Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 1, 2018.Decided on Nov 6, 2018. Petitioner: Mount Lemmon Fire District.Respondent: John Guido, et al.. Advocates: E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for petitioner) Jeffrey L. Fisher (for respondents) Jonathan C. Bond (Assistant to the Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2000, John Guido and Dennis Rankin were hired by the Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona. They were full-time firefighter captains, and at ages 46 and 54, respectively, were the two oldest full-time employees at the Fire District when they were terminated in 2009. Guido and Rankin filed age discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which found reasonable cause to believe that the Fire District had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Guido and Rankin subsequently filed suit against the Fire District. The Fire District sought summary judgment on the basis that it was not an “employer” within the meaning of the ADEA, and the district court agreed. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. Ruling counter to what other circuits have concluded, the appellate court stated that a political subdivision of a state does not need to have 20 or more employees, as private sector employers do, in order to be covered by the ADEA.  Question Under the ADEA, does the same twenty-employee minimum that applies to private employers also apply to political subdivisions of a state, as the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held, or does the ADEA apply instead to all state political subdivisions of any size, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case? Conclusion In a unanimous (8–0) opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the ADEA applies to all state political subdivisions, regardless of the number of employees.  The Court first looked to the plain language of the statute, finding the two-sentence delineation in the definitional provision § 630(b), coupled with the expression “also means” at the start of §630(b)’s second sentence, establish two separate categories: persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 20 or more employees; and states or political subdivisions. The latter category has no numerosity limitation. For this reason, the Court found that Mount Lemmon Fire District was subject to the ADEA despite the number of full-time employees there. Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 1, 2018.Decided on Nov 27, 2018. Petitioner: Weyerhaeuser Company.Respondent: United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al.. Advocates: Timothy S. Bishop (for petitioner) Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2010, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) included a privately owned parcel of land (“Unit 1”) in Louisiana in an expanded designation of critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. Though these endangered frogs had not inhabited Unit 1 for decades, the land contained historic breeding sites. Other necessary features would need to be restored however. The landowners, Weyerhaeuser Company and two other entities (collectively, the “Landowners”), intended to use the land for residential and commercial development, as well as timber operations. They brought suit against the FWS in federal district court, challenging Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. All parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the district court ruled in favor of the agency on the merits.  A divided 5th Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, upholding Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat. The court rejected the Landowners’ argument that the FWS had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making this designation on the theory that Unit 1 was not presently habitable nor essential to species conservation. Explaining that land need not be habitable to be considered “essential” under 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the court deferred to the agency’s interpretation of that term. The majority also held that the FWS had not acted unreasonably in interpreting the ESA to not contain a requirement that land be “currently” habitable by a species to be designated as critical habitat. The 5th Circuit also held that the FWS had not made an arbitrary and capricious decision under 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) in not excluding Unit 1 from the critical habitat based on economic impacts, and that this determination was not reviewable in federal court.  Question Does the Endangered Species Act prohibit designation of privately owned land as unoccupied critical habitat that is neither habitat nor essential to species conservation? Is an agency determination not to exclude an area from critical habitat due to the economic impact of designation subject to judicial review? Conclusion In a unanimous (8–0) opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held as to the first question presented that to be designated a "critical habitat" under the Endangered Species Act, the land must also be habitat for the species. The Court found unpersuasive FWS's argument that habitat can include areas that, like Unit 1, would require modification to support a given species but which do not currently serve as habitat for the species. The statute provides that when the Secretary lists a species as endangered he must also "designate any habitat of such species which is then considered to be critical habitat." That language on its face requires that only "habitat" of an endangered species is eligible for designation as "critical habitat." Thus, even if if an area otherwise meets the statutory definition of "unoccupied critical habitat," Section 4(a)(3)(A)(i) does not authorize the agency to designate the area as critical habitat unless it is also habitat for the species. As to the second question, the Court held that the agency's determination is subject to judicial review. The Administrative Procedure Act creates a presumption that agency determinations are subject to judicial review that may be rebutted only if the relevant statute precludes review or the action is specifically granted by law to the agency's discretion. Here, the Court found neither. Although the second sentence of Section 4(b)(2) states the Secretary "may" exclude an area from critical habitat, that section requires the Secretary to consider economic impact and relative benefits before deciding whether to exclude an area from critical habitat or to proceed with designation. Because the statute articulates a meaningful standard against which to judge the Secretary's exercise of discretion, the agency's determination is not beyond judicial review. Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.