Criminal Procedure Law Lecture Two: Arrest, Pretrial Process, and Confession/Interrogation Law (Part 2 of 3)

This lecture covers lawful arrests, pretrial procedures, and confession/interrogation law, building on Fourth Amendment search and seizure. Key topics include constitutional standards for stops, frisks (reasonable suspicion), and arrests (probable cause); pretrial steps from initial appearance to plea negotiations; and Fifth/Sixth Amendment safeguards concerning Miranda warnings, waiver, invocation, and right to counsel at critical stages. A seizure occurs when a reasonable person wouldn't feel free to leave, distinguishing temporary stops (reasonable suspicion, limited pat-down) from custodial arrests (probable cause, full procedures). The Terry stop allows brief stops and pat-downs based on articulable suspicion of criminal activity and a reasonable belief of being armed and dangerous, limited to weapon discovery. Arrests generally require a warrant based on probable cause from a neutral magistrate, with exceptions for exigent circumstances (fleeing suspect, public safety). Warrantless felony arrests in public are permitted with objective probable cause, respecting the individual's dignity and avoiding excessive force. The pretrial process begins with an initial appearance (charges, counsel, release). Bail is considered under the Eighth Amendment (no excessive bail), balancing offense seriousness, criminal history, and community risk, potentially involving release on recognizance, bonds, or preventive detention. Federal felony cases often require a grand jury indictment (probable cause), while other jurisdictions use prosecutorial information and preliminary hearings as a screen against unfounded prosecutions. Prosecutors have broad charging discretion and utilize plea bargaining (guilty plea for reduced charge/sentence) which raises concerns about coercion and unequal power. Pretrial motions, especially to suppress illegally obtained evidence (Fourth Amendment challenges), are crucial. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a speedy trial. The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination during custodial interrogation (Miranda warnings: right to silence, use of statements, right to counsel, appointed counsel if indigent), requiring knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waivers based on totality of circumstances. Invoking the right to counsel or silence requires ceasing interrogation. Exceptions to Miranda include public safety and non-custodial questioning (voluntariness still applies). The Sixth Amendment guarantees counsel at critical stages after formal charges (indictment, arraignment, etc.), such as plea discussions, lineups, and hearings, requiring knowing and intelligent waivers. Massiah prohibits deliberate elicitation of incriminating statements from an indicted defendant without counsel. Elstad allows subsequent admissible statements after defective initial Miranda warnings if later warnings are proper and waiver is valid. Edwards' "bright line" rule requires ceasing interrogation upon invoking Miranda counsel until counsel is present or the suspect initiates further communication. The lecture concludes by summarizing these themes, leading to discussions on trial, sentencing, and post-conviction in the next session.