Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-35 – Shang-Su Wu and Collin Koh – The Philippines’ Security in the Face of China’s Rising Threats

Nov 14, 2025

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Dr. Shang-Su Wu and Dr. Collin Koh discuss the ties between the Philippines and Taiwan and how the Philippines would be affected in a conflict between Taiwan and China. Their discussion also delves into topics such as military modernization in the Philippines and US involvement in the Philippines.

Keywords: Philippines, Taiwan, China, Philippine-Taiwan relations, security, military modernization

Disclaimer: This transcript has been edited for clarity.

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Joining me virtually today are Dr. Shang-Su Wu and Dr. Collin Koh. Wu is the author of “The Philippines’ Security in the Face of China's Rising Threats,” which was published in the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters. He's an assistant professor and research coordinator in the Homeland Security Program at Rabdan Academy in Abu Dhabi.

Koh is [a] senior fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) based in Nanyang Technological University. He primarily researches maritime security and naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific region, focusing on Southeast Asia.

Welcome to Decisive Point.

Dr. Shang-Su Wu

Thank you

Dr. Collin Koh

Thank you

Host

Tell me about the security connection between the Philippines and Taiwan. What are the likely scenarios that might play out in Taiwan, and how would these different scenarios impact the Philippines?

Generally, if China wants to use force against Taiwan, there's probably two most likely scenarios. The one is a blockade, then another—of course, after a blockade or certain fire projection—[is to] try to eventually do the invasion. So, deployment of the US military near to Taiwan, no matter in Okinawa or in the Philippines, they [are a] dilemma [for] China because China, on the one hand, if they want to constrain the conflict [bilaterally], just go straight. Yes, they would not like to attack, but on the other hand, that means their flanks are opened for the intervention for the attack. On the other hand, if you want to extend the conflict, then, of course, the scale will be much bigger, the outcome will be much worse, or the risk much higher. In that case, they have to pay very [close] attention on military deployments.

And, in the past, of course, the Philippines remained less relevant because most invasion [scenarios] remain focused on Taipei, the northern part of Taiwan. So, Japan’s side will be important, but nowadays, if they are doing a blockade (of course, if they are surrounding the island), they would also [employ] the longer range of the weapon systems for the munitions.

So, even the northern part [of Taiwan] would be under the firepower [deployed from] the Philippines. That’s why the US military deployment in the Philippine would matter a lot. But, on the other hand, the Philippines have various weakness. The one weakness is their armed forces haven’t been modernized since, generally, between the 1980s to the 2000s or early 2010s. So nowadays, their capability is still weak, especially compared to China. And, you know, they have the maritime disputes over various islands, and China may use that to press the Philippines. Another issue is [that] the Philippines likes to export the labor force for their economy. And in Taiwan, they [have] at least 154,000 Filipino workers. China may use these people as a kind of hostage to threaten the Philippines. And in 2003, the Philippines quit Operation Iraqi Freedom [because] al-Qaeda threatened the Filipino workers overseas, and there could be a similar situation [in Taiwan someday]. So, that makes the US deployment in the Philippines, and overall, the security connection with Taiwan, significant.

Koh

Yes, thank you. I think, first of all, allow me to first comment [compliment], Shang-Su, on the new publication. Congratulations. And, it's a great honor to be here to share about what I feel to be the security connection between the Philippines and Taiwan.

This is a very timely discussion we are having because the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] Eastern Theater Command started a whole new series of [exercises], and one of the itineraries that was being exercised was the blockade [in] some parts of the waters around Taiwan.

As Shang-Su has rightly pointed out, in the past, it used to be that the invasion would have focused on the northern part of Taiwan—and particularly around Taipei. I do understand that there is still an emphasis on the defense around the Tan-shui River area, but now, given that the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) has been maneuvering more frequently around Taiwan, it's not [an] “around Taiwan” issue. So, the conception has all changed. The south of Taiwan, which is right close to the doorstep of the northern Philippines, has become increasingly more saliant. The Bashi Channel, which is the channel—the waterway—just in between southern Taiwan and northern Philippines, is a key waterway for the transit of various forces, not just for the PLA, but also for US and Allied forces. So, it will be a contested waterway in times of conflict, and the Philippines will find it rather difficult to stay out of it completely. So that's one.

Second is with the [Ferdinand] Marcos Jr. administration, in recent times, there has been a boost to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the two countries. Under this agreement [signed in 2014], which is, in fact, dated all the way back to the late [Benigno Aquino III] administration, there [have] been moves to reinvigorate the bases and other access arrangements centering around [the] northern Philippines. Those exercises that we see, for example, [in the] exercise Balikatan, they actually have a focus on the northern area of the Philippines in mind, and that actually has Taiwan right in the crosshairs without being them actually naming Taiwan as the area of focus.

But, clearly, the intent is to boost the forces—both the American forces and the Philippine forces—to deal with a Taiwan contingency. So, whether or not the Philippines like it or otherwise, being involved in some way or another in a Taiwan Strait conflict might be a higher possibility these days. I remember Marcos Jr. did mention that it will be inevitable for the Philippines to be involved in one way or another.

The question here is: If the US has to be involved in direct combat operations around Taiwan, and if the Philippines would opt to stay out of direct combat operations around Taiwan, then it would mean that the Philippine forces will have to take on the primary mantle of safeguarding its waters in the South China Sea. And that, in itself, is going to be a tall order for the Philippines, as Shang-Su rightly pointed out. The armed forces of the Philippines is still currently in the midst of modernization, and there is much to be done before they become a more credible deterrent force going forward.

Host

Regarding the balance of forces, what impact does America’s involvement in the Philippines and Taiwan have vis-à-vis China’s threat?

Because [of] the Philippines very limited capability—there’s just one squadron of fighter jets and, and maybe it will expand to four very soon, this year—[it] has a very limited capability to defend itself. So, if the armed conflict happened—and in the Philippines—then US detachments would have to shoulder most [of the] responsibility of the missions because the Philippines itself only can protect very key locations, very few—even [in] most of [its] territory.

Regarding this imbalance, of course, we have to mention [the] Philippines since 2012, because the Scarborough Shoal incident, they indeed put the effort into modernization, but unfortunately, they face China, the quickest expanding (or military increasing), the rising power. So, [the] Philippines’ effort compared to China is very limited. It’s very insufficient. So, if anything, the US will play a very key factor [in bringing] balance. But, on the other hand, it also means the US knows [it has] to handle different locations—so, how [many forces the US can provide to the] Philippine regarding defense—and that will be challenging.

Koh

If I could chime in quickly on that. Shang-Su, you rightly pointed out the current modernizational challenges faced by the AFP—the Armed Forces of the Philippines—and, I think one thing to also point out is that the Philippines, as an archipelagic state, has multiple maritime areas of interest. And, given that it doesn’t just have the West Philippine Sea, which is the area within the South China Sea that they claim under their sovereignty and jurisdiction, other than the West Philippine Sea, we have also the eastern seaboard of the Philippines, which, of course, [centers] around what they call the Philippine Rise, which is an underwater submerged feature that is considered resource rich. And not to mention that there are key waterways that run through the Philippine archipelago that actually allow access right into the open western Pacific Ocean. Now, one example would be that in recent times we have seen PLA Navy ships actually transiting some of those waterways, for example, the Basilan Strait, which is in the southern part of the Philippines. And, it also could mean that in wartime, those waterways could be contested, largely because the Philippine armed forces on its own might be unable to, in fact, police effectively those waterways, much less to even think about defending them in times of war.

So, it will really depend on the US, but what I do tend to see is that the war in Ukraine might actually offer some very important lessons. For example, Ukraine was derided as having no Navy to talk about. But Ukraine—with the help of Western, primarily US, intelligence and other [types] of support—was, in fact, able to deal a blow to the Russian Black Sea fleet with the sinking of the flagship Moskva soon after conflict broke out in Ukraine. I believe, using this model, the Philippines might be able to stand a chance in at least dealing a blow to Chinese forces in certain parts of its archipelago. But, it goes without saying that the armed forces of the Philippines remain pretty limited when it comes to capacity, especially when we are talking about a long-drawn sustained conflict over a period of time.

Host

What do our listeners need to know about the Philippines’ military modernization?

Before the 1960s, it took the lead in Southeast Asia because of the ties under the [US-Philippines Mutual] Defense Treaty with the US, and also the US military deployment, then also during the Cold War context. So, [the] Philippines received a certain kind of capability [to] build out the Navy and the Air Force, but during later 1960, when their insurgency happened, they [were mostly at] war. And in war, that means the external [issues like modernization for] the Navy [and] Air Force generally were [considered] secondary development. And, of course, [because of these circumstances, it] turned out their Navy, until [the]2010s, didn’t have any [missiles].

So, the defense fell behind other countries, and especially after the [Ferdinand] Marcos Sr. regime collapsed in1986. More of the internal turmoil made the military modernization even worse. Then, following the US closing of [its] bases, they found their resources could not handle [the requirements of] modernization. So, overall, they lay behind—not just compared to China [but] compared to all the other Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, United Malaysia. They fell much behind [the] others.

So, from the Scarborough Shoal [incident of] 2012, because they proved then their overall capability, China is really too [much for the Philippines to] even maintain [a] forcing presence. So, they started to modernize [and] started to build back against the [Chinese] build up—build back the capability. But a build-back capability based on the Philippines financial capacity is limited. It is still at a slow pace. Then, of course, also, from 2012 until now, they have [had] three different administrations. And in the Philippines, every presidency will have a different approach [regarding defense spending]. So, the route—I can’t say it is very zigzag, but of course, it won’t [be the same as what] all the less strong efforts like Vietnam or other South Asian country will have done. So, this is relatively less than just, unfortunately, their territorial contest. And now, with the location with regarding Taiwan facing China, [it gives] them much more, much heavier pressure.

Host

Collin, do you have anything to add?

Koh

Yes, very interesting. Shang-Su rightly pointed out [that] this evolution of the Philippines’ security conception and threat perceptions over time, much of it, of course, has to do with the fact that right into the 1990s, all the way into the early 2000s, the priority has always been on internal security. I mean, look, there has been a militant threat in the post–9/11 environment. The militant threat actually magnified in the Philippines, especially around the southern Philippines, in particular. The Philippines was also facing a communist insurgency. So, much of the emphasis had been on internal security [rather] than on external security.

Those presidencies that existed back then, talking about the [Joseph] Estrada administration, before that was the [Fidel V.] Ramos administration. They have largely been looking more inwards than outwards, and that, thereby, means that over time, despite what happened in 1990s with the first flare-up on the South China Sea, with the Philippines centering around Mischief Reef, in fact, there was more of a conception that, you know, that wasn’t so much a big problem. But, dealing with internal threats from communist insurgents and militants will take precedence, and there has always often been a somewhat, I call, fatalistic defeatist type of thinking that there’s no point or very little meaning in trying to build up the armed forces with a credible deterrent capability because there’s no way the Philippines is able to fight a war with China anyway, so don’t waste time on that.

So, now it all changed last year because now, with Marcos Jr., he has adopted a more assertive stance on the South China Sea issue, together, backed up by a very supportive congress [of the Philippines], and we are going to look at what’s going to happen with the midterm election in the Philippines and, of course, a largely supportive population that backs up the administration’s South China Sea policy, its approach on China, as well as the modernization of the Philippines’ military. The problem here is funding is short. At the same time, the armed forces of Philippines is starting from a pretty low base—the low base that actually was frozen since the 1960s [and] ’70s ’til now. So, the base was so low that any modernization effort has to be not just sustained, but it does require a lot more effort in trying to, sort of, match up various aspects—air, naval, land, cyber, and other domains as well.

Host

Is there another really important factor as it relates to Taiwan, the Philippines, and China that you want to touch on?

All I want to add [is] as previously mentioned about the Philippine overseas labor in Taiwan, that this issue, so far, is, I think, still very hard to solve. And [regarding] the military modernization for the Philippines—just as Collin mentioned—there is this huge gap, but on the other hand, it’s [about] the profits. There’s no shortcut. Of course, if [the] US [has a] large military deployment [to the area], they [might] show up very quickly [and fill] the gap. Another thing [is that] the Philippines may not politically accept [going] back to the Cold War era. So, what they do is still their modernization and, if possible, they [can] adjust their own overseas labor deployment or, overall, the labor distribution around the major market may help. And, either way, [it] won’t be fast.

But, on the other hand, there's probably no other solution, so they have to take this slow pattern. Then, the US and the other [allies or partners] for the Philippines probably only can just assist them because as long as the Philippines [builds itself] better [and prepares] better, it will lower the cost and then lower the burden on others and also [generate] a more confident or credible attitude to face the challenge.

Koh

Yeah, I will quickly chime in on what Shang-Su has shared, but I will focus more on what probably hasn’t been so much touched on, namely the security or, rather, informal security relationship between Taiwan and the Philippines.

The Philippines has officially embraced a One China policy, and there is no way of publicizing much of those interactions between the two militaries. But, first of all, we have to highlight that the answer of those arrangements that actually existed, for example, the two countries’ coast guards actually police the Balintang Channel—and, of course, that is part of the Bashi Channel in itself—over fishery operations. There have been instances of illegal fishing that took place across the waterways from time to time. Having the two coast guards coordinate and at least engage in some form of communications with each other is, in fact, a good thing to have. And, that might actually potentially form the basis of any potential wartime strategic coordination, if necessary. So that is one.

Second is that between the two navies—at least from an earlier Philippine report—there was an instance where the Taiwanese navy and the Philippine navy engaged in some form at-sea interaction, practicing the core unplanned encounters at sea, or queues, that came about more than 10 years ago with the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. Though these two navies practiced queues during their interaction, which, while it might be minor, I tend to see it as, again, one type of interaction that could serve as a basis for future operational cooperation between the two forces in terms of contingencies that concern both entities.

Host

Shang-Su, last word to you. Do you have any closing comments or a rebuttal to Collin?

Okay, the final spot probably is not about the Philippines [but] something with [Taiwan] because [for] Taiwan, the external focus has always been on the US and China. I mean Southeast Asia, yes, they mentioned the ostensible policy, but [it is] still quite limited, especially like the bilateral relations with the Philippines, especially after 2013 because there [was] a fishing incident. But I think further engagement [has] to improve—we can see [that relations between] Japan and Taiwan improved quite much in the last decades, but I think the Philippines have a lot of potential in Taiwan—and Taiwan [in the Philippines] (both sides) regarding the coordination of certain kinds—at least the mutual understanding that could be improved.

Koh

I guess it is important to look at, from the standpoint of the Philippines, that engagement in any future conflict over Taiwan is going to be a very tricky calculation for Manila because, on the one hand, there is, of course, the obligation that the Philippines has to fulfill as a treaty ally to the US under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty [United States-Japan Security] . But on the other hand, clearly, you know, there are interests that Manila could not ignore, and that will be, of course, the South China Sea interest [and] concerns that if the Philippines is involved one way or another that it will be possibly embroiled in a conflict in the South China Sea with China. In other words, the Taiwan Strait conflict, right, may potentially expand into a larger conflict that involves the South China Sea that the Philippines will have to be involved [in] directly.

So, therefore, I think there is quite a bit of soul searching on the part of Manila when it comes to future planning. But with the military exercises from the PRC [People’s Republic of China] around Taiwan, now the armed forces of the Philippines has instructed the Northern Luzon Command, which is [all] the command that is, in fact, you know, centering on the northern part of the, of the archipelago itself, telling the command to start to prepare for any future Taiwan contingency. So, right now, as we see, there is now serious talk about what the contingency is like. Very possibly, we won’t see that plan that will transpire, but what I tend to see is the Philippines slightly calibrating its involvement in any future Taiwan conflict going forward.

Host

It’s been a real pleasure talking with you both. Thank you so much for making time to speak with me today.

Koh

Thank you, Stephanie. Thank you, Shang-Su.

Thank you, Collin. Thank you, Stephanie.

Host

Listeners, you can read the genesis article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 4. There will also be a link to the article in the show notes. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.