The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast Ep. 223: Guest Ned Block on Consciousness (Part Two)
Aug 19, 2019
Ned Block, philosopher of mind known for work on consciousness and the access vs phenomenal distinction, joins to debate Chalmers' fading qualia and robot replacement thought experiments. He defends biological criteria for consciousness, critiques historical/teleological accounts, and previews a book on perception vs cognition. The conversation also ranges over experiments, animal pain, and limits of testing phenomenal experience.
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Zombie Argument Tests Functional-Phenomenal Link
- Ned Block frames Chalmers' zombie argument as testing whether functional duplicates could lack phenomenal consciousness.
- The argument uses gradual replacement to claim such zombies are nomologically impossible by producing introspective pathology.
Fading Qualia Creates Introspection Problems
- Chalmers claims intermediate gradual-replacement stages would make the subject dramatically wrong about their experience.
- Block finds this claim empirically implausible and philosophically question-begging.
Intermediate Stages Defy Mentalistic Terms
- Block argues intermediate stages resist ordinary mentalistic description and Chalmers' tepid pink example is incoherent.
- He says Chalmers illicitly assumes certain functional pathologies can't exist, begging the question for functionalism.
