Autocrats Can't Always Get What They Want
Book • 2024
Autocrats Can’t Always Get What They Want examines how formal state institutions, bureaucracies, and political organizations can limit the power of authoritarian rulers.
The co-authors analyze case studies and theory to show that institutional structures create constraints and pathways that shape policy outcomes and leadership autonomy.
The book argues that differing institutional configurations produce variation among non-democratic regimes, affecting their stability and policy choices.
It highlights why some authoritarian leaders succeed in reshaping institutions while others face persistent limits.
The work contributes to understanding authoritarian durability, elite bargaining, and the role of institutions in non-democratic politics.
The co-authors analyze case studies and theory to show that institutional structures create constraints and pathways that shape policy outcomes and leadership autonomy.
The book argues that differing institutional configurations produce variation among non-democratic regimes, affecting their stability and policy choices.
It highlights why some authoritarian leaders succeed in reshaping institutions while others face persistent limits.
The work contributes to understanding authoritarian durability, elite bargaining, and the role of institutions in non-democratic politics.
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Damir Marusic
Did We Get Hungary Wrong?
