Signs of a New (Fourth) Value Shift

We're joined by Ian Morris, British historian, archaeologist, and author of Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels

Ian’s central argument is both simple and radical: our beliefs about fairness, justice, hierarchy, equality, and even democracy are not timeless moral truths floating above history. They are shaped, constrained, and repeatedly reorganised by the ways societies extract and use energy. Across tens of thousands of years, he argues, there is a pattern beneath the chaos.

We dive into:

• Why hunter-gatherer societies tended to enforce radical egalitarianism

• How agriculture made hierarchy, inheritance, patriarchy, and forced labor more functional

• Why fossil fuel societies unexpectedly shifted back toward equality and democracy

• How values evolve like adaptations to changing material conditions

• Why the industrial age expanded the moral community

• Why inequality has begun rising again in recent decades

• Whether we are entering a fourth great shift in human values

• What energy transitions, AI, and new technologies could mean for democracy and civilisation

Key Takeaways from the Episode:

1. Human Values Are Not Fixed — They Adapt to Energy Systems

Morris argues that values are not random, but nor are they eternal. Over the long run, societies repeatedly develop moral systems that fit the material conditions created by how they capture energy from the world. This is not a metaphor. Morris means it in a nearly biological sense: values that match the prevailing energy regime help societies function, grow, and outcompete their neighbours — while mismatched values lead to stagnation, fragmentation, or collapse.

The mechanism is cultural evolution, operating on a civilisational timescale. A foraging band that tried to enforce agrarian-style kingship would fall apart. An industrial economy run on feudal principles would be outproduced by its rivals. Morris draws on decades of archaeological and anthropological data — compiled in his earlier work Why the West Rules — for Now — to show that this pattern holds across every major region and epoch. The implication is unsettling: the values we consider timeless may be temporary artefacts of the energy system we happen to inhabit.

2. Hunter-Gatherer Life Favoured Equality

In low-energy societies, people lived in small, mobile groups with little surplus and little material inheritance. Under those conditions, strong egalitarian norms were not idealistic luxuries — they were necessary for survival and cohesion. Morris draws on ethnographic evidence from groups like the Kung San of the Kalahari and the Hadza of Tanzania to show that foraging bands actively enforced equality through what Christopher Boehm calls “reverse dominance hierarchies” — systems in which the group collectively suppresses anyone who tries to accumulate too much power or prestige.

The tools were social: ridicule, gossip, ostracism, and in extreme cases, targeted violence. This was not paradise. Per capita rates of violent death among foragers were far higher than in modern states. But it was a system that worked under the constraints of low energy capture. When you cannot store surplus, when anyone can walk away from the group, when survival depends on mutual cooperation, radical equality is not a philosophy — it is an engineering requirement.

3. Agriculture Made Inequality Functional

Once farming emerged, people settled, accumulated land, inherited property, and built larger social structures. In that world, hierarchy, patriarchy, kingship, and coercive labour became easier to justify and more useful for organising society. Morris is careful to frame this not as moral decline but as adaptive reorganisation. Agrarian societies that developed clear lines of inheritance, centralised leadership, and mechanisms for extracting surplus labour — whether through serfdom, taxation, or slavery — were able to build irrigation systems, raise armies, and defend territory more effectively than those that did not.

The Gini coefficients of agrarian civilisations, from ancient Rome to Qing Dynasty China, consistently clustered between 0.40 and 0.60 — far higher than anything observed in foraging societies. Patriarchy, too, became structurally embedded: when wealth flows through land and land flows through lineage, control of reproduction becomes an economic imperative. As Morris puts it, agrarian societies did not choose hierarchy because they were morally inferior. They chose it — or more precisely, it chose them — because it was the value system that worked at that scale of energy capture.

4. Industrialisation Reversed the Pattern

The fossil fuel age created such a dramatic expansion in energy capture that it supported a return toward broader equality. Democracy, women’s rights, religious tolerance, and mass political participation became more functional in industrial societies than they had been in agrarian ones. The scale of the shift is difficult to overstate. Drawing on the data compiled in his Social Development Index, Morris shows that Western economies went from capturing roughly 38,000 kilocalories per person per day in 1800 to 230,000 by the 1970s. This explosion of productive capacity required a workforce that was literate, mobile, and motivated — not coerced.

Slavery became economically irrational when a free worker operating a power loom could outproduce a plantation of forced labourers. The franchise expanded because industrial states needed buy-in from the populations whose labour and consumption drove growth. The period between 1945 and 1975 — what economists call the Great Compression — saw inequality fall to historic lows across the industrialised world, a pattern Morris attributes directly to the structural demands of fossil-fuel economies rather than to moral awakening alone.

