China’s Infrastructure Diplomacy and Debt Concerns

As a key battleground in the global struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, Africa offers US policymakers insights to navigate competing interests and power dynamics. For a comprehensive view of this competition, this article analyzes American, Chinese, French, and Russian geopolitical strategies; employs a geopolitical analysis of current events, diplomatic maneuvers, and historical lessons; and uses policy documents, expert opinions, and case studies of geopolitical engagements. It then provides actionable policy recommendations for fostering stable, long-term US relations in Africa and offers strategic perspectives on managing the global power competition applicable to broader national security and diplomatic contexts.

Keywords: US policy in Africa, global order and power dynamics, strategic insights for policymakers, Russia-China relations in Africa, proxy conflicts and diplomatic maneuvers

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

My guests today are Hamid Lellou and Dr. Amin Tarzi. Lellou is the author of “US Relations with Africa and the New Cold War,” which was published in the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters. Lellou is an independent analyst specializing in conflict resolution and regional dynamics in the Middle East and Africa. Tarzi is the professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps War College. His teaching and research include the Middle East, hybrid actors, major power competition in the region, and evolving competition and contestation in the Red Sea, Black Sea, and Mediterranean regions.

Welcome to Decisive Point.

Dr. Amin Tarzi

Thank you for having us.

Hamid Lellou

Thank you.

Host

Hamid, give us a brief overview of your article.

Lellou

My article discusses evolving dynamics between the United States and the African nations in a very particular area and time. We have [the] United States, and in the title, as you saw, I added “and the new Cold War,” referring to other [superpowers] including Russia and China. When you invited me to this podcast, and I looked back to my article, I thought if I had to change or add something, I would do it in the title. And rather [than] saying, “US-Africa relations,” I would say “US-Africa Win-Win Relations.”

In the paper, I talk about the approaches [to Africa], mainly the Chinese approach and the Russian approach. On the one hand, I described the Chinese approach as development/infrastructure diplomacy and, on the other hand, we have [Russian] security diplomacy. As the US, what should be our approach, knowing that the interests are different, approaches are different, values are different, which [puts] the United States in a very unfair situation. And, whatever things we’ll be talking [about] on Africa, in the back of my mind, I look at two different Africas. I look at the Africa from the academic and official point of view, the formal Africa, but there is also the informal Africa.

Host

Hamid, please outline how African nations are addressing their security issues.

Lellou

That’s a great question. Again, [regarding] African nations, if I said that they are doing it in a very specific way, it means I will imply that they’re doing it together. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. So, I would frame it in two dimensions: the global, international, continental dimension, and the local dimension.

I will start with the local [dimension] because it has also some implications [for] the regional aspect of it. Internally, they are working on developing their military infrastructure capabilities, trying to develop some economies, and so forth. The problem that I see in Africa is that when it comes to, for instance, developing the military there, we see a lot of arms [races] rather than developing their capabilities in ways that will lead to a better development and protection of their countries. And, I’m saying this because, as I said before, I look at the informal side of Africa-Africa [relationships]—and, unfortunately, African countries don’t necessarily have great [relationships] between them. So, even if you look at it from the internal standpoints, it has an effect on the trans-border relationship.

For that, I can give you examples. There are many countries where [the] United States has interest in working with different countries and yet, these same countries, they don’t necessarily have great [relationships]. Take the case of Algeria and Morocco. [They are] great partners, already having [a] great relationship with Morocco, developing [a] great relationship with Algeria—and yet, these countries, don’t have [a] diplomatic relationship. How can we work with countries like this? [It is the] same thing when you look at Central Africa [and] what’s going on between DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] and Rwanda—and even with Uganda, and you name it. There are many examples. This is one. The problem that I see, though, with many of these countries—and this is the caveat in the official Africa when I talk about “official” and “nonofficial”—is that using, for instance, the fight against terrorism for regimes means instead of state security.

And, I will leave it there because I’m sure Dr. Tarzi will have to add [to my thoughts].

Host

Dr. Tarzi?

Tarzi

First of all, thank you for having me on Decisive Point.

You know what, I’ll respond [to] your question, first and foremost, by challenging a prevalent assumption that we, specifically the United States, have regarding African states, and namely that is that we assume—and I think my colleague said that—that they act collectively, in tandem. You never hear us saying “How are the Asian states?” It’s just never happened. We specifically refer to either a specific country, whether it’s India or Pakistan or China—or even the smaller ones—or at least the region, [such as] the Middle East [and] South Asia. Somehow, we do that with Africa as if the 55 countries work together. We use the word “Africa” as if it’s one place. It is not. There are 55 countries there, or 56 if you count some countries that are not official, or [it] could be 57, you know. We could go on, but [there are] at least 55 officially, according to the African Union.

