The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast Ep. 221: Functionalist Theories of Mind (Putnam, Armstrong) (Part One)
Jul 15, 2019
They tackle what it means to be a mind by explaining functionalism: mental states defined by role, not brain matter. They compare functionalism with identity theory and behaviorism. They explore multiple realizability and the hardware/software analogy for minds. They unpack Putnam and Armstrong’s differing functionalist approaches and use concrete examples like pain and belief to illustrate the ideas.
AI Snips
Chapters
Books
Transcript
Episode notes
Mind As Function, Not Stuff
- Functionalism identifies mental states by what they do, not by their physical makeup.
- That lets minds be multiply realizable across different materials or systems.
Mental States As Causal Roles
- Functional states are defined by their causal relations to sensory inputs, other mental states, and behavior.
- This expands behaviorism by including internal states and their interrelations.
Cognitive Science Uses Functional Schematics
- Functionalism motivates cognitive science methods that model mental processes as flowcharts or algorithms.
- Those schematics become the target of implementation, not a specific neural substrate.