5. Moral Progress May Be Less Moral Than We Think

One of the most provocative ideas in the conversation is that what we call moral progress may often be adaptation. Values spread not simply because they are truer or nobler, but because they work better under new productive conditions. Morris is not arguing that moral reasoning is meaningless — he acknowledges the role of philosophers, activists, and reformers in articulating new ethical frameworks. But he insists that these frameworks gain traction only when the material conditions are right.

The abolition of slavery is his sharpest example: anti-slavery arguments had existed since antiquity, from Stoic philosophers to medieval theologians. They gained no lasting foothold until the fossil fuel revolution made free industrial labour more productive than coerced agricultural labour. In this reading, the abolitionists were morally right — but they succeeded because the energy regime had shifted in their favour. The danger in this insight, as Princeton philosopher Christine Korsgaard argues in her response to Morris’s Tanner Lectures, is that it can erode our confidence in the permanence of our own moral achievements. If democracy rose with fossil fuels, what happens when fossil fuels decline?

6. The Last 40 Years May Mark the Start of a New Shift

Morris suggests the egalitarian arc of the fossil fuel age may be weakening. Since the late 20th century, rising inequality and growing acceptance of concentrated power may signal the beginnings of a fourth great transformation in values. The data supports the concern. According to the World Inequality Database, the share of national income captured by the top one per cent in the United States roughly doubled between 1980 and 2020, returning to levels last seen before the Great Depression. Freedom House has documented eighteen consecutive years of global democratic decline. Morris interprets these trends not as policy failures to be corrected but as potential symptoms of a deeper structural shift: as economies move from mass industrial production toward automation, platform monopolies, and AI-driven services, the number of people whose active participation is economically essential may be shrinking.

If the fossil fuel age favoured equality because it needed mass labour and mass consumption, an age of intelligent machines may not. The egalitarian values we assumed were permanent may have been contingent on a phase of industrial development that is now passing.

7. Energy Abundance Does Not Automatically Create Equality

Cases like Qatar and other resource-rich states show that energy alone is not enough. The social context into which new energy arrives matters enormously; pre-existing structures can allow elites to monopolise wealth and preserve hierarchy. Qatar holds the fourth-highest GDP per capita in the world, yet ranks near the bottom of the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Brunei tell similar stories: vast energy wealth, minimal democratic development.

Morris argues this is not a contradiction of his thesis but a refinement. What matters is not merely how much energy a society captures, but how many people must participate in capturing it. In industrial economies, millions of workers were needed — creating structural pressure for education, wages, and political rights. In petrostates, a tiny elite controls extraction, distributes revenue as patronage, and faces no structural need to empower the broader population. The lesson is critical for understanding the current energy transition: if the next energy regime — whether solar, nuclear, or AI-driven — can be controlled by a narrow class of technologists and capital owners, the democratic dividend may not follow.

8. The Future May Be a Contest Between Democratic and Authoritarian Models

As energy systems, technology, and AI evolve, Morris sees a real competitive struggle ahead between more egalitarian democratic societies and more centralised, authoritarian ones. The question is not only what kind of world we want — but which kind will prove more effective. Democracy’s advantages are significant: distributed innovation, self-correcting institutions, the ability to attract global talent through individual freedom. But authoritarian systems have their own competitive strengths, particularly in an age of AI-enabled surveillance and rapid state-directed investment. China’s ability to mobilise resources for infrastructure, energy, and technology development without electoral friction presents a genuine challenge to the democratic model.

Morris draws on the framework laid out by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in Why Nations Fail — the contest between inclusive and extractive institutions — but adds an energy dimension: the outcome may depend less on which system we prefer and more on which system the next energy regime structurally favours. If renewable energy is distributed and requires broad participation, democracy may thrive. If AI and automation concentrate power, authoritarianism may prove more durable than we hope.

Timestamps:

(00:00) – Introduction to Ian Morris and the core thesis of Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels

(01:00) – Why values are not random: the pattern across history

(02:10) – Hunter-gatherers, equality, and the logic of low-energy societies

(03:10) – Agriculture, hierarchy, kingship, and why inequality became moralized

(06:00) – Energy capture as the hidden driver of value systems

(09:10) – Why farming societies relied on inheritance, patriarchy, and force

(15:20) – Rousseau, Hobbes, and why both misunderstood early humans

(17:20) – Cultural evolution and how values adapt like biological traits

(21:20) – Why fossil fuel societies moved back toward equality

(28:20) – Factory labor, capitalism, and the widening of the moral community

(34:20) – Are we now moving into a fourth great shift?

(36:20) – Inequality, EROI, and the current energy transition

(38:00) – Why Morris thinks we are still early in a new energy revolution

(44:00) – Elon Musk, elite power, and why democracy is being questioned again

(46:10) – Oil-rich states, Qatar, and why history still matters

(54:40) – What readers should take from the book for navigating the future

(56:00) – China, democracy, and the coming civilizational competition