I think this homogeneity applied to Africa makes our decision making also based on this idea that they all work together. They don’t, and it’s not because there’s something wrong with them, it’s just that they [have] different issues. You heard about Algeria and Morocco. They have their problems. That is totally apart from their [relationships] with [the] United States.

Also, I deal with countries such as Egypt. Egypt and Madagascar, what [do] they have in common? They are very different. And, in [the] case of the United States’s [relationships], Egypt actually happens to be not even dealt with [by] AFRICOM. It’s still sitting in Central Command for various reasons because Egypt’s trajectory, security, [and] relationship [are] much more connected to its Middle Eastern neighbors than it is with their African neighbors. They still have a lot of [relationships]. They are in Africa. Most people think Egypt is not in Africa.

I would challenge that before we even start talking about outlining how African nations address their security, [let us] underline the idea that there is no such thing as African nations because of a continent—they are different countries, groupings, [and] historical realities. And, I think if we start dealing with them in that way, we might get a lot more traction than [by] looking at it holistically as a homogeneous continent.

Thank you.

Lellou

It’s a perceived homogeneity. It’s also part of my policy recommendations, if you go back to my paper. Instead of looking at Africa as a whole continent holistically, look at it as blocks. This is what I recommended. [Look at it] in blocks that naturally exist right now. But, we will discover later that, actually, there are some missing legs, which means we need to have maybe more blocks in Africa to make them much more homogeneous. That will ease any relationship with [the] outside—and between them, to start—and with outsiders, including the United States.

Host

In your view, how could NATO learn from the African model, particularly in terms of respecting sovereignty and empowering local leadership?

Lellou

Sovereignty. That’s the keyword here. Sovereignty. And I will add another word—antagonism—which we were talking about—the different interests and approaches due to competing interests. But, when it comes to the United States, it doesn’t stop there. You have Russia and China, who have their competing interests, including economy, politics, and resources. But, when it comes to [the] United States, we cannot stop there. We have values, and that is a huge disadvantage. When you compare [the] United States’s engagement with Africa [or] you compare it to [Russian] and Chinese engagement with Africa, there are some existing institutions. We’re not saying this to describe Africa as everything is black and bleak, and everything is bad. No, there are some strong foundations like [the] AU [African Union], which originally existed since 1963 as [the] African Organization Union, which turned to AU, I think, in 2002. We have, for instance, a regional block, [the] ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States]. ECOWAS is the most successful, despite some hiccups with the Sahel.

We should take this AES, which is the Alliance [des] États du Sahel [Alliance of Sahel States]. People may look at it as a bad idea [saying,] “It is a bad idea because military coups led to this because of what’s going on in the Sahel.” But let’s take it from the other side. Instead of fighting against the current, let’s swim a little bit with the current. And, this is a great opportunity to actually create another regional block (and I called it Economic Community of Sahel States) and take those countries that are in ECOWAS and instead of leaving them in ECOWAS, where there is no homogeneity with Western Africa, [which] already [has] access to the Atlantic, but the Sahel [doesn’t, and move them to the Economic Community of Sahel States]. All the issues we have seen in the region are due to what is believed in the Sahel region. So, let’s go and encourage this block of Sahel, and to Niger, Mali, [and] Burkina Faso [that] they could add Chad, Mauritania, and Sudan, and that will become a very homogeneous and natural group.

This is one of the approaches. We can also leverage IGAD [Intergovernmental Authority on Development]. IGAD is a good body of influence in Eastern Africa. We have also the Southern African block, which is already pretty homogeneous. If you take them as blocks, they are much more homogeneous [than] if you look at them as one continent.

Tarzi

The African model, in my view, is based on expecting the unique approaches by individual states or [groups] of states to [address] their collective security. However, this model, while [it] greatly enhances, [as] my colleague just said, with operationalization of the Peace and Security Council within the AU—and I think that happened in 2004 as well, about two years after AU was rebranded—it lacks mechanisms and abilities, in my view, to confront major threats to its members. What you have is a mechanism. That’s a positive. So, there is a mechanism, and it has worked in some places. But still, confronting a major power from outside, whether it be China or Russia, [the capability is not there]. Secondly, within their own union, the big, more powerful states cannot be confronted.

