Horns of a Dilemma Understanding Schelling's Nuclear Paradigms with Francis J. Gavin
Apr 1, 2026
Francis J. Gavin, director at the Henry Kissinger Center and scholar of nuclear strategy. He revisits Schelling’s influence, questions the foggy use of “strategic stability,” and explores tensions between mutual vulnerability, U.S. extended deterrence, and nonproliferation. He also examines Cold War politics shaping U.S. posture and urges prioritizing state interests when assessing emerging technologies like AI, cyber, autonomy, and biotech.
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Why Schelling Shaped Nuclear Strategy
- Thomas Schelling became foundational to nuclear strategy despite being an economist, because his clear prose and game-theory framing reshaped how scholars thought about nuclear deterrence.
- Schelling's interdisciplinary work at Harvard-MIT brought economists, physicists, historians, and policymakers together, creating lasting influence on policy and scholarship.
Strategic Stability Is Assumed Not Defined
- Strategic stability was treated as an assumed, undefended good in policy debates, but people rarely could precisely define it or its tradeoffs.
- Schelling's ideas fed arms control architecture, yet tensions existed between mutual vulnerability and U.S. practices like reserving first-use and counterforce forces.
Extended Deterrence Undermines Mutual Vulnerability
- U.S. goals to extend deterrence and limit proliferation conflicted with pure mutual vulnerability: to reassure allies the U.S. developed counterforce, preemptive options, and reserved first-use.
- Those choices stabilized alliances but undermined classic notions of strategic stability.
