The Nonlinear Library LW - Nietzsche's Morality in Plain English by Arjun Panickssery
Dec 4, 2023
07:25
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Nietzsche's Morality in Plain English, published by Arjun Panickssery on December 4, 2023 on LessWrong.
In 1924, Clarence Darrow's
eight-hour plea for Leopold and Loeb blamed the universities and scholars of Nietzsche (who died in 1900) for their influence on Leopold:
He became enamored of the philosophy of Nietzsche. Your honor, I have read almost everything that Nietzsche ever wrote. A man of wonderful intellect; the most original philosophy of the last century. A man who had made a deeper imprint on philosophy than any other man within a hundred years, whether right or wrong. More books have been written about him than probably all the rest of the philosophers in a hundred years.
Nietzsche is popularly associated with Nazism and even before this with "the superman … free from scruple" that Darrow describes, but he was also popular among the left-anarchists and the Left generally. Meanwhile, Tyler Cowen
reports that "if you meet an intellectual non-Leftist, increasingly they are Nietzschean" (whatever that means). Common sense demands that some of these people are misreading him.
Pinning down a moral theory that we can engage faces some initial hurdles:
Nietzsche's views changed over time. His works appear to make contradictory claims.
His writing is notoriously poetic and obscure.
Huge volumes of notes left behind after his 1889 mental collapse were compiled into The Will to Power and the Nachlass notes. It's unclear how to consider these since he wanted his notes destroyed after his death.
I favor Brian Leiter's approach and conclusions in
Nietzsche on Morality. He offers practical solutions: identifying his works starting from Daybreak (1881) as "mature work," working to extract philosophical content from even his esoteric output, and avoiding claims that depend on unpublished notes, in part just because they're low-quality.
Nietzsche's overarching project is the "revaluation of all values": a critique of herd morality (which he typically just refers to as "morality") on the grounds that it's hostile to the flourishing of the best type of person.
First his broad outlook. Philosophically, he supports a methodological naturalism where philosophy aspires to be continuous with natural or social scientific inquiry. Metaethically he's an anti-realist about value and would ultimately admit to defending his evaluative taste.
His psychological views can be strikingly modern. He argues that our beliefs are formed from the struggle of unconscious drives which compete in our mind so that our conscious life is merely epiphenomenal. He advances what Leiter calls a "doctrine of types" where everyone is some type of guy and the type of guy you are determines the kind of life you can lead, and that you'll hold whatever philosophical or moral beliefs will favor your interests. He doesn't hold any extreme "determinist" position but is broadly fatalistic about how your type-facts circumscribe and set limits on the kind of person you'll be and the beliefs you'll hold, within which you can be influenced by your environment and values.
From here we can proceed to herd morality, the general class of theories associated with normal morality. Nietzsche criticizes three of its descriptive claims (quoting exactly from Leiter):
Free will: Human agents possess a will capable of free and autonomous choice.
Transparency of the self: The self is sufficiently transparent that agents' actions can be distinguished on the basis of their respective motives.
Similarity: Human agents are sufficiently similar that one moral code is appropriate for all.
In line with Nietzsche's theory of psychology, these empirical beliefs are held in support of herd morality's normative beliefs: free will is needed to hold people accountable for their actions and transparency of the self is needed to hold people accoun...
In 1924, Clarence Darrow's
eight-hour plea for Leopold and Loeb blamed the universities and scholars of Nietzsche (who died in 1900) for their influence on Leopold:
He became enamored of the philosophy of Nietzsche. Your honor, I have read almost everything that Nietzsche ever wrote. A man of wonderful intellect; the most original philosophy of the last century. A man who had made a deeper imprint on philosophy than any other man within a hundred years, whether right or wrong. More books have been written about him than probably all the rest of the philosophers in a hundred years.
Nietzsche is popularly associated with Nazism and even before this with "the superman … free from scruple" that Darrow describes, but he was also popular among the left-anarchists and the Left generally. Meanwhile, Tyler Cowen
reports that "if you meet an intellectual non-Leftist, increasingly they are Nietzschean" (whatever that means). Common sense demands that some of these people are misreading him.
Pinning down a moral theory that we can engage faces some initial hurdles:
Nietzsche's views changed over time. His works appear to make contradictory claims.
His writing is notoriously poetic and obscure.
Huge volumes of notes left behind after his 1889 mental collapse were compiled into The Will to Power and the Nachlass notes. It's unclear how to consider these since he wanted his notes destroyed after his death.
I favor Brian Leiter's approach and conclusions in
Nietzsche on Morality. He offers practical solutions: identifying his works starting from Daybreak (1881) as "mature work," working to extract philosophical content from even his esoteric output, and avoiding claims that depend on unpublished notes, in part just because they're low-quality.
Nietzsche's overarching project is the "revaluation of all values": a critique of herd morality (which he typically just refers to as "morality") on the grounds that it's hostile to the flourishing of the best type of person.
First his broad outlook. Philosophically, he supports a methodological naturalism where philosophy aspires to be continuous with natural or social scientific inquiry. Metaethically he's an anti-realist about value and would ultimately admit to defending his evaluative taste.
His psychological views can be strikingly modern. He argues that our beliefs are formed from the struggle of unconscious drives which compete in our mind so that our conscious life is merely epiphenomenal. He advances what Leiter calls a "doctrine of types" where everyone is some type of guy and the type of guy you are determines the kind of life you can lead, and that you'll hold whatever philosophical or moral beliefs will favor your interests. He doesn't hold any extreme "determinist" position but is broadly fatalistic about how your type-facts circumscribe and set limits on the kind of person you'll be and the beliefs you'll hold, within which you can be influenced by your environment and values.
From here we can proceed to herd morality, the general class of theories associated with normal morality. Nietzsche criticizes three of its descriptive claims (quoting exactly from Leiter):
Free will: Human agents possess a will capable of free and autonomous choice.
Transparency of the self: The self is sufficiently transparent that agents' actions can be distinguished on the basis of their respective motives.
Similarity: Human agents are sufficiently similar that one moral code is appropriate for all.
In line with Nietzsche's theory of psychology, these empirical beliefs are held in support of herd morality's normative beliefs: free will is needed to hold people accountable for their actions and transparency of the self is needed to hold people accoun...