Revolution in Military Affairs It Takes a Land Force to Defeat a Land Force: Russo-Ukrainian War Assessment
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Feb 29, 2024 A strategic two-year assessment of the Russo‑Ukrainian conflict and why holding terrain matters. A case is made that land forces, not just strikes or drones, decide outcomes. Detailed comparison of aims, resources, methods and risks for both sides. Forecasts of attritional trench warfare and which side holds the advantage into 2024.
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Russia's Minimal Acceptable Outcome
- Russia's minimal acceptable outcome is holding Donbass, the land bridge to Crimea, and Crimea itself.
- Amos C. Fox argues this objective is realistic and shapes Moscow's defensive, attrition-focused strategy rather than grand offensives.
Precision Fires Don't Replace Ground Troops
- Precision fires and drones cannot substitute for large ground formations when the objective is holding or retaking territory.
- Fox emphasizes repeatedly that it takes land forces to remove and hold land against counterattacks.
Russia's Six Strategic Ends
- Russia's strategic ends include fracturing Ukraine, maintaining territorial gains, material overmatch, exhausting Ukrainian resistance, normalizing annexations, and eroding Ukraine's offensive capacity.
- These aims support a strategy of gradual territorial gains plus attrition to shape future negotiations.