Measures of success and messy outcomes

My guest today is Amos Fox, who is an officer in the US Army with more than 24 years of service in uniform. Amos has written extensively on war and conflict over the past decade, producing over 60 publications. His work focuses on causal mechanisms to explain patterns in armed conflict. Much of Amos’ current writing addresses proxy war, land warfare, the Russo-Ukrainian War, and military thinking.

He joined me to discuss some of his views on the state of Western military thinking, particularly our potential over-reliance on the concept of manoeuvre warfare. Some of the topics we covered are:

• Amos’ background in the military and path into academia
• Influences of Amos’ first operational deployment in Iraq
• Understanding the reality on the ground – when intentions clash
• Defining manoeuvre warfare and its adoption by Western militaries
• Lack of pragmatism and reality in Western doctrine – what you need to know
• Why accurate and relevant doctrine matters for success in war
• Learning from Liddell Hart and his relevance today
• Debunking the illusion of manoeuvre in modern battles
• Avoiding misapplication of past terminology in today's warfare
• Battle of Mosul – Western usage of sieges examined
• The Precision Paradox – what it means for modern warfare
• Expanding doctrine to include Sieges, Urban Warfare, Proxy Warfare and re-imagined combined arms/joint warfare
• Russian invasion of Ukraine – A case in point for modern warfare
• The importance of questioning preconceived ideas for effective learning

During our chat, I made reference to my conversation with Marc Garlasco, Chief of High Value Targeting at the Pentagon between 1997 and 2003 where he led targeting teams during operations Iraqi Freedom, Desert Fox, and Allied Force. You can find that episode here.

Additionally, you can find all the articles Amos mentioned at the links below:

"Moving Beyond Mechanical Metaphors: Debunking the Applicability of Centers of Gravity in 21st Century Warfare," The Strategy Bridge, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/6/2/moving-beyond-mechanical-metaphors-debunking-the-applicability-of-centers-of-gravity-in-21st-century-warfare. 

"Ukraine and Proxy War: Improving Ontological Shortcomings in Military Thinking," Association of the United States Army, Land Warfare Paper 148, https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/publications/LWP-148-Ukraine-and-Proxy-War-Improving-Ontological-Shortcomings-in-Military-Thinking.pdf

"Maneuver is Dead? Understanding the Conditions and Components of Warfighting," RUSI Journal, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2022.2058601.

"On Sieges," RUSI Journal, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2021.1924077.

"The Reemergence of the Siege: An Assessment of Trends in Modern Land Warfare," Institute of Land Warfare, Land Power Essay 18-2, https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/LPE-18-2-The-Reemergence-of-the-Siege-An-Assessment-of-Trends-in-Modern-Land-Warfare.pdf.

"Sieges in Modern War," Presentation delivered at Harvard Law School, 31 March-1 April 2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.31870.25929. 

Lastly, Amos has extended an invite to anyone who may with to take this conversation further to email him on amos.c.fox@gmail.com.