Supreme Court Oral Arguments

United States v. Hemani Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 2, 2026. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Ali Danial Hemani. Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner) Erin E. Murphy (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A grand jury indicted Ali Danial Hemani in February 2023 for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), a federal law prohibiting firearm possession by an “unlawful user of…a controlled substance.” The indictment alleged that in August 2022, Hemani knowingly possessed a Glock 19 9mm pistol while being an unlawful user of controlled substances. The government specified that Hemani allegedly used marijuana, promethazine, and cocaine. The pistol was located in the closet of Hemani’s parents’ home. Crucially, the prosecution did not allege that Hemani was intoxicated or using a controlled substance at the precise time he possessed the firearm. The government’s case rested on his status as a regular drug user, not on simultaneous use and possession. Hemani filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing the law was unconstitutional as applied to him. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted the motion and dismissed the indictment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that a binding regional precedent (United States v. Connelly) rendered the law’s application to Hemani unconstitutional. Question Does a federal law that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” violate the respondent’s Second Amendment right to bear arms?

Philip L. Ellison, appellate counsel arguing fair market value should set just compensation. Matthew T. Nelson, county counsel defending tax-foreclosure procedures and surplus-as-forced-sale value. Frederick Liu, U.S. attorney urging historically fair tax sales mean surplus can count as compensation. They debate when auctions are fair, historical guideposts for sales, valuation timing, and remedies after foreclosure.

Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 24, 2026. Petitioner: Enbridge Energy, LP.Respondent: Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan. Advocates: John J. Bursch (for the Petitioners) Ann M. Sherman (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Enbridge Energy, LP, owns and operates Line 5, an oil pipeline that transports petroleum products through Wisconsin and Michigan before terminating in Ontario, Canada. Since 1953, Line 5 has run across the bottomlands of the Straits of Mackinac under an easement granted by the State of Michigan, which owns the submerged lands. In recent years, concerns over Line 5’s safety and environmental impact led to increased scrutiny and legal challenges regarding the pipeline’s continued operation, including questions about Michigan’s regulatory authority and the potential preemption of state law by federal pipeline laws and international treaties. On June 27, 2019, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel filed a lawsuit in Michigan state court, seeking to enjoin Enbridge from operating Line 5 in the Straits. The Attorney General alleged violations of the public-trust doctrine, common-law public nuisance, and the Michigan Environmental Protection Act. Both parties filed dispositive motions, with Enbridge asserting, in part, that federal law preempted Michigan’s claims. Separate but closely related litigation followed when Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued an easement-revocation notice in November 2020 and filed her own state-court suit against Enbridge. After engaging in nearly two years of state-court proceedings in the Attorney General’s case, Enbridge removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan in December 2021, arguing federal-question jurisdiction. The district court rejected the Attorney General’s motion to remand, holding that removal was proper either under statutory timing rules or equitable exceptions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding Enbridge’s removal was untimely and that statutory deadlines for removal are mandatory and immune to equitable exceptions, and ordered the case remanded to Michigan state court. Question Do district courts have the authority to excuse the thirty-day procedural time limit for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)?

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba) Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 23, 2026. Petitioner: Exxon Mobil Corporation.Respondent: Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al. Advocates: Morgan L. Ratner (for the Petitioner) Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Jules L. Lobel (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves Exxon Mobil Corporation’s claim to property confiscated by the Cuban government decades ago. Exxon, through its predecessor Standard Oil Company, owned several subsidiaries in Cuba, including Esso Standard Oil, S.A. (Essosa), which operated oil and gas assets like a refinery, product terminals, and over 100 service stations. In 1960, following Fidel Castro’s rise to power, the Cuban government confiscated these assets without providing compensation. The assets were subsequently transferred to Cuban state-owned enterprises, including Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET), the state oil company, and Corporación CIMEX S.A. (Cuba) (CIMEX), a conglomerate. In 1969, the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) certified Standard Oil's loss at over $71 million, plus interest, due to the confiscation. In 1996, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, also known as the Helms-Burton Act, which created a private right of action in Title III for U.S. nationals to sue any “person” who “traffics in” their confiscated property, explicitly defining “person” to include an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. Although every President suspended this right of action until May 2, 2019, President Donald Trump’s administration then allowed the suspension to lapse, and Exxon filed its lawsuit that same day. Exxon’s complaint names the Cuban instrumentalities CIMEX, CUPET, and Corporación CIMEX S.A. (Panama) as defendants, alleging they continue to traffic in the confiscated property through commercial activities such as refining oil and operating service stations that process remittances and sell imported goods. The Cuban defendants moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court held that the Helms-Burton Act did not independently abrogate foreign sovereign immunity and that the FSIA’s expropriation exception did not apply, but found that the commercial-activity exception was met for CIMEX. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed that the Helms-Burton Act did not displace the FSIA and that the expropriation exception was inapplicable, but vacated the ruling on the commercial-activity exception and remanded for further jurisdictional discovery. Question Does the Helms-Burton Act abrogate foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, even if the parties do not satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?

Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 23, 2026. Petitioner: Havana Docks Corporation.Respondent: Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., et al. Advocates: Richard D. Klingler (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The dispute centers on property in the Port of Havana now known as the Havana Cruise Port Terminal. In the early 20th century, the Cuban Government granted a 50-year concession to a predecessor of Havana Docks Corporation (Havana Docks) to build and operate piers and terminal facilities at the port. This concession, a usufructuary right, was extended to 99 years in 1920, with a scheduled expiration date in 2004. Havana Docks, a company organized under the laws of Delaware and determined to be a U.S. national, acquired the concession in 1928. In 1960, shortly after Fidel Castro came to power, the Cuban Government confiscated the concession, expropriating Havana Docks’ property and assets at the Port of Havana without compensation. Subsequently, Havana Docks filed a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which certified a loss of over $9 million stemming from the confiscation. After Title III of the Helms-Burton Act became fully effective in May 2019, Havana Docks sued several cruise lines, including Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises S.A. Co., for “trafficking” in the confiscated port property when their ships used the Havana Cruise Port Terminal from 2016 to 2019. The district court initially issued judgments totaling over $100 million against the four cruise lines. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Havana Docks is a U.S. national under the Helms-Burton Act. However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgments related to the 2016-2019 conduct, holding that Havana Docks’ limited property interest, the 99-year concession, would have expired in 2004, meaning the cruise lines did not traffic in the confiscated property during that period. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on Havana Docks’ separate claims against Carnival for alleged trafficking between 1996 and 2001. Question Is the legal right to sue under Title III of the LIBERTAD Act tied to the confiscated property claim or the hypothetical, unexpired duration of the original property interest?

General Sauer, a senior government appellate advocate, discusses the complexities of presidential removal authority concerning Governor Cook's mortgage misrepresentations. Mr. Clement, representing Cook, argues for the independence of the Federal Reserve, highlighting the importance of procedural limits on removal. They delve into whether inadvertent errors constitute 'cause' for removal, the standards of judicial review, and the implications of their arguments on the separation of powers, all while the justices challenge and probe the nuances of the case.

In this discussion, Mr. Beck, an appellate counsel representing Jason Wolford, passionately argues that Hawaii's law unfairly limits Second Amendment rights by presuming a ban on carrying firearms on private property open to the public. Ms. Harris, representing the State of Hawaii, counters that the law aligns with historical practices and property rights. They debate the implications of consent rules, the historical context of carrying laws, and the balance between state authority and constitutional protections, offering a compelling insight into a key legal challenge.

In this discussion, Mr. Keneally, lead counsel for M & K Employee Solutions, champions the argument that actuarial assumptions should remain fixed at the valuation date. Mr. Roberts, representing the Trustees, counters by explaining that 'as of' allows for retrospective calculations and customary post-measurement adjustments. Mr. Barber supports these interpretations with insights on long-standing actuarial practices. The debate unpacks complex statutory interpretations and the implications of variable financial assumptions on employer liabilities.

In this discussion, Mr. Zuckerman, counsel for New Jersey Transit, highlights the agency's creation and legal powers, arguing it qualifies as an arm of the State of New Jersey entitled to sovereign immunity. He contrasts this with Mr. Kimberly, representing the petitioner Cedric Galette, who posits that NJ Transit is a separate entity, lacking such immunity. They explore crucial legal precedents, the implications of corporate status, and the delicate balance between state control and corporate independence, leading to a compelling debate on liability and sovereignty.

Little v. Hecox Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2026. Petitioner: Bradley Little, Governor of Idaho, et al.Respondent: Lindsay Hecox, et al. Advocates: Alan M. Hurst (for the Petitioners) Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Kathleen R. Hartnett (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2020, Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, which categorically barred transgender girls and women from participating on female athletic teams in public schools—from elementary school through college. Prior to the law’s passage, Idaho’s high school athletic association and the NCAA allowed transgender women to compete on women’s teams after a year of hormone therapy. At the time, there were no known instances of transgender girls competing in Idaho athletics under those existing rules. Nonetheless, Idaho lawmakers passed the Act, citing concerns about “fairness” and biological differences attributed to testosterone and other factors. The law allowed any individual to challenge a female athlete’s gender, triggering a mandatory medical verification process that could include analysis of reproductive anatomy, genetic make-up, or testosterone levels. Cisgender women, including those perceived as more masculine, could also be subjected to these checks. Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman and student at Boise State University who wished to join the women’s cross-country team, filed suit alongside a cisgender high school athlete known as Jane Doe. They alleged that the Act violated their constitutional rights, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hecox had undergone hormone therapy, significantly lowering her testosterone levels, but was still categorically excluded under the law. The district court granted a preliminary injunction blocking the law in August 2020, finding it likely unconstitutional. After several rounds of appeal and remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the injunction as applied to Hecox but remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the scope of the injunction, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Labrador v. Poe. Question May a state, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, categorically require sports participants to compete based on their biological sex, rather than gender identity?