The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast Ep. 218: The Hard Problem of Consciousness (Chalmers et al) (Part Two)
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Jun 24, 2019 Gregory Miller, a panpsychism researcher focused on the intrinsic nature of matter and type-F monism, joins to explore panpsychist takes on consciousness. Short, lively dives cover dualist varieties, epiphenomenalism, quantum measurement links, and whether simple proto-experiences can combine into human minds. The conversation weighs why panpsychism remains strange but resilient.
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Type A Materialism Denies The Hard Problem
- Type A materialists deny the epistemic gap and hold that phenomenal facts are reducible to functional/behavioral facts.
- They treat consciousness as identical to cognitive capacities like reporting and control, so Mary would learn nothing new when she leaves the room.
A Posteriori Identity Is Epistemically Primitive
- Type B materialists accept an a posteriori identity between mental and physical but call it epistemically primitive.
- Chalmers argues this identity isn't deducible from complete physical truth, making it unlike typical scientific identities like water = H2O.
Focus Research On Mechanisms Not Mysteries
- Accept the limits of current science when investigating consciousness and focus on explaining correlations and mechanisms.
- Use neuroscientific detail to produce practically useful insights even if the 'hard problem' remains unresolved.