KOL004 | Interview with Walter Block on Voluntary Slavery and Inalienability

Kinsella on Liberty Podcast: Episode 004. Update: See also Thoughts on Walter Block on Voluntary Slavery, Alienability vs. Inalienability, Property and Contract, Rothbard and Evers (Jan. 9, 2022); Batting about voluntary slavery (Oct. 5, 2011); Slavery, Inalienability, Economics, and Ethics See also Walter Block's response: Walter E. Block, Block, "Rejoinder to Kinsella on ownership and the voluntary slave contract,” Management Education Science Technology Journal (MESTE) 11, no. 1 (Jan. 2023): 1-8 [pdf] Update: See KOL395 | Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: A Dissection (PFS 2022). . Transcript below. Walter and me at my dad's house in Prairieville, Louisiana, for a (Catholic) baptism party for my son, October 2003 My longtime friend Walter Block was recently in town (Houston) and stayed over at my house one night. While we visited we had several discussions on libertarian theory, as we usually do when we see each other. He agreed to let me record a discussion on one of the few issues we do not completely agree on: voluntary slavery; we recorded this last night (Jan. 26, 2013). Walter believes voluntary slavery contracts ought to be enforceable in a private law society, and in this I believe he is wrong and in the minority of libertarians (with Nozick, say). We touched on a variety of issues, including debtor's prison, how acquisition of body-rights differs from Lockean homesteading, and the like. Youtube: Some of my writing relevant to this topic and our discussion include: A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability, Journal of Libertarian Studies 17, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 11-37 Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith, Winter 1998-99, Journal of Libertarian Studies. How We Come To Own Ourselves, Mises Daily (Sep. 7, 2006) (Mises.org blog discussion; audio version) Causation and Aggression (co-authored with Patrick Tinsley), The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, vol. 7, no. 4 (winter 2004): 97-112 Walter's articles on this topic include: Toward a Libertarian Theory of Inalienability: A Critique of Rothbard, Barnett, Gordon, Smith, Kinsella and Epstein, Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring 2003, pp. 39-85 “Alienability: Reply to Kuflik,” Humanomics. Vol. 23, No. 3, 2007, pp. 117-136 “Are Alienability and the Apriori of Argument Logically Incompatible?” Dialogue, Vol. 1, No. 1. 2004. Alienability, Inalienability, Paternalism and the Law: Reply to Kronman American Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 28, No. 3, Summer 2001, pp. 351-371 Market Inalienability Once Again: Reply to Radin Thomas Jefferson Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1, Fall 1999, pp. 37-88 Alienability, Inalienability, Paternalism and the Law: Reply to Kronman   Update: see this Facebook post: Stephan Kinsella: I agree with David Gordon. I disagree with pro-voluntary slavery libertarians, like Walter Block (Thomas L. Knapp is another, though he pettifogs on the use of the term "voluntary slavery"). Jeremiah Dyke: I too think it's insane not to have the ability to contract any percentage of your labor for any duration of time. [Sarcasm] Stephan Kinsella: This is not an argument. Abilities don't come from opinions. Let's be clear: to justify voluntary slavery means you have to justify the use of force by a would-be "master" against a would-be "slave", if the slave tries to run away or changes his mind or disobeys an order. The libertarian thinks use of violence against another person's body is unjustified aggression, unless it is (a) consented to, or (b) in response to aggression.  But the slave has not committed aggression, so (b) is not a possible justification. Some alienabilists disingenuously argue that it IS "aggression" since the master owns the slave's body, so it's trespass (aggression) for the slave to use the master's property (the slave's body) in ways the owner (master) does not consent to. This argument is disingenuous because it is question-begging; it presupposes the legitimacy of body-alienability, in order to prove it. So this does not fly. I will say that I get very tired of people who engage in question-begging arguments. They do this all the time in IP -- where they label an act of copying "stealing" in order to show that what was "stolen" must have been ownable property. Horrible reasoning. I hope you don't engage in this kind of dishonest trick.  As for (a); clearly the slave who tries to run away does NOT consent to the force the master wants to apply to him. The only way the alienabilist can get around this is to say that the PREVIOUS consent the slave gave (say, a week before) is still somehow applicable, i.e. that the slave cannot change his mind. Why not? because ... well ... because ... well ... because the slavery contract was binding! So we see, yet again, the sneaky and dishonest resort to question-begging; slavery contracts are binding because they are binding. Neat trick, that!  The reason people can change their minds is that it does not commit aggression. And the reason a previous statement of intent is relevant is simply that it provides evidence of what the current consent is. It's a standing order, but one that can be overridden with better, more recent, evidence. If a girl tells her boyfriend he may kiss her now, and any time he feels like it in the future, then when tomorrow comes he is reasonable in assuming that she is still actually consenting NOW to another kiss, even if she says nothing, because she set up that presumption earlier. Her previous statement was not a binding contract, but just a way of establishing a standing presumption about what her ongoing consent IS. But if he goes to kiss her and she says NO, then we know that the previous statement about what her future consent WOULD be, was a bad prediction and has been undermined by the better, present/current evidence she is giving.  It is no different in all the voluntary slavery situations. *** TRANSCRIPT Stephan Kinsella vs. Walter Block on Voluntary Slavery Jan. 26, 2013 00:00:01 STEPHAN KINSELLA: Okay, so this is Stephan and Walter is here sitting next to me in my billiards room, former billiards room.  There’s no billiards table anymore.  My wife took it out.  There’s just a bunch of gray wallpaper.  And Walter has been here for awhile in Houston.  How do you like our fair city? 00:00:22 WALTER BLOCK: Oh, it’s a wonderful city.  I’m glad to be here, and I’m glad to be on your podcast. 00:00:26 STEPHAN KINSELLA: If we form a new state, I will do what I can to get you welcomed here. 00:00:31 WALTER BLOCK: Oh, you’re very kind.  Thank you. 00:00:33 STEPHAN KINSELLA: So Walter and I have been buddies for awhile, been hashing out issues in paper and in person at Mises events, etc. for quite awhile.  And we’ve talked this weekend—we’ve been together three nights now—about a lot of things: retribution. 00:00:51 WALTER BLOCK: Cabbages and kings. 00:00:54 STEPHAN KINSELLA: Bitcoin a little bit. 00:00:55 WALTER BLOCK: A little bit. 00:00:56 STEPHAN KINSELLA: We didn’t get to fractional reserve banking but… 00:00:58 WALTER BLOCK: IP. 00:00:59 STEPHAN KINSELLA: IP.  Well, there’s not much to talk about there.  We agree on that too much. 00:01:03 WALTER BLOCK: Yeah. 00:01:03 STEPHAN KINSELLA: Okay, so on the issue of voluntary slavery. 00:01:06 WALTER BLOCK: Yes. 00:01:07 STEPHAN KINSELLA: Which we’ve talked about before. 00:01:08 WALTER BLOCK: Yes. 00:01:09 STEPHAN KINSELLA: A little bit and sparred in print. 00:01:13 WALTER BLOCK: Yes. 00:01:14 STEPHAN KINSELLA: So what I thought I would do is try to summarize my take on your take on it, and you tell me where I’m wrong or where we disagree. 00:01:25 WALTER BLOCK: Sounds good. 00:01:26 STEPHAN KINSELLA: All right.  Or my take on our common Rothbardian influence or whatever.  And the one problem I have with your analysis is that you rely upon a type of analysis Rothbard makes as well in his Ethics of Liberty like where he talks about debtors’ prison, etc.  And the assumption that I have a problem with is the assumption that if you own something it means you can make a contract about it, or you can sell it.  I’ll put it that way.  And so you always give these hypotheticals about the guy who has little money.  He needs a million bucks to save his kid. 00:02:18 And so he wants to enter into a voluntary slavery contract, which is outlandish because this is probably unlikely, but let’s just assume it.  And so you’re saying that if we don’t allow these contracts, he won’t be able to do the deal, right?  But my question is what is the thing that’s stolen?  And I see this ambiguity in the Rothbardian issue of debtors’ prison as well.  So let’s talk about a typical contract of a debt like you’re talking about.  So someone loans a million bucks to A on a given day.  And they’re supposed to do something in exchange for it: be a slave, repay it in a year with 10% interest, or whatever, right? 00:03:15 WALTER BLOCK: Yeah. 00:03:16 STEPHAN KINSELLA: So the argument is that if you do not comply with the terms of the agreement, then you’re a thief. 00:03:22 WALTER BLOCK: In effect, yes. 00:03:23 STEPHAN KINSELLA: So the question is what has been stolen?  Is it the original sum of money, or is it something in the future when the performance that was not given? 00:03:37 WALTER BLOCK: Well, I think it’s something in the future when the performance that was promised isn’t given because that’s what the contract specifies that you should give.  But are we or are we not getting off the issue of voluntary slavery by talking about debtors’ prison, or do you see it as the same issue? 00:03:53 STEPHAN KINSELLA: I think – well, I think they’re related.