Constitutional law of the United States: Theory: Purposive approach

The purposive approach (sometimes referred to as purposivism, purposive construction, purposive interpretation, or the modern principle in construction) is an approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation under which common law courts interpret an enactment (a statute, part of a statute, or a clause of a constitution) within the context of the law's purpose.

Purposive interpretation is a derivation of the mischief rule set in Heydon's Case, and intended to replace the mischief rule, the plain meaning rule and the golden rule. Purposive interpretation is used when the courts use extraneous materials from the pre-enactment phase of legislation, including early drafts, hansards, committee reports, and white papers. The purposive interpretation involves a rejection of the exclusionary rule.

Israeli jurist Aharon Barak views purposive interpretation as a legal construction that combines elements of the subjective and objective. Barak states that the subjective elements include the intention of the author of the text, whereas the objective elements include the intent of the reasonable author and the legal system’s fundamental values.

Critics of purposivism argue it fails to separate the powers between the legislator and the judiciary, as it allows more freedom in interpretation by way of extraneous materials in interpreting the law.

Historical origins.

Plain meaning rule.

The plain meaning rule gained popularity during the 18th and 19th centuries as the courts took an increasingly strict view of the words within statutes. Under the plain meaning rule, the words of the statute are given their natural or ordinary meaning. The plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation should be the first rule applied by judges.

One of the leading statements of the plain meaning rule was made by Chief Justice Nicholas Conyngham Tindal in the Sussex Peerage case (1844), concerning whether Augustus d'Este succeeded to the titles of his father Prince Augustus Frederick, Duke of Sussex, in particular whether the marriage of his father and mother was valid under the Royal Marriages Act 1772:

... the only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such a case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver.

Strict application of the plain meaning rule can sometimes result in "absurd" outcomes. Examples of the plain meaning rule producing absurd outcomes can be seen in the following cases:

In Whitely v Chappel (1868) a statute made it an offence "to impersonate any person entitled to vote". The defendant used the vote of a dead man. The statute relating to voting rights required a person to be living in order to be entitled to vote. The plain meaning rule was applied and the defendant was thus acquitted.

In R v Harris (1836) the defendant had bitten off his victim's nose. But because the statute made it an offence "to stab cut or wound" the court held that under the plain meaning rule the act of biting did not come within the meaning of stab cut or wound as these words implied an instrument had to be used. The defendant's conviction was overturned.

In Fisher v Bell (1961) the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1958 made it an offence to "offer for sale" an offensive weapon. The defendant had a flick knife displayed in his shop window with a price tag on it. Statute made it a criminal offence to "offer" such flick knives for sale. His conviction was overturned as goods on display in shops are not "offers" in the technical sense but an invitation to treat. The court applied the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation.