The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast Ep. 219: The Harder Problem of Consciousness (Block & Papineau)
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Jul 1, 2019 Gregory Miller, host of the Panpsycast and consciousness researcher, joins to unpack Ned Block and David Papineau's takes on consciousness. They contrast functionalism and physicalism. They debate whether substrate matters, the limits of behavioral tests, and whether our phenomenal concepts are vague. Quick, sharp conversations about thought experiments, multiple realizability, and what would justify calling non-humans conscious.
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Harder Problem Frames Other-Minds Doubt
- The harder problem asks how we can epistemically justify ascribing consciousness beyond behavioral similarity.
- Physicalism raises the worry that material substrate, not just function, could be essential to consciousness.
Function Versus Substrate Tension
- Functionalism treats consciousness as multiply realizable and substrate-insensitive like a computer.
- Searle and others resist this, arguing substrate might matter to qualia even if function matches.
Chinese Nation And Data Examples
- The Chinese Nation thought experiment imagines a brain built from people to challenge functionalism.
- Eric Schwitzgebel later argued that functionalism would imply large systems like nations could be conscious.
