very costly.The Chinese Communist Party is not going to abandon its long-term ambitions. However, we can approach the issue not from the possibility of definitive resolution, of which there may be none, but from the possibility of maintaining stability in the short term, by which we think of the short term being approximately the next 10 years.And so, really, we’ve come up with a plan that we think could create significant incentives to maintain peace between Taiwan and China, probably for the next decade.HostSo the plan you came up with—you’re talking about the broken nest approach, right? Do you want to walk us through that?McKinneyFor years Pentagon planners have pushed for Taiwan to adopt what someone in the Naval War College called a “porcupine strategy” more than a decade ago, and the porcupine strategy is to make the cost of invading very high. It acknowledges that invasion probably won’t be prevented, but by investing in anti-access area denial capabilities, Taiwan can inflict significant costs already at the step of invasion.That’s the status quo. We say accept the status quo. Double down on it. And as part of that, if Taiwan is serious about defending itself, it also could double down on its defense budget. The Liberal Democratic Party in Japan is talking about doubling Japan’s national defense budget in response to the changing security environment.I think Taiwan should do the same thing. And it has the capability to do so, given that it’s spending at approximately two percent of GDP is relatively meek compared to the threat with which it is faced.But beyond spending more and spending it on the right things, a tailored deterrence package would have to be planned ahead of time. There would have to be a resistance operating concept developed and integrated across Taiwan’s society. Taiwan’s people would have to be willing to fight and suffer and die for their freedom.And Taiwan would have to be willing to develop a device that automatically destroyed the physical capital in the semiconductor foundries. And a mechanism would also be needed to be developed to evacuate as much of Taiwan’s human capital in this sphere as well because physical capital can in fact be rebuilt, though it takes time. But human capital is key to doing so.So, this approach can only work if it’s absolutely assured that a Chinese invasion 1) is going to be costly, 2) it’s going to spark a resistance, 3) it’s going to result in the destruction of Taiwan’s technological production, and 4) it’s going to have significant regional security consequences.These costs would not make an invasion impossible, but it come at such a cost that Beijing’s leadership would have a significant incentive to put off the issue as long as possible.And probably putting off the issue as long as possible is the only realistic strategy for both sides at this point.HostI’m afraid that’s all we have time for, Jared. Thanks so much for your time today.Listeners, you can read the entire article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters.If you enjoyed this episode of Decisive Point and would like to hear more, look for us on Amazon Music, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, and any other major podcast platform.

PROLOGUE: In the wake of the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3-4, 1993, in which 19 American servicemembers were killed and 73 injured, I was tasked to lead an effort to discern the strategic lessons to be learned from the ill-fated US intervention. The study highlighted several shortfalls: the absence of a clear US strategy and whole-of-government plan for the operation, the onset of mission creep as the operation evolved from a humanitarian mission into a manhunt for a notorious Somali warlord, the lack of coordination across the US government agencies and other coalition partners involved, and the failure to maintain proper oversight of execution as one presidential administration transitioned to the next. The study’s recommendations, which were briefed to the secretary of defense, the national security adviser, and other key participants, ultimately led to a more integrated US approach to planning for US operations in Haiti in 1994 as well as a new Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), Managing Complex Contingency Operations.In this context, Len Hawley, a retired Army colonel, who as a civilian served as the director of multilateral affairs, became the National Security Council’s (NSC) point person to lead the implementation of PDD-56. Throughout his tenure in the Clinton administration, Len oversaw the drafting of more than 40 political-military plans for contingencies ranging from East Timor to Kosovo. These plans sought to incorporatethe costly lessons of Somalia in an effort to improve the outcomes and reduce the risks associated with US contingency operations overseas. After 25 years in the Army, Len continued to serve his country as a civilian leader in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the NSC staff, and the 9/11 Commission staff. This article is the last piece Len wrote before he died of complications from leukemia in 2020. It is full of the insights and wisdom of an unsung hero who was an extraordinary public servant, strategic thinker, and beloved mentor and colleague to many.Keywords: Somalia, Haiti, Mogadishu, Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), whole-of-government plan, Managing Complex Contingency OperationsClick here to read the article.Michèle FlournoyCofounder and Managing Partner of WestExec AdvisorsChair, Center for a New American Security Board of Directors

Statistical evidence suggests that Army battalion commanders are significant determinants of the retention of their lieutenants—especially high-potential lieutenants. Further, this so-called Battalion Commander Effect should be included in brigadier general promotion board assessments and used to inform officer professional military education curricula.Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/10/Keywords: force retention, Army battalion commanders, Battalion Commander Effect, promotion board assessments, officer professional military, education

The reemergence of great power competition, conflict with near-peer competitor states below the level of armed conflict, and persisting threats from nonstate actors with transnational ambitions and global reach pose challenges for strategists planning, executing, and assessing military operations and strategy. Building on current visualization tools, two proposed models—the National Strategic Risk Abacus and the National Strategic Risk Radar Chart—address these challenges and better depict how the US military may inadvertently contribute to risk at the national strategic level.Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/5/​Keywords: National Strategic Risk Abacus, National Strategic Risk Radar Chart, near-peer competitor, below the level of armed conflict

Global health engagement, an underutilized strategy rooted in the strengths of soft power persuasion, can lead to more military-to-military cooperation training, help establish relationships that can be relied on when crises develop, stabilize fragile states, and deny violent extremist organizations space for recruiting and operations. Examining Chinese efforts worldwide to curry favor and influence and the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, this article shows health as a medium is a very compelling and advantageous whole-of-government approach to national security policy concerns.Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/7/Keywords: pandemic, whole-of-government, Global health, national security policy, COVID-19

The concept of hybrid war has evolved from operational-level use of military means and methods in war toward strategic-level use of nonmilitary means in a gray zone below the threshold of war. This article considers this evolution and its implications for strategy and the military profession by contrasting past and current use of the hybrid war concept and raising critical questions for policy and military practitioners.Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/11/Keywords: US military, gray zone, hybrid warfare, below the threshold of war

Looming budget cuts will necessitate adept management to retain a military capable of competing and winning by avoiding the mistakes made in prior drawdowns. This article presents a framework for government and defense leaders to prepare for the coming drawdown and plan for the necessary capacity of tomorrow across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic framework.Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/6/Keywords: drawdown, budget cuts, government and defense leaders

Drawing on Samuel P. Huntington’s three phases of self-regulation used to determine if an occupation qualifies as a profession, this article focuses on the third phase of policing and removing those who fail to uphold the standards set forth in the first two phases. It reviews how the Army implemented this phase following the Civil War through the post–Vietnam War years and the implications for the officer corps.Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/9/Keywords: Civil War, officer corps, Samuel P. Huntington, three phases of self-regulation, post–Vietnam War

Identifying the January 6 insurrection at the US Capitol as an inflection point, this article analyzes the historical relationship between White supremacy and the US military from Reconstruction after the Civil War to the present. The article posits causes for the disproportionate number of current and former members of the military associated with White power groups and proposes steps the Department of Defense can take to combat the problems posed by the association of the US military with these groups. Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/3/Keywords: US Capitol, January 6, insurrection, White power groups, White supremacy and the US military