The Nonlinear Library LW - In Defense of Epistemic Empathy by Kevin Dorst
Dec 28, 2023
10:26
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: In Defense of Epistemic Empathy, published by Kevin Dorst on December 28, 2023 on LessWrong.
TLDR: Why think your ideological opponents are unreasonable? Common reasons: their views are (1) absurd, or (2) refutable, or (3) baseless, or (4) conformist, or (5) irrational. None are convincing.
Elizabeth is skeptical about the results of the 2020 election. Theo thinks Republicans are planning to institute a theocracy. Alan is convinced that AI will soon take over the world.
You probably think some (or all) of them are unhinged.
As I've argued before, we seem to be losing our epistemic empathy: our ability to both (1) be convinced that someone's opinions are wrong, and yet (2) acknowledge that they might hold those opinions for reasonable reasons. For example, since the 90s our descriptions of others as 'crazy', 'stupid' or 'fools' has skyrocketed:
I think this is a mistake. Lots of my work aims to help us recover our epistemic empathy - to argue that reasonable processes can drive such disagreements, and that we have little evidence that irrationality (the philosophers' term for being "crazy", "stupid", or a "fool") explains it.
The most common reaction: "Clever argument. But surely you don't believe it!"
I do.
Obviously people sometimes act and think irrationally. Obviously that sometimes helps explain how they end up with mistaken opinions. The question is whether we have good reason to think that this is generically the explanation for why people have such different opinions than we do.
Today, I want to take a critical look at some of the arguments people give for suspending their epistemic empathy: (1) that their views are absurd; (2) that the questions have easy answers; (3) that they don't have good reasons for their beliefs; (4) that they're just conforming to their group; and (5) that they're irrational.
None are convincing.
Absurdity.
"Sure, reasonable people can disagree on some topics. But the opinions of Elizabeth, Theo, and Alan are so absurd that only irrationality could explain it."
This argument over-states the power of rationality.
Spend a few years in academia, and you'll see why. Especially in philosophy, it'll become extremely salient that reasonable people often wind up with absurd views.
David Lewis thought that there were talking donkeys. (Since the best metaphysical system is one in which every possible world we can imagine is the way some spatio-temporally isolated world actually is.)
Timothy Williamson thinks that it's impossible for me to not have existed - even if I'd never been born, I would've been something or other. (Since the best logical system is one on which necessarily everything necessarily exists.)
Peter Singer thinks that the fact that you failed to give $4,000 to the Against Malaria Fund this morning is the moral equivalent of ignoring a drowning toddler as you walked into work. (Since there turns out to be no morally significant difference between the cases.)
And plenty of reasonable people (including sophisticated philosophers) think both of the following:
It's monstrous to run over a bunny instead of slamming on your brakes, even if doing so would hold up traffic significantly; yet
It's totally fine to eat the carcass of an animal that was tortured for its entire life (in a factory farm), instead of eating a slightly-less-exciting meal of beans and rice.
David Lewis, Tim Williamson, Peter Singer, and many who believe both (1) and (2) are brilliant, careful thinkers. Rationality is no guard against absurdity.
Ease.
"Unlike philosophical disputes, political issues just aren't that difficult."
This argument belies common sense.
There are plenty of easy questions that we are not polarized over. Is brushing you teeth a good idea? Are Snickers bars healthy? What color is grass? Etc.
Meanwhile, the sorts of issues that people polariz...
TLDR: Why think your ideological opponents are unreasonable? Common reasons: their views are (1) absurd, or (2) refutable, or (3) baseless, or (4) conformist, or (5) irrational. None are convincing.
Elizabeth is skeptical about the results of the 2020 election. Theo thinks Republicans are planning to institute a theocracy. Alan is convinced that AI will soon take over the world.
You probably think some (or all) of them are unhinged.
As I've argued before, we seem to be losing our epistemic empathy: our ability to both (1) be convinced that someone's opinions are wrong, and yet (2) acknowledge that they might hold those opinions for reasonable reasons. For example, since the 90s our descriptions of others as 'crazy', 'stupid' or 'fools' has skyrocketed:
I think this is a mistake. Lots of my work aims to help us recover our epistemic empathy - to argue that reasonable processes can drive such disagreements, and that we have little evidence that irrationality (the philosophers' term for being "crazy", "stupid", or a "fool") explains it.
The most common reaction: "Clever argument. But surely you don't believe it!"
I do.
Obviously people sometimes act and think irrationally. Obviously that sometimes helps explain how they end up with mistaken opinions. The question is whether we have good reason to think that this is generically the explanation for why people have such different opinions than we do.
Today, I want to take a critical look at some of the arguments people give for suspending their epistemic empathy: (1) that their views are absurd; (2) that the questions have easy answers; (3) that they don't have good reasons for their beliefs; (4) that they're just conforming to their group; and (5) that they're irrational.
None are convincing.
Absurdity.
"Sure, reasonable people can disagree on some topics. But the opinions of Elizabeth, Theo, and Alan are so absurd that only irrationality could explain it."
This argument over-states the power of rationality.
Spend a few years in academia, and you'll see why. Especially in philosophy, it'll become extremely salient that reasonable people often wind up with absurd views.
David Lewis thought that there were talking donkeys. (Since the best metaphysical system is one in which every possible world we can imagine is the way some spatio-temporally isolated world actually is.)
Timothy Williamson thinks that it's impossible for me to not have existed - even if I'd never been born, I would've been something or other. (Since the best logical system is one on which necessarily everything necessarily exists.)
Peter Singer thinks that the fact that you failed to give $4,000 to the Against Malaria Fund this morning is the moral equivalent of ignoring a drowning toddler as you walked into work. (Since there turns out to be no morally significant difference between the cases.)
And plenty of reasonable people (including sophisticated philosophers) think both of the following:
It's monstrous to run over a bunny instead of slamming on your brakes, even if doing so would hold up traffic significantly; yet
It's totally fine to eat the carcass of an animal that was tortured for its entire life (in a factory farm), instead of eating a slightly-less-exciting meal of beans and rice.
David Lewis, Tim Williamson, Peter Singer, and many who believe both (1) and (2) are brilliant, careful thinkers. Rationality is no guard against absurdity.
Ease.
"Unlike philosophical disputes, political issues just aren't that difficult."
This argument belies common sense.
There are plenty of easy questions that we are not polarized over. Is brushing you teeth a good idea? Are Snickers bars healthy? What color is grass? Etc.
Meanwhile, the sorts of issues that people polariz...