Episode 8: The Manipulation Argument with Derk Pereboom

Four Views on Free Will is a survey volume that presents competing positions on free will and moral responsibility, with each chapter offering a clear defense of a major perspective. The book juxtaposes compatibilist, libertarian, skeptical, and other influential stances, enabling direct comparison and critical engagement. Contributors include leading philosophers who articulate arguments, respond to objections, and clarify implications for moral responsibility and agency. The format allows readers to see how different theories handle classic puzzles like determinism, manipulation, and moral luck. It serves both as an accessible introduction and as a platform for advanced debate among contemporary free will theorists.

Alfred Mele's Free Will and Luck investigates how various kinds of luck affect moral responsibility, including influential discussions of manipulation cases. Mele offers detailed empirical and conceptual analyses to challenge simplistic assumptions about freedom and moral blame. The book introduces thought experiments, like the zygote case, to probe intuitions about responsibility when agents are causally influenced. Mele also assesses compatibilist and incompatibilist responses, emphasizing careful distinctions between different kinds of luck and control. The work is a significant contribution to contemporary free will literature, blending philosophical argumentation with attention to psychological data.

Derk Pereboom argues that basic-desert moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism and develops a comprehensive view of practical agency and the sources of meaning without it. The book explores implications for ethics, punishment, and interpersonal attitudes, proposing alternative frameworks for blame and responsibility. Pereboom defends the manipulation argument and examines both deterministic and indeterministic threats to desert-based responsibility. He also addresses psychological, legal, and moral consequences of rejecting basic-desert responsibility while preserving meaningful agency. Overall, the work integrates metaphysical argumentation with practical concerns about living a meaningful moral life.

In Living Without Free Will, Derk Pereboom argues that determinism and certain forms of indeterminism undermine the kind of control necessary for deserving praise or blame. He examines philosophical arguments for and against free will, including manipulation and consequence-style challenges. Pereboom explores the moral and practical consequences of rejecting basic-desert responsibility for punishment, moral education, and interpersonal attitudes. He offers alternatives for social practices rooted in forward-looking considerations rather than desert. The book is a foundational statement of skepticism about free will and its implications for ethics and law.