New Books in Middle Eastern Studies Matthew Moran et al., "Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons" (Oxford UP, 2025)
Mar 14, 2026
Jeffrey W. Knopf, a Middlebury Institute professor and co-author, discusses U.S. coercive strategies toward Syria over chemical weapons. He recounts the 2012 red line, the 2013 sarin crisis, and the Russia-mediated disarmament. He assesses why deterrence often failed, how assurances and survival motives shaped outcomes, and critiques simplistic "resolve plus bombs" approaches.
AI Snips
Chapters
Books
Transcript
Episode notes
Why Credibility Alone Didn’t Stop Chemical Attacks
- Deterrence failed against Assad despite apparent U.S. credibility because other factors mattered more than capability.
- Assad valued regime survival far more than U.S. interests like norms, so retaliation risk was baked into his calculus.
The Red Line Comment And The Damascus Sarin Attack
- Obama warned a red line in 2012 and a year later a massive sarin attack killed roughly 1,400 people near Damascus.
- Obama prepared strikes but sought Congress authorization and ultimately did not launch the planned retaliation.
Three Conditions That Made Coercion Work Briefly
- Three factors determine coercive success: credibility, balance of motivations, and assurances.
- The 2013 sarin attack changed perceptions and Russian assurances plus U.S. pressure aligned those three, producing the rare compellence success.