Your question had a NATO component. That’s where I swim a lot. I think I would add that all decisions in NATO are made by consensus, which at its very core is respecting member states’ sovereignty. So, I think if you want to look at your question, if you want to take NATO, it is a model that is based on consensus. The question is whether this model is applicable [to] the current situation within Africa. I go back to the question. In certain areas—again, you heard my colleague talk about a regionalization—yes. Within the 55 countries, I don’t think this is applicable. Even in NATO, we have had issues with it, but at least [in] NATO, they are much closer. Geographically, they’re all in the same place except two members that are not on this side of the Atlantic. And, NATO has a very specific mandate that is not security as such—it is security of the member states. It was created for a very specific threat, actually. So, I think there [are] things to learn, but there [are] also inherent differences between a collective security agreement, such as NATO, which is consensus-based, to what we have in Africa right now.

I leave it at that. Thank you.

Host

Hamid?

Lellou

Regarding NATO, I agree. If we are talking about NATO, if we are talking about the relationship that NATO could have with Africa as two entities, in this case, I’m not trying to recreate other international-national bodies, but what is NATO? NATO is a north [Atlantic] alliance; it is security for Western Europe and [the] United States. But what are the issues they are facing? And, actually, NATO has evolved beyond that. People, they know NATO. Maybe other people, they don’t know what NATO does. Do they know about the Mediterranean Dialogue? Do they know about the Istanbul [Cooperation] Initiative? These are sort of [ramifications] of NATO ensuring that safety and stability goes beyond its borders and [its] prevention approach.

Where is Africa in that? Africa is closer to NATO countries, given globalization. And, even with this Mediterranean Initiative, we have North African countries, but we don’t have the rest of Africa. With even the nonmajor NATO allies, there is one country, if I recall, Kenya, and maybe Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, but these countries are North African. Again, they go in that very specific regional block. But are there any other African countries that are considered as very strategic allies to NATO?

No.

Correct me if I’m wrong, Dr. Tarzi.

Tarzi

It’s five countries in Africa. There are more outside of Africa. So, it’s Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. So, it’s pretty much aligned in the north, with the addition of Mauritania. For NATO, again, because the mandate of NATO is safeguarding Northern Europe and North America, that is the line that, for them, holds [the] security of Mediterranean basin. Every country north of there is a NATO member, and the island.

So, what happens is, you’re right, NATO’s vision is to make sure that it safeguards its own borders, and these five countries are part of it—and that includes also Israel because it is also in the Mediterranean. It literally is a band of discussions. It’s very successful. It actually brings those countries, including two that we heard do not even have a diplomatic relationship, [to] the same table. That is where you see Algeria and Morocco actually working, at least, in the same room [and at the] same table on a specific topic, which is based on a dialogue. It’s called a dialogue for a reason—because there is no operational aspect to it.

And, to be very, very frank right now, the biggest challenge for NATO is refugees. Terrorism, wars, and refugees; those are the biggest challenges they look at. But, [it is difficult to know] how to mitigate that and how to work together. In my view, any dialogue, whether it’s a dialogue with a kinetic component or it’s a dialogue for understanding, it’s a positive step. Now, yes, anything south of Mauritania is not there. But, at this point, at least, that is there. NATO’s mission is in the name: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It’s not meant to be beyond that.

Thank you.

Lellou

If I may quickly follow up on this one, dialogue is the first step. And, thank you for mentioning those cases where countries, [if] you take them individually, they wouldn’t talk, but if you have a powerful block or entity, like NATO or [the] United States, [they will]. And, this is one of my recommendations. That’s why I insist [in my] recommendation [on] having [the] United States as that vehicle to boost [relationships] between the countries.

As Dr. Tarzi was mentioning, when you have these big entities such as NATO, or even the United States by itself, it has that leverage to help other countries to come together and work together. As I mentioned in the beginning, Morocco and Algeria, they cannot work together. And yet, because we have this NATO initiative, it’s a dialogue, but we have to start somewhere, and they are dialoguing. They’re sitting around the same table and they’re talking.

Host

What can the United States learn about multilateral partnerships and, as you were just saying, regional collaborations and dialogues, when it comes to African security and really even Mediterranean security, like you were talking about Dr. Tarzi?

Lellou

The most important thing right now for [the] United States, when it comes to Africa is, unfortunately, security, security, security. But [at] the same time, your listeners may wonder, “Why should we care? There is a huge body of [water] between us. Why should we care? We have no connection to Africa.”

