EconTalk Bruce Bueno de Mesquita on Democracies and Dictatorships
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Feb 12, 2007 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Professor of Politics at NYU and Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, discusses the incentives facing dictators and democratic leaders. He applies his insights to foreign aid, the Middle East, Venezuela, China's potential for evolution to a democratic system, and Cuba. He emphasizes the importance of freedom of assembly and freedom of the press for true democracy.
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Selectorate Explains Why Leaders Prioritize Public Goods
- Political survival depends on the selectorate and the winning coalition, not just elections or charisma.
- Large winning coalitions force leaders to provide public goods; small coalitions incentivize private rents to cronies, shaping policy outcomes.
Foreign Aid Fuels Autocrats Like Natural Resources
- Foreign aid acts like a natural resource: it gives leaders money without taxing labor, enabling rent extraction and regime survival.
- Donor conditionality reflects donor domestic politics, so aid often buys policies the donor's constituents want, not recipient welfare.
Democracies Fight Fewer Wars But Escalate To Win
- Democracies pick wars selectively and escalate when losing because leaders face removal for defeat; autocrats can risk more but often under-resource wars to protect cronies.
- Autocrats only fully mobilize when defeat means deposition by an external victor.