Very Bad Wizards Episode 113: Pascal, Probability, and Pitchforks
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Apr 18, 2017 A deep dive into Pascal’s Wager and whether expected-value reasoning makes belief rational. They debate whether belief can be chosen and grapple with the many-gods objection. The conversation shifts to Pascal’s Mugging, AI and extinction risk, and how huge but tiny-probability payoffs warp decisions. They also examine transformative experiences and practical limits of expected-utility thinking.
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Pascal's Wager As Decision Theory
- Pascal's Wager reframes belief as a decision under uncertainty using expected value, so infinite reward/punishment can rationally justify belief.
- David and Tamler highlight that decision theory (expectancy × value) grew from this move and remains normative for uncertainty.
You Can't Flip Belief Like A Switch
- Belief can't simply be switched on; many religions tie belief to sincere conviction, not mere verbal assent.
- Tamler discusses practice-based routes (e.g., Judaism, Buddhism): actions and immersion can lead to genuine belief over time.
Living A Year As An Orthodox Conversion Example
- Tamler recounts being asked to live as an Orthodox Jew for a year as part of his wife's conversion requirement.
- He notes relatives argued practice would reveal truth and that immersion can change belief and community ties.
