EconTalk The Political Economy of Power
16 snips
Aug 14, 2006 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, NYU and Hoover political scientist and co-author of The Logic of Political Survival, explores why leaders cling to power. He gets into selectorate theory, loyalty buying, foreign aid propping up bad governments, why autocrats may prefer corruption to growth, King Leopold’s contrasting rule, and how term limits can backfire.
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Dictators Survive By Buying The People With Guns
- Dictators do not stay in power just because they have guns; they stay because a tiny, richly paid coalition controls the guns for them.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita estimates Kim Jong-il needed only 250 to 2,500 supporters and about $1.2 billion yearly, making loyalty vastly more valuable than ordinary life.
Autocrats Can Liberalize Economically Without Freeing Politics
- New autocrats can survive without total terror by supplying basic welfare while withholding coordination goods like press freedom and assembly.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita says free assembly slashes an autocrat's one-year survival odds, so regimes like China and Putin's Russia liberalize economically while blocking coordination.
Corruption Can Outperform Growth For Dictators
- Autocrats may benefit from growth, but corruption can protect them even better because it binds cronies to the regime.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita says a petty dictator with 6 percent growth hits a 50 percent loss risk after 12 years, versus 25 years with a high black-market premium.