Well, we should care because of many reasons. In this era of globalization, which means those distances, they mean nothing, and borders have become obsolete. You need to protect yourself, and security is very important. But [what we] also need to know is [that] because of that globalization, whatever happens in the United States, whatever we do in [the] United States, it affects—directly or indirectly—Africa, and vice versa. Whatever happens or whatever is done in Africa, it affects us here in the US. So, those are very important reasons why we should care.

Now, the best approach. What can we do about it? I like to use some descriptive analogies and, to me, the relationship I see between [the] United States and Africa is presented this way: Look at a coffee table. The coffee table has three legs, okay? And, for me, the table is the stability of Africa. It’s Africa tomorrow. It is the future of Africa. One leg should be security. The second leg should be development and economy. And the third leg should be good governance. These three legs, like the coffee table, if you take away one of them, what happens to the table? [It] flips around. It’s exactly the same thing. The US approach to Africa should bear in mind these three legs and work hand in hand with them and give equal importance, equal emphasis on these three legs.

Tarzi

I would add, if I may, to my colleague’s three leg [example]. I’ll add a fourth leg of understanding. Having been, throughout my life, mostly in the Middle East, I would say we have the economic component, but yet, still, we lack understanding—it’s both ways. I’m not saying it’s just from our side to theirs. I think enhancing that is crucial, especially now that you have powers such as China that pretend to understand and come in there or Russia, [which] is very nefarious and comes in and provides the security to [an] individual group, usually undemocratic, to contain democracy or take over or protect a coup or something. Here, I think understanding in the broader sense would be a fourth leg if, I may.

In talking about the United States security architecture, I would go back [to the] end of the Second World War. Our security has been based, and I say successfully so, on multilateral partnerships and regional collaborations. [The] African model can be a good example of how 50 countries with different cultures, cultural norms, challenges, languages, religions, and overlapping historical narratives can come together towards at least safeguarding the continent’s collective security; [it is] not always successful, but at least they have a model.

The Peace and Security Protocol Council is the most solid thing they [the African Union] have put together in 2004. Now, how can we, the United States, looking at our own examples from [the] Second World War, whether it’s NATO or other [global] partnerships, look at that and not just “Africanize” it but make sure that it applies to different parts of Africa together to ensure our [interests], but at the same time, I think Hamid said something very important—we bring value in there.

I think what is lost, is lost in the conversation. That value is not explained well. Explain that value and I believe the African continent as a whole will be in a much better position. Let us not forget that Africa will produce the majority of humans, so we have to be aware of that. They [have] the highest child [birthrate] anywhere. Europe is actually declining. Even now, China is slowing down. We are not going forward. Even Latin America is not. So, you’re looking at a place that has [the] potential of becoming the center of activity and democratization and good production, good governance, or [becoming] China’s place for their minerals of rare earths. Because of that, [they could] become dependent and subjected to something that is not good for anybody.

Host

Hamid, did you want to add to that?

Lellou

I agree completely with understanding. And mutual understanding and culture [are] a big part of it, right? You cannot do business with your partners if you don’t understand, if you don’t know what the common interests [are]. That’s why in the beginning, remember, I told you if I had to change something to my paper [it] is the title, and [I would] add the win-win [relationship]. That win-win [relationship] cannot happen without common understanding. It has to go both ways.

Host

We just talked about what the United States can learn from Africa and the African-led approach to security. What about NATO? What can NATO learn?

Lellou

[For] NATO, it’s the same thing. The approach both for [the] United States—and NATO [is that] it has to be support [and] advise [rather] than leading, than doing. Sometimes, I can understand [that] we want things to be done correctly but let them fail if they have to. Sometimes, we need to fail to do better later. What we can do, as we have mentioned, is strengthen these AU institutions—whether through the economic groups like ECOWAS and IGAD—and there are other institutions like the African Standby Force. With, for instance, direct intervention [and] what we have seen in some places, we have to be careful with this capacity building.

And, we’re doing these recommendations, but some of them, they’re already in place: ACOTA [African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance]. Listeners are aware of ACOTA, security cooperation. There is training and education, and Dr. Tarzi can speak [to] that, with international students coming to [the United States Army Command and General] Staff College. Maybe, what I would add to this is [to] maybe develop curricula within military institutions, since we’re talking about security, where African affairs would be taught in terms of what they are doing. How do they approach their own security? Do they have doctrines? What are their doctrines? I’m talking about the African doctrines.

Let’s sit and learn [and] understand. If they have doctrines, how are their doctrines developed? As I said, we mentioned the example of this dialogue. We can continue with this but also make sure that all approaches are adapted to Africa. And, going back to understanding, meaning flexibility and context-driven because Africa—I don’t know if all listeners know about it—it’s a huge continent, but it is so dynamic. It changes every single day, and you need to keep up with that.

