Only US Enemies Can Be Drug Lords or Terrorists / Laleh Khalili

Laleh Khalili's 'Time in the Shadows' examines the evolution of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tactics employed by the United States and Israel, linking modern methods to earlier colonial practices. Through archival and field research, Khalili traces doctrines, training, and institutional transfers that shaped security practices across regions. The book demonstrates how counterinsurgency rationales justified repression and covert operations while being packaged as professional military science. It highlights the human costs of these practices and the political structures that sustain them. Khalili's analysis situates contemporary security regimes within longer histories of imperial governance.

In 'Instruments of Statecraft', Michael McClintock examines the history of U.S. unconventional warfare, including guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, from World War II through the Cold War era. The book draws on declassified documents to explore U.S. military strategies in various regions, including Vietnam, Central America, and the Middle East. McClintock critiques the ethical implications and effectiveness of these tactics.

This book by David Halberstam examines the decisions that led to the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War, particularly highlighting the roles of academics and intellectuals in President John F. Kennedy's administration. It delves into the lives and policies of key figures such as Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Dean Rusk, and critiques the 'whiz kids' who implemented policies that often defied common sense. The book covers the period from 1960 to 1965 and beyond, providing a detailed account of the strategic blunders and moral crises that characterized the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.