The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast Episode 155: Richard Rorty Against Epistemology
Jan 2, 2017
They dig into Rorty’s attack on traditional theories of knowledge and the idea of foundational justification. Conversations cover indeterminacy of translation, meanings as social practices, and holism versus foundationalism. The group debates whether science is privileged, Kant’s role in making epistemology self-confident, and if knowledge is best seen as conversationally justified.
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The Myth Of The Given Rejected
- Rorty and the guests reject treating perceptual 'givens' as epistemic foundations that justify beliefs.
- They stress justification operates within the logical space of reasons, via propositions and social corroboration, not raw impressions.
Knowledge That Vs. Knowledge Of
- Rorty distinguishes 'knowledge that' (propositional justification) from 'knowledge of' (direct acquaintance or presentation).
- He claims philosophy wrongly models knowledge as subject-object confrontation rather than conversational justification.
Philosophy Or Physiology?
- If philosophy treated knowledge like a natural capacity, follow-up study would be empirical psychology, not armchair foundationalism.
- Rorty suggests Kant's synthesis made philosophers view epistemology as a tribunal of reason instead of a historical-social activity.