Tarzi

NATO is a consensus-based decision-making organization that is very unique, and it has an inherent limitation in acting as a unit in global peacekeeping and security, unless Article 5 is involved, which has only been involved once in the history of this amazing organization, and that happened in support of our country, [the] United States of America, after 9/11 [in the] case of Afghanistan. I say that because this uniqueness, while it is very important in safeguarding the North Atlantic security—inclusive of the attack against [one] is [an] attack against all—it is very difficult to, in my view, duplicate in any other area, whether [it] is even a regional post or, especially, with holistically looking at Africa, the 55 countries or so. Can we learn from it? Yes.

Now, as I say, there is a learning process from Africa by NATO, and that’s specifically the Mediterranean Dialogue. I have had the good fortune to have been involved in that in some capacity, and this is a very important part where learning happens. Where, again, that fourth leg that I’m glad that Hamid accepted—that accepting each other’s issues, not always saying, “Okay, well, it doesn’t make sense to me. Let us understand that.” That said, also, Africa, unlike Europe and, thankfully, North America, has become, we all have said it, a specific point for what we call the major power competition. And then here, I think, whether it’s a long-term investment, predatory investments of China, or [in] the short term, I would say destructive, disruptive activities by the Russian Federation, [is] how we’ll bring in a component of stability through some security arrangement. And, this is where the NATO part comes in, as a model, to make sure to safeguard Africa against becoming, as I’ve said before, basically China’s [plaything].

I don’t think Africa is just sitting there and accepting it, but it’s overwhelming how much has happened. I was just in Sub-Saharan Africa—and I was just being [an] observer. I was going from [the] airport to the downtown—and almost everything was built by the Chinese. The taxi drivers told me this. And I saw the cranes—they all had Mandarin on them, and you don’t see us there. We can pretend that we are the good guys and we are there, but if you’re not there and the other side comes in and it keeps on investing, at the end of the day, with the dynamic youth, very, very high rate of birth, the one who’s there and investing will win, and that is a detriment not only [to] the United States, but [to] the Africans as well, in my view. I think this is what we need to learn from NATO. NATO should learn from Africa, and they [will] learn from there that security as a whole is no longer. You cannot pretend to protect the Mediterranean Coast and think everything else is okay, to be very blunt, you know what I’m trying to say?

Thank you.

Lellou

It is a great point, and this is what I mentioned in the beginning with the Chinese approach [to] development, infrastructure, [and] diplomacy. I will nuance one point: It is rather an approach than [an] investment because China is not investing. China knows Africa has the resources. China doesn’t put cash into that. They built all those infrastructures, but African countries, they have already paid for it. There are some talks and writings about another issue that is facing Africa, [which] is the debt trap. Some people, they say this is not true, but we say in French, “n’y a pas de fumée sans feu,” no smoke without fire, right?

So, if people are talking about it, probably, there is something there, and we have to be very careful with this so Africa doesn’t become [a] hostage of China, economically speaking, which takes us back to their sovereignty. And, this is the unfair side of the United States having [a] relationship in Africa—you come with those values you cannot put on the table: human rights, democracy, power sharing, while other partners like China and Russia, they overlook that. Maybe it will answer how America should approach its relationship to Africa.

Host

Before we go, concluding thoughts?

Lellou

The United States, the government, the business, they are big [fans] of [the whole-of-government] approach. I would take that model and translate it to [a] relationship to Africa, which means we should think of [our] relationship with Africa as a [whole-of-government approach] from both sides—meaning not only Americans doing their business the right way, where civilians [are] concerted with the military, with businesses, with civil society, [but] the other side should be the same. Rather than having [a] US-Africa summit where you have guest speakers speaking, the [whole-of-government] approach is to have participative and engaging [participants], where they bring in not only their military folks but their civilian diplomats, also the economic players and civil society. And, they will work with their American counterparts. But, if you’re doing it in a very bilateral [way] and [are] reduced to officials—military talking only to military and civilian diplomats talking only to civilian diplomats—you are assuming that they’re doing business the way you do it in-house.

Tarzi

I’ll just end it with a quotation from Sir Winston Churchill, who said, and I quote, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, that is fighting without them.” Let’s remember the wise words of that great stateman.

I leave it at that.

Host

Thank you both so much for joining me today.

Tarzi

Thank you, ma’am.

Lellou

My pleasure.

Host

Listeners, you can read the genesis article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 4.

For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.