Philosophy Bites Shelly Kagan on Speciesism
Aug 1, 2015
Shelly Kagan, a Yale philosopher known for his work in moral philosophy, critiques Peter Singer's views on speciesism. He defines speciesism as a form of prejudice and discusses its implications regarding humans and animals. Kagan shares how his perspective on Singer evolved, exploring the nuances of moral intuitions. He introduces the concept of personhood as crucial for moral consideration and argues against simple equal treatment of interests. Ultimately, he presents a refined approach that assigns varying moral status based on personhood.
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Singer's Speciesism Argument
- Peter Singer popularised 'speciesism' as favoring humans merely for being human rather than for relevant properties.
- Singer argues it's analogous to racism/sexism and wrong when like interests (e.g., equal pain) are counted unequally.
Kagan's Personal Change Of View
- Shelly Kagan recounts his initial reaction decades ago: he found Singer immediately persuasive and changed his behaviour.
- Revisiting Singer later, Kagan reports he no longer finds the arguments fully persuasive.
Prejudice As Epistemic Double Standard
- Kagan identifies prejudice by epistemic double standards: holding beliefs on inadequate evidence you wouldn't accept elsewhere.
- If speciesist judgments rest on sincere moral intuitions treated like other intuitions, they needn't be mere prejudice